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Zusammenfassung 
 
 
Aufgrund der hohen Nachfrage nach Datenrate und wegen der Knappheit an Ressourcen in 
Funknetzen ist die effiziente Allokation von Leistung ein wichtiges Thema in den heutigen 
Mehrnutzer-Kommunikationssystemen. Die Spieltheorie bietet Methoden, um egoistische und 
soziale Konfliktsituationen zu analysieren. 
 
Das vorgeschlagene System befasst sich mit der Erfüllung der auf 
Signal-zu-Rausch-und-Interferenz-Verhältnis (SINR) basierenden Quality-of-Service 
(QoS)-Anforderungen aller Nutzer mittels effizienter Leistungsallokation, anstatt die 
Übertragungsrate zu maximieren. Es wird ein Framework entworfen, um die 
Leistungsallokation mittels universellen Pricing-Mechanismen umzusetzen. In der 
Dissertation werden zentralisierte und verteilte Leistungsallokationsalgorithmen unter 
Verwendung verschiedener Pricing-Ansätze diskutiert. 
 
Die Nutzer in Funksystemen handeln rational im spieltheoretischen Sinne, indem sie ihre 
eigenen Nutzenfunktionen maximieren. Die mobilen Endgeräte, die dasselbe Spektrum 
nutzen, haben den Anreiz durch bewusste Fehlinterpretation ihrer privaten Informationen das 
eigene Ergebnis zu verbessern. Daher ist es wichtig, die Funktionalität des Systems zu 
überwachen und durch Optimierung des Pricings und Priorisierungsgewichte zu beeinflussen. 
 
Für den zentralisierten Ressourcenallokationsansatz werden der allgemeine 
Mehrfachzugriffskanal (Multiple Access Channel, MAC) und der Broadcastkanal (BC) mit 
linearen bzw. nichtlinearen Empfängern untersucht. Die Preise, die resultierenden 
Kostenterme und die optimale Leistungsallokation, mit der die QoS-Anforderungen in der 
zulässigen Ratenregion erfüllt werden, werden in geschlossener Form hergeleitet. Lineare und 
nichtlineare Pricing-Ansätze werden separat diskutiert. Das unendlich oft wiederholte Spiel 
wird vorgeschlagen, um Spieler vom Betrügen durch Übermittlung falscher 
Kanalinformationen abzuhalten. 
 
Für die verteilten Ressourcenvergabe wird das nichtkooperative Spiel in Normalform 
verwendet und formuliert. Die Nutzer wählen ihre Sendeleistung zur Maximierung ihrer 
eigenen Nutzenfunktion. Individuelle Preise werden eingeführt und so angepasst, dass die 
QoS-Anforderungen mit der Leistungsallokation im eindeutigen Nash-Gleichgewicht erfüllt 
werden. Verschiedene Arten des Nutzerverhaltens werden bezüglich der Täuschung ihrer 
Nutzenfunktion analysiert, und ein Strategy-Proof-Mechanismus mit Strafen wird entwickelt. 
 
Die Ergebnisse für den MAC sind anwendbar auf heterogene Netzwerke, wobei zwei 
neuartige Ansätze zur Kompensation bereitgestellt werden, die den hybriden Zugang zu 
Femtozell-Netzwerken motivieren. Mithilfe des Stackelberg-Spiels wird gezeigt, dass die 
vorgeschlagenen Ansätze in einer Win-Win-Situation resultieren. 
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Abstract
The efficient allocation of power is a major concern in today’s wireless communications sys-
tems. Due to the high demand in data rate and the scarcity of wireless resources such as power,
the multi-user communication systems like the multiple access channel (MAC) and broadcast
channel (BC) have become highly competitive environments for the users as well as the sys-
tem itself. Theory of microeconomics and game theory provide the good analytical manner
for the selfish and social welfare conflict problems.
Instead of maximizing the system sum rate, our proposed system deals with fulfilling the
utility (rate) requirement of all the users with efficient power allocation. The users formulate
the signal to interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) based quality-of-service (QoS) requirements.
We propose the framework to allocate the power to each user with universal pricing mecha-
nisms. The prices act as the control signal and are assumed to be some virtual currency in the
wireless system. They can influence the physical layer operating points to meet the desired
utility requirements. Centralized and distributed power allocation frameworks are discussed
separately in the thesis with different pricing schemes.
In wireless systems we have users that are rational in the game theoretic sense of making
decisions consistently in pursuit of their own individual objectives. Each user’s objective is to
maximize the expected value of its own payoff measured on a certain utility scale. Selfishness
or self-interest is an important implication of rationality. Therefore, the mobiles which share
the same spectrum have incentives to misinterpret their private information in order to obtain
more utility. They might behave selfishly and show also malicious behavior by creating in-
creased interference for other mobiles. Therefore, it is important to supervise and influence
the operation of the system by pricing and priority (weights) optimization.
In the centralized resource allocation, we study the general MAC and BC (with linear and
nonlinear receiver) with three types of agents: the regulator, the system optimizer and the
mobile users. The regulator ensures the QoS requirements of all users by clever pricing and
prevents cheating. The simple system optimizer solves a certain system utility maximization
problem to allocate the power with the given prices and weights (priorities). The linear and
nonlinear pricing mechanisms are analyzed, respectively. It is shown that linear pricing is a
universal pricing only if successive interference cancellation (SIC) for uplink transmission or
dirty paper coding (DPC) for downlink transmission is applied at the base station (BS). For
MAC without SIC, nonlinear pricing which is logarithmic in power and linear in prices is a
universal pricing scheme. The prices, the resulting cost terms, the optimal power allocation
to achieve the QoS requirement of each user in the feasible rate region are derived in closed
iv
form solutions for MACwith and without SIC using linear and nonlinear pricing frameworks,
respectively.
The users are willing to maximize their achievable rate and minimize their cost on power by
falsely reporting their channel state information (CSI). By predicting the best cheating strategy
of the malicious users, the regulator is able to detect the misbehavior and punish the cheaters.
The infinite repeated game (RG) is proposed as a counter mechanism with the trigger strategy
using the trigger price. We show that by anticipating the total payoff of the proposed RG, the
users have no incentive to cheat and therefore our framework is strategy-proof.
In the distributed resource allocation, each user allocates its own power by optimizing the
individual utility function. The noncooperative game among the users is formulated. The in-
dividual prices are introduced to the utility function of each user to shift the Nash equilibrium
(NE) power allocation to the desired point. We show that by implicit control of the proposed
prices, the best response (BR) power allocation of each user converges rapidly. The Shannon
rate-based QoS requirement of each user is achieved with minimum power at the unique NE
point. We analyse different behavior types of the users, especially the malicious behavior of
misrepresenting the user utility function. The resulting NE power allocation and achievable
rates of all users are derived when malicious behavior exists. The strategy-proof mechanism
is designed using the punishment prices when the types of the malicious users are detected.
The algorithm of the strategy-proof noncooperative game is proposed. We illustrate the con-
vergence of the BR dynamic and the Price of Malice (PoM) by numerical simulations.
The uplink transmissionwithin the single cell of heterogeneousnetworks is exactly the same
model as MAC. Therefore, the results of the pricing-based power allocation for MAC can be
implemented into heterogeneous networks. Femtocells deployed in the Macrocell network
provide better indoor coverage to the user equipments (UEs) with low power consumption
and maintenance cost. The industrial vendors show great interest in the access mode, called
the hybrid access, in which the macrocell UEs (MUEs) can be served by the nearby Femtocell
Access Point (FAP). By adopting hybrid access in the femtocell, the system energy efficiency
is improved due to the short distance between the FAP and MUEs while at the same time,
the QoS requirements are better guaranteed. However, both the Macrocell base station (MBS)
and the FAP are rational and selfish, who maximize their own utilities. The framework to
successively apply the hybrid access in femtocell and fulfill the QoS requirement of each UE
is important.
We propose two novel compensation frameworks to motivate the hybrid access of femto-
cells. To save the energy consumption, the MBS is willing to motivate the FAP for hybrid
access with compensation. The Stackelberg game is formulated where the MBS serves as the
leader and the FAP serves as the follower. The MBS maximizes its utility by choosing the com-
pensation prices. The FAP optimizes its utility by selecting the number of MUEs in hybrid
access. By choosing the proper compensation price, the optimal number of MUEs served by
the FAP to maximize the utility of the MBS coincides with that to maximize the utility of the
vFAP. Numerous simulation results are conducted, showing that the proposed compensation
frameworks result in a win-win solution.
In this thesis, based on game theory, mechanism design and pricing framework, efficient
power allocation are proposed to guarantee the QoS requirements of all users in the wireless
networks. The results are applicable in the multi-user systems such as heterogeneous net-
works. Both centralized and distributed allocation schemes are analyzed which are suitable
for different communication scenarios.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Wireless communication has undergone significant development over the past years, e.g. by
the introduction of new physical layer technologies, marketing of new application layer ser-
vices and entry of players who were not traditionally considered an operator participating in
the market. To tame such an ever-changing market of wireless systems, it is pivotal to ensure
that wireless resources are allocated in a socially optimal manner.
Research results show that nowadays about 0.2% of the global CO2 emissions are due to
mobile telecommunication networks, and this percentage is expected to increase. The funda-
mental concern of radio resource management is the physical layer transmit power allocation.
In a wireless system, each user’s objective may be maximizing the expected value of its own
payoff measured on a certain utility scale, while the system regulator aims at minimizing the
system total resource consumption. This makes the users and the system regulator conflicting
entities. Game theory is suitable for analyzing this kind of problems. Each user is endowed
with intelligence in a game theoretic sense of knowing the rules about the underlying game.
Since the self-interested users act selfishly, the outcome of the game may not be the best
operating point. How to allocate communications resource fairly and more efficiently in or-
der to not only minimize the energy consumption of the whole system, but also achieve the
quality-of-service (QoS) requirement of each user is the main issue discussed in this thesis.
The signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) based Shannon rate is set to be the criterion
of the QoS requirement.
Today’s wireless communications and networking practices are tightly coupled with eco-
nomic considerations [1]. In particular, pricing on the system resources such as power is a
useful tool to lead the resource allocation result to the socially optimal point. The prices are
assumed to be some virtual currency in the wireless system and can influence the physical
layer operating points to meet the desired utility requirements. However, the mobiles which
share the same spectrum have incentives to misinterpret their private information in order to
obtain more utility. They might behave selfishly and show also malicious behavior by creat-
ing increased interference to other mobiles. A pricing mechanism is said to be strategy-proof
if with properly designed pricing, the user behavior is guided to a more robust and efficient
point. Pricing is typically motivated because it is beneficial to the wireless system regulator
and it encourages better resource allocation and more reliable user behavior. Comparing with
the real monetary charges on the higher layer, pricing on the physical layer refers more to the
control signal [2].
2 1 Introduction
We basically distinguish two models for the user-centric resource allocation of the multi-
user wireless systems.
• The first model deploys a central controller which supervises and influences the operation
of the system by pricing and priority (weights) optimization. The central controller is
referred to as the regulator. The regulator acquires all necessary information of the whole
system. It is responsible of detecting and preventing the user misbehavior.
• The second model allocates the power based on the distributed manner. The noncoop-
erative game is played among the multiple users. Each user allocates its own power by
maximizing its utility function. The individual prices are introduced into the user util-
ity function to motivate a more efficient distributed resource allocation and better user
behavior.
The multiple access channel (MAC) is a typical multi-user transmission system. Due to
the uplink-downlink duality, the broadcast channel (BC) is also considered. Firstly, the MAC
instantiating in different scenarios is investigated. In the traditional setting, multiple transmit-
ters send at the same time and frequency to one base station (BS). The BS is interested in all
data and applies the optimal receive strategy, e.g., the minimum mean square error (MMSE)
estimator receiver plus successive interference cancellation (SIC) [3]. Another case occurs in
the passive infrastructure sharing if one BS is shared by several operators with different radio
access networks (RANs). In this case, we assume that SIC is not applied and complete inter-
ference from all other mobile stations is present in the single user decoder. In order to guaran-
tee the QoS requirements of all the users in the wireless system, linear and nonlinear pricing
mechanisms are investigated, respectively. Different types of user behavior are analyzed in de-
tail. A variety of games are proposed to prevent user misbehavior with the carefully tailored
prices. We show that by clever pricing, the users in the system have no incentive to cheat and
therefore our framework is strategy-proof.
With the explosion of 4G, the indoor wireless data traffic is increasing rapidly. Many mobile
operators have launched femtocell service, including Vodafone, SFR, AT&T, Sprint Nextel,
Verizon and Mobile TeleSystems. The Femtocell Access Points (FAPs), also known as home
BSs, are small and low power devices to provide high-quality indoor coverage. These FAPs
are connected to the operators’ macrocell networks via backhaul DSL, optical fibre or other
connections [4]. By adopting femtocells, the expensive spectrum is better utilized. Different
from otherwireless access equipments, themacrocell BS (MBS) is able to get all the information
about the femtocells inside its range by the backhaul connection. The MBS is responsible to
allocate the wireless resource in the femtocell in order to manage the interference between the
femto and macrocells.
Within the single cell of macrocell or femtocell, the uplink transmission is exactly the same
model as MAC. In order to ensure the rate requirement of each user equipment (UE), the
power allocation analyzed in MAC can be implemented in the setting of heterogeneous net-
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works. Currently, there are three access control mechanisms: open access, closed access [5]
and hybrid access. From an energy aware point of view, by selecting the nearby macrocell
UEs (MUEs) under the range of service of the femtocell, hybrid access shows the most poten-
tial and is of high interest to the industry operators.
The MBS and the FAPs are considered to be simple and selfish devices, who maximize their
own interest. In order to gain in the energy saving of the whole two-tier macro-femtocell sys-
tem, the MBS is willing to compensate the FAP for accepting some nearby MUEs. Pricing is
introduced in the compensation function to motivate the hybrid access. The MBS can indi-
rectly control the two-tier system by adapting the compensation prices in the compensation
function.
1.2 Multiple Access and Broadcast Channel
The thesis mainly discusses the user-centric resource allocation in the general multiple access
and broadcast channels under the QoS requirement of each user. In this section, the mathe-
matical model of the multiple access and broadcast channels are described.
1.2.1 Multiple Access Channel
The uplink transmission with multiple transmitters and single receiver is referred to as MAC.
A common example of MAC is a couple of mobiles communicating with a BS. The general
MAC withK transmitters is depicted in Fig. 1.1. The K transmitters wish to communicate to
the BS over the common channel. They send signal xi, i ∈ 1, · · · ,K to the BS simultaneously.
Both the transmitters and the receiver BS are equipped with single antenna. The transmission
power of the transmitter i is pi with single user power constraint pmax, i,e., 0 < pi ≤ pmax. The
transmitters in the MAC compete not only with the received noise, but also the interference
from each other [6].
The quasi-static block flat-fading channels are statistically independent of each other and
remain constant for a sufficient long time period. The channel coefficient from the transmitter
i to the BS is denoted as hi.
The received complex signal in the equivalent base-band representation for the BS in MAC
is given by
y =
K∑
i=1
hixi + n, (1.1)
where n ∼ CN(0, σ2n) is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with zero-mean and vari-
ance of σ2. The channel gain from the transmitter i to the BS is αi = |hi|2. All xi and n are
statistically independent. The data signal xi is created by a Gaussian codebook with zero-
mean and variance pi ≥ 0.
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Transmitter 1 x1
Transmitter 2 x2
Transmitter 3 x3
Transmitter K xK
y BS
h1
h2
h3
hK
Figure 1.1: General multiple access channel
Let S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. Let Sc denote the complement of S. Denote R(S) =
∑
i∈S Ri and
x(S) = {xi : i ∈ S}. Then the capacity region of theK-user MAC is derived as follows [6].
1.1 Definition. The capacity region of theK-user MAC is the closure of the convex hull of the
rate vectors satisfying
R(S) ≤ I(x(S); y | x(Sc)) for all S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,K}. (1.2)
The BS receives the superposition of all signals from the K transmitters. If the BS treats the
interference from all the other transmitters as noise, then the achievable rate ri of transmitter
i at the BS without successive interference cancelation1 (SIC) is
ri = I(xi; y)
= log
(
1 +
αipi
1 +
∑
k 6=i αkpk
)
, (1.3)
where the noise power is normalized to be 1.
1.2 Definition. Successive Interference Cancelation (SIC) decodes the signals in an arbitrary or-
der and subtracts the re-encoded signal, which effectively increases the SINR. It is iteratively
repeated forK transmitters.
1SIC is explained in Sec. 1.2.3
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Receiver 1 y1
Receiver 2 y2
Receiver 3 y3
Receiver K yK
BS x
h1
h2
h3
hK
Figure 1.2: General broadcast channel
1.2.2 Broadcast Channel
If there are single input and multiple outputs for the channel, it is referred to as the BC. Typ-
ically, the mathematical model of the BC is to describe the simultaneous communication of
information from single source to several receivers [6].
Fig. 1.2.2 shows the standard representation of the BC. The received complex signal in the
equivalent base-band representation at each receiver i for BC is
yi = hi
K∑
k=1
xi + n. (1.4)
If there is no dirty paper coding2 (DPC), the achievable rate ri achieved at the receiver i is
ri = I(x; yi)
= log
(
1 +
αipi
1 + αi
∑
k 6=i pk
)
. (1.5)
2DPC will be discussed in Sec. 1.2.3.
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1.2.3 Successive Interference Cancelation and Dirty Paper Coding
The growing need for QoS enhancements along with the dense user deployment in the wire-
less systems contradict mainly to capacity limitations. Interference plays a crucial role in such
limitations. Interference cancelation (IC) is an interesting alternative to the interference avoid-
ance [7]. The SIC, where the signals are decoded at the receiver successively, is first suggested
in [6]. By adopting SIC, the signal of one user is removed in the following decoding process if
it is already decoded. Thus, it is more efficient when comparing with conventional reception,
where the interference from all the other users are treated as noise.
The achievable rate ri of transmitter i in the general MAC when SIC is adopted with the
decoding order π = [K → · · · → 1] is then
ri = I(xi; y | x1, . . . , xi−1)
= log
(
1 +
αipi
1 +
∑
k<i αkpk
)
. (1.6)
DPC is an efficient transmission technique when some interference is known to the transmit-
ter. It requires channel state information (CSI) of all users. As long as the full knowledge of
the i.i.d interference is given to the encoder, the capacity of a channel with additive Gaussian
noise and power constrained input is not affected [8]. In the downlink BC, the transmitter
precodes the data in order to cancel the interference. If DPC is adopted with the precoding
order π in the BC , the achievable rate ri of receiver i, i = [1, . . . ,K] is
ri = log
(
1 +
αipi
1 + αi
∑
k<i pk
)
. (1.7)
1.2.4 Uplink-Downlink Duality
Given a set of powers, the uplink performance of the kth user is only a function of the receive
filter of user k. In the downlink, however, the SINR of each user is a function of all transmit
signals of the users. Thus, the problem is seemingly more complex. However, there is in fact
an uplink-downlink duality to achieve the same SINR for the users under the same sumpower
[9].
For the transmission with single antenna at both the transmitters and receivers, the SINR
for user i of the uplink transmission with normalized noise is given by
SINRi :=
αipi
1 +
∑
j 6=i αjpj
, (1.8)
where pi is the power allocated to user i.
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Now consider the downlink channel that is naturally ’dual’ to the given uplink channel. The
SINR for user i of the downlink transmission with normalized noise is given by
SINRi :=
αipi
1 + αi
∑
j 6=i pj
. (1.9)
The relationship between the performance of the downlink transmission and its dual uplink
is that to achieve the same SINR for the users in both links, the total transmit power is the same
for the MAC and BC systems.
Denote p := [p1, . . . , pK ] as the power allocation for the uplink transmission and q :=
[q1, . . . , qK ] as the power for the dual downlink transmission, respectively. Then to achieve
the same SINR, the power is solved by
p = (Da −A
t)−1 ·1, (1.10)
q = (Db −A)
−1 ·1, (1.11)
where Da := diag( 1a1 , . . . ,
1
aK
), Db := diag( 1b1 , . . . ,
1
bK
) and 1 is the column vector of all 1’s. A
is aK ×K matrix with index of α, i.e.,
At =


α1 . . . αk . . . αK
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
α1 . . . αk . . . αK

 . (1.12)
Since the SINR requirement is the same for both the uplink and its dual downlink,
ai :=
SINRi
(1 + SINRi)αi
, bi :=
SINRi
(1 + SINRi)αi
,
a = b. (1.13)
Therefore, the total transmit power for both links is
K∑
i=1
pi = 1
t(Da −A
t)−11 = 1t
[
(Da −A
t)−1
]t
1
= 1t(Da −A)
−1
1 =
K∑
i=1
qi. (1.14)
The duality holds that under the same sum transmit power, the MAC and its dual BC can
achieve the same SINR. The individual powers pi and qi are not the same in both links to
achieve the same SINR. The results in (1.10) and (1.11) are utilized to calculate the power
allocation under SINR-based QoS requirement in this thesis.
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1.3 User-Centric Resource Allocation
We aim to investigate an user-centric interference management perspective of resource alloca-
tion strategies. User-centric refers to that each user k in the system has a QoS requirement uk,
or more specifically the Shannon rate requirement to be guaranteed by the wireless system.
The user-centric resource allocation problem is to allocate the power efficiently under differ-
ent criterions while guaranteeing the QoS requirement of each user. These criterions include
minimum power, energy efficiency (EE), social welfare and so on, which will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 3-6.
In a wireless system, consider K transmitters with source messages are transmitting with
power3 p = [p1, · · · , pK ]T , and at least K sinks are interested in their messages. Consider a
general utility function
u(p,ω) =
K∑
k=1
ωkgk
(
pk
Ik(p)
)
, (1.15)
where ωk is the weight for user k, ω = [ω1, · · · , ωK ] and ωk is usually between zero and one,∑
ωk = 1.
The QoS requirement of each user k is fulfilled if the following condition is satisfied.
gk
(
pk
Ik(p)
)
≥ uk, (1.16)
where gk
(
pk
Ik(p)
)
is a general SINR-based utility function.
Ik(p) is from the set of simple linear interference (plus noise) functions I(p).
1.3 Definition. Interference functions: I(p): RK+1+ 7→ R+ is an interference function for all p ≥ 0
if the following properties are satisfied [10].
• Positivity: I(p) > 0
• Monotonicity: I(p) ≥ I(p′) if p ≥ p′
• Scalability: αI(p) > I(αp) for all α > 1.
The vector inequality p > p′ is a strict inequality in all components. The property of posi-
tivity is implied by the nonzero background receiver noise. The property of scalability shows
that if all powers are scaled up uniformly, the resulting interference is smaller than scaling
up the existing interference function directly. In other words, the SINR of scaling up all the
powers simultaneously is better than the original SINR [10].
One general expression of an interference function is
Ik(p) = a
T ·p+ σ2n, (1.17)
3The sources as well as sinks could be collocated resulting in MAC or BC.
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u2(g(p))
u1(g(p))
u(p*)
g1(p)
g2(p)
g(p*)
p1
p2
(c)
p
*=[p1
*, p2
*]
(a) (b)
Figure 1.3: Illustration of a set of resources p and the QoS set u for the case of 2 users in a
wireless system. (a) QoS region after the transformation of the SINR region via the utility
function mapping u(p) = u(g(p)); (b) SINR region corresponding to the set of powers, with
the transformation g = g(p); (c) Set of power resources for 2 users. In this case the set of
powers are permitted by the power constraints for the 2 users.
where the vector a depends on the concrete system scenario and contains the effective channel
coefficients, e.g., by adopting SIC, some ai are zero. σ2n is the additive noise power.
The general interference function possesses the properties of positivity, scalability andmono-
tonicity with respect to the power allocation and strict monotonicity with respect to the noise
component [11]. We assume gk ∈ Conc.
1.4 Definition. [12] Conc is the family of all strictly monotonic increasing, continuous func-
tions g, such that g(x) is concave.
In the whole thesis, the Shannon rate is referred to as criterion of the QoS requirement if
without specification. Then (1.16) becomes
rk(α,p) = gk
(
pk
Ik(p)
)
(1.18)
rk(α,p) ≥ uk, (1.19)
where rk(α,p) is the achieved rate of user k as a function of the power allocation p and CSI α.
Fig. 1.3 shows an example of wireless communication for a 2-user resource allocation prob-
lem under QoS requirement. Each user has an SINR-based QoS requirement to be guaranteed
by the wireless system, which is shown in (a) as the QoS region. The corresponding SINR
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region to achieve the QoS as a function of the set of powers is shown in (b). (c) shows the
region of power resource such that the QoS requirements are fulfilled in (a). The user-centric
resource allocation we are dealing with is to find the efficient power allocation in (c) such that
the QoS requirements in (a) can be achieved.
The dense deployment of the wireless equipments and the scarcity of the wireless resources,
such as power, frequency, etc., make the resource allocation an important problem [13]. The
conflicts are not only among the users who wish to transmit with higher data rate and there-
fore create more interference to others, but also between the users and the system. Since the
users may have incentives to manipulate their private information, such as CSI or user pref-
erences, in order to maximize their own utility, the system regulator is responsible to detect
and prevent the user misbehavior. Otherwise the QoS requirements of each user cannot be
guaranteed.
Microeconomic theory [14, 15] provides an efficient manner to analyze this kind of conflict
problem. The alternative approach based on economicmodels has been introduced to resource
allocation problem in wireless systems [16, 17, 18, 19]. Each user in the system is assume to be
rational, who only cares about its own utility.
Each user in the system plays the role as a decision maker in the market. Game theory
studies the interaction among rational decision makers. In the book The Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior [20], von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced game theory. One could
study the strategic interactions of multiple agents from different directions, such as sociology,
psychology, biology, etc. Game theory emphasizes the mathematical modeling on the conflict
problem of the rational agents. These economic agents are referred to as ’players’ in game
theory. Each player aims at maximizing its own utility function by choosing a particular com-
bination of strategies. Selfishness or self-interest is an important implication of rationality in
traditional models.
Game theory has been deeply developed and widely applied to many aspects such as eco-
nomics, politics and engineering in the last decades. Indeed, most economic behavior can be
viewed as special cases of game theory. We will discuss game theory in detail in Sec. 1.3.1.
In wireless systems we have agents that are rational in the game theoretic sense of making
decisions consistently in pursuit of their own individual objectives. In particular, each agent is
strategic, i.e. takes into account its knowledge or expectation of the behaviour of other agents
and is capable of carrying out the required computations. For example the users would like to
maximize their individual rate and therefore cause more interference to others. In multiuser
wireless communications, resource allocation is a challenging topic in studying the conflict
problems between the wireless resources and the demands of users. Such resources include
the time slots, frequency bands, orthogonal codes or spaces, power, etc. From an economic
theoretic point of view, these resources can be regarded as valuable goods that are allocated by
the BS to themultiple users centrally or among the users distributively. Time division multiple
access (TDMA), frequency division multiple access (FDMA), code division multiple access
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Microeconomics Theory
Game Theory PricingMechanism Design
Nash Equilibrium Repeated Game Stackelberg Game
Linear Pricing Non-Linear Pricing
Figure 1.4: Distinctions in microeconomics related to user centric resource allocation in wire-
less communications.
(CDMA) and space division multiple access (SDMA) are commonly used resource allocation
methods. In our work, we focus on the power allocation where the system organizer has
to intelligently conjure a mechanism to design a game such that the individual user’s QoS
requirement is satisfied and the system efficiency is achieved.
In our system the users have the possibility to manipulate the system objective by falsely
reporting their private types such as CSI and/or individual preference for utilities. We shall
utilize tools from microeconomics such as mechanism design, pricing and game theory and
analyze this problem from an information theoretic point of view to obtain resource allocation
strategies forwireless systems. These resource allocation strategies shall possess the properties
of non-manipulability of the system, system spectral efficiency and non-dictatorial behaviour
for all users in the system.
Fig. 1.4 shows the branches in microeconomics theory that are related to the resource alloca-
tion for the user centric interferencemanagement in wireless communications. The centralized
and decentralized implementation of these strategies or outcome rules are studied in terms of
complexity, feedback overhead, and performance. The tools from game theory, mechanism
design and pricing are analyzed in Sec. 1.3.1, Sec. 1.3.2 and Sec. 1.3.3, respectively.
1.3.1 Game Theory
In this section, the basic knowledge about game theory is introduced, especially those applied
in our study of the user-centric resource allocation for wireless communications. Game theory
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is the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational
decision-makers [19]. Game theory is widely used in economics, political science, psychology,
logic and biology. Nowadays, game theory is applied to a broader range of studies such as
in engineering. It provides a powerful manner to analyze interactions between self-interested
users and to predict their strategies [21, 22, 23].
There are three basic elements to describe a game G(K, S,U) in strategic (or normal) form:
the set of players i ∈ K. K is the finite set {1, 2, . . . ,K}; The strategy space Si of each user i, S =
S1×S2 · · ·×SK is the set of strategy profiles; and player i’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
ui(s) for each strategy profile s = {s1, . . . , sK}. For example, the most familiar interpretations
of strategies in economics may be the choices of prices or output levels [23].
The structure of the game is common knowledge among the players. All players participat-
ing in the game are assumed to be fully aware of the game structure of the strategic form. The
players are supposed to be rational that they know that their opponents know this, and are
aware that their opponents know that they know, and so on ad infinitum. Strategic form of
finite games are usually depicted as matrices. A pure strategy provides a complete definition of
how a player will play a game. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over pure strate-
gies. Mixed strategies are not considered in this thesis, because mixed strategies correspond
to time-sharing which requires coordination overhead [24].
1.5 Definition. [23] Pure strategy si is dominated for player i if there exists s′i ∈ Si such that
ui(s
′
i, s−i) ≥ ui(si, s−i) for all s−i ∈ S−i, (1.20)
and the inequality is strict for at least one s−i.
The strategy si is strictly dominated if the inequality (1.20) holds with strong inequality. A set
of dominating strategies is not guaranteed to exist.
1.3.1.1 Nash Equilibrium
In game theory, the concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) [25, 26] takes a very important role. NE
is a profile of strategies of a noncooperative game such that the strategy of each player is an
optimal response to other players’ strategies. The formal definition of NE is as follows.
1.6 Definition. A strategy profile s∗ ∈ S is an NE if, for all players i, i ∈ [1, . . . ,K],
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i) ≥ ui(si, s
∗
−i) for all si ∈ Si. (1.21)
At the NE, no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable for that player.
When the inequality above holds strictly for all players and all feasible alternative strate-
gies, then the equilibrium is classified as a strict NE. If instead, for some player, there is exact
equality between s∗i and some other strategy in the set S, then the equilibrium is classified
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as a weak NE. By definition [27], a strict NE is necessarily a pure-strategy equilibrium such
that each user has a unique best response (BR) to his rivals’s strategies. The BR of player i is
the strategy or set of strategies from Si that maximizes player i’s utility function against the
strategies of other players.
The NE is a stable state when each player in the game chooses his BR to the strategies of
other players. Therefore the NE is achieved by playing the BR dynamic (BRD), i.e., a series of
BRs [28]. Strict NE is more compelling and robust to various small changes in the nature of
the game. However, strict NE needs not exist. Conditions for the existence and uniqueness of
a pure strategy NE are proposed in [29].
A game can have either a pure-strategy or a mixed NE (in the latter a pure strategy is chosen
stochastically with a fixed probability). All players choose the strategy which is the BR to the
anticipated action of their opponents. In a noncooperative game, the NE holds the property
that all players can predict it, predict that their opponents can predict it and so on.
J. Nash in his work [25] shows the existence of a NE: Every finite strategic-form game has
a mixed strategy equilibrium. A pure-strategy equilibrium is an equilibrium in degenerate
mixed strategies. However, the NE point may not be efficient. That is why pricing is intro-
duced to indirectly influence the outcome of the game to the desired efficient point.
1.3.1.2 Repeated Game
In the previous part, the game in static form is discussed, where the players choose their ac-
tions simultaneously. However, many applications of game theory have an important dynamic
structure. Such dynamic situations can be represented by using the concept of extensive form
games. The extensive form allows explicit representation of the order in which players move,
and what acquired by each player when making each strategy.
The following information should be contained when defining the extensive form of a game:
• the set of players
• the order of moves
• the players’ payoffs as a function of the moves that were made
• what the players’ choices are when they move
• what each player knows when he makes his choices
• the probability distributions over any exogenous events.
Repeated game (RG) is the best understood class of dynamic games [23, 19, 30, 31]. The
RG consists of certain number of repetitions of some stage game and the player’s long-term
overall payoff is a weighted average of the payoffs in each stage. The RG leads to different
equilibrium outcomes to that of the stage game which is played only once. Because the players
are able to condition their strategies on the past actions of their opponents.
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The RG can be divided into two classes: infinite RG and finite RG, depending on the hori-
zon played in the game is infinite or finite. The outcome of the finite RG is determined by
backward-induction because finite horizon of the game is played. If the terminal horizon of
the game is not a common knowledge to players, the infinite RG is a suitable measure of de-
scribing a game. It is found that the optimal method of playing an RG is to cooperate and play
a socially optimum strategy. One essential part of infinite RG is to punish players who deviate
from this cooperative strategy.
There are several alternative utility functions to describe a infinite RG.
• Discounting RG: Players discount future utilities by the discount factor δi, 0 < δi < 1.
Player i’s total payoff is
u¯i = (1− δi)
∞∑
t=0
δtigi(s
t), (1.22)
where δtigi(s
t) is the payoff of each stage game. t denotes the number of rounds in the RG.
• Limit of means RG: If the players are completely patient, corresponding to the limit δi = 1,
the time-average criterion can be implemented. Player i’s total payoff is
u¯i = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=0
gi(s
t). (1.23)
The players in the RG choose their strategy by anticipating the long-term total payoff as
shown in (1.22) or (1.23). The game designer can punish those players when they perform
actions not leading to the social optimal outcome. Then by predicting the overall payoff of the
infinite RG, no user will have incentives to misbehave.
1.3.1.3 Stackelberg Game
The Stackelberg game is a strategic game named after the German economist Heinrich Frei-
herr von Stackelberg [32]. The players of the Stackelberg game are a leader and a follower
competing on quantity. The leader chooses her strategy s1 first and the follower chooses his
own strategy s2 after observing s1.
The leader should predict that the follower will choose the best response s2(s1) to whatever
s1 she chooses. The follower’s strategy is to solve s∗2 = maxs2 u2(s1, s2(s1)). Before choosing
her own strategy, the leader predicts s∗2 first and then solves s
∗
1 = maxs1 u1(s1, s
∗
2). Comparing
to the possibly existing NEswhere the strategies are the same as if the players move simultane-
ously, the ’Stackelberg equilibrium’ is the unique credible outcome [23]. ’Backward induction’
is applied to obtain this Stackelberg equilibrium. The idea is to firstly solve the BR of the last
mover and then compute backward of the BR for the player before, and so on [33, 34].
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1.3.2 Mechanism Design
Mechanism Design is a branch of the study in game theory. It can be thought as the reverse
game theory and is rather unique in economics to have an engineering perspective. From the
game theoretic point of view, the objective of each user is to maximize the expected value of
its own payoff measured on certain utility. Each rational user is endowed with intelligence in
a game theoretic sense of knowing the rule about the underlying game. Since each player in
the game is strategic by taking into account the strategy of other players, announcing one’s
true private type or preference to the system regulator may not be the best strategy of players.
That is why the theory of mechanism design comes into play.
In order to allocate the resources in a socially optimal manner, the system regulator has the
pivotal role to envisage and extract the true value of the user preferences and/or private types.
The preferences or private types of users include CSI, location, data traffic, QoS and other
private information. Mechanism design concerns the settings for the problem of aggregating
the announced preferences of multiple users in a collective or social decision. Assume that
all the players act rationally, mechanism design attempts to implement the desired goals in a
strategic setting. The goals of the proposed mechanism is normally viewed as social choice.
1.7 Definition. Social Choice is an aggregate or sum of individual preferences of different users
into a single combined social welfare decision.
Mechanism design theory uses the framework of non-cooperative games with incomplete
information and seeks to investigate how the privately held preferences or types can be elicited
from the users. Furthermore it investigates the extent to which the information elicitation
problem constrains the way in which social decisions can respond to individual preferences.
The main focus of mechanism design is to design institutions or outcome rules (protocols)
that satisfy certain desired objectives, assuming that the individual users, interacting through
the institution will act strategically and may hold private information that is relevant to the
decision at hand [23].
1.8 Definition. In mechanism design, a process is Incentive Compatible if all participants fare
best when they truthfully reveal any private information asked for by the mechanism.
1.9 Definition. In game theory, an asymmetric game where players have private information
is said to be Strategy Proof if none of the players has an incentive to lie about or hide their
private information from the other players.
Strategy proofness is also known as dominant strategy incentive compatibility. For the user-
centric resource allocation we studied in wireless communications, incentive compatibility
and strategy proofness are very important. Due to the interference coupling, the wireless sys-
tem is able to guarantee the QoS requirement only when each user reveals its true information
to the system.
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1.3.3 Pricing in Wireless Communications
As stated in Sec. 1.3.1, the outcome of a game such as the NE, may not be efficient, some
measure should be implemented to lead the outcome of the game to the desired point. Pricing
is a useful tool to design such a framework. Traditionally, engineers design the physical layer
algorithm in wireless communications without considering how the communication services
or the wireless resources are priced. However, due to the scarcity of wireless resources and
the exploded demand of data transmission in the competitive market, technology and pricing
are highly related with each other. In particular, pricing affects the way how communication
services are used and the resources are consumed. Modern networking technologies provide
possibilities for producers and consumers to exchange economic signals on fast time scale [35].
Pricing can be viewed as a mechanism designed by the system regulator to motivate the users
to utilize the network efficiently. As a result, the robustness and stability of the wireless system
is enhanced with the mechanism of pricing. The strategies that the users choose according to
the pricing mechanism can also feed back some signal to the system regulator about their user
preferences, which helps the system regulator allocate the wireless resource and make sure
that the system is incentive compatible.
A well designed pricing mechanism is responsible to collect the correct information about
the users. With these information, the system regulator can allocate the resources amongst the
users indirectly to meet the desired operating point.
One simple model for pricing a single link can be formulated as follows [35]. Let P denote
the problem of maximizing the total user benefit, i.e.,
P : max
x1,··· ,xN
N∑
i=1
ui(xi)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
xi ≤ C, (1.24)
where C is the capacity of the link. Each of the N customers is allocated xi bits per second
with the utility function ui.
If each ui is a concave increasing function, then there exists a price β¯ such that each user is
able to choose xi to solve the problem
P : max
xi
ui(xi)− β¯xi (1.25)
and therefore, P can be solved simply by setting this price β¯.
Let xi(β) be the demand function of user i, which is the amount of bandwidth he wishes to
purchase if the price per unit bandwidth is β. By setting the price β = β¯, the system operator
ensures the total bandwidth purchased equals the supply, i.e.,
∑
i xi(β¯) = C . This allocation
leads the total benefit to the social welfare of all the users.
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It is also possible to tailor the prices to individual users. For example, nonlinear pricing
could be adopted in order to increase the revenue of the system operator or to motivate the
social welfare.
How can the wireless system meet the high QoS requirement of its users with the limited
resources? The pricingmechanism gives the system regulator an opportunity to ensure the sys-
tem efficiency and the social welfare. The system regulator needs to adapt the prices smartly.
The pricing mechanism in our context is introduced formally as follows.
Let U be the family of utility functions u(p,ω). u(p,ω) is not jointly concave with respect
to p for all w > 0. The utility u(p,ω) is a function of the weights ω and the SINR. Moreover,
u(p,ω) is not a convex optimization problem even for linear interference functions [12].
The utility function in (1.15) is a frequently encountered utility maximization problem in
wireless systems based on the SINR. The utility u(p,ω) is a strictly monotonic increasing con-
tinuous function defined on R+. Denote Fk(βk, pk) as the function of the price βk and power
pk, βk ≥ 0. Let F be the family of the pricing functions. The UMP with pricing is defined as
u˜(p,β,ω) = u(p,ω)− Fk(βk, pk). (1.26)
Denote the optimal power allocation p∗(β,ω) of the system as a function of the prices β and
the weights ω. p∗(β,ω) solves the UMP in (1.26), i.e.,
p∗(β,ω) = arg max
0≤p≤pmax
u˜(p,β,ω) (1.27)
s.t. gk
(
pk
Ik(p)
)
≥ uk for all k. (1.28)
The pricing mechanism in the context of SINR-based utility optimization problem is defined
as follows.
1.10 Definition. [12] Pricing Mechanism: A pricing mechanism is a mapping from U(α) to F.
U(α) is the feasibility region for channel states α = [α1, · · · , αK ]:
U(α) =
⋃
p≥0
(g1(p1/I1(p)), · · · , gK(pK/IK(p))) . (1.29)
The pricing mechanism is a tool used by the system regulator to force the resource allocation
in such a way that the resulting operation point meets the required point. For the user centric
resource allocation of wireless communication, the means of pricing is to choose the pricing
parameters β such that the QoS requirement of each user is achieved with minimum power.
The universal pricing mechanism is introduced in the next subsection.
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1.3.3.1 Universal Pricing Problem
The pricing problem is to find the universal pricing parameter β∗ for given ω and u ∈ U(α),
i.e.,
Find β∗ (1.30)
s.t. gk
(
p∗k(β
∗,ω)
Ik(p∗(β
∗,ω))
)
= uk
for all k ∈ K .
1.11 Definition. Universal Pricing: A universal pricing scheme finds a pricing vector β for all
channels α and all weights ω and their feasible utility requirements u ∈ U(α).
In the following chapters, we investigate the universal pricing framework for different sce-
narios in wireless communication networks. Normally pricing is related to the higher layer
revenue. However, pricing on physical layer also plays an important role to affect the resource
allocation for wireless systems. There are research works concerning about pricing of different
scenarios of wireless networks [1, 36, 37]. We focus on the pricing framework for the physical
layer power allocation in order to guarantee the QoS requirement of each user in the wire-
less system. Particularly, the possible user misbehavior in the system is discussed and the
strategy-proof mechanisms using pricing are proposed to counter the malicious behavior in
the system. The prices in the current context are rather the control signaling than pecuniary
units. The physical layer resource consumption certainly influences the application layer cost
and revenue of the system vender. However, the mapping of the physical layer pricing and
the higher layer monetary prices is out of the scope of our research. When we refer to cost
terms or fee of the power allocation, it is an additional evaluation to indicate the performance
of the universal pricing mechanism.
19
2 General System Model and Problem Formulation
2.1 User Centric System Model
Consider the general MAC or BC as shown in Sec. 1.2. A set K := {1, . . . ,K} of transmitters
(or receivers) are communicating with the BS simultaneously on the same spectrum band.
Each user has an SINR-based QoS requirement u to be guaranteed by the system.
In this thesis, the achievable Shannon rate is adopted as the QoS criterion. Each user suffers
from the interference caused by other users in the system. In order to meet the rate require-
ment of each user with minimum resource, the system regulator should make sure that each
user reports its information accurately, which includes the CSI, and/or its preferences, such
as the utility function. Denote uk as the rate-based QoS requirement of each user. The achiev-
able rate rk of each user k should be larger than or equal to its QoS requirement uk. From the
energy saving point of view, the system guarantees the user QoS requirement by achieving it
with the minimum power, i.e., equality holds for (1.16)
gk
(
pk
Ik(p)
)
= uk = log
(
1 +
αkpk
Ik(p)
)
. (2.1)
Game theoretic analysis and pricing mechanisms are introduced to tailor the resource alloca-
tion amongst the users. From the game theoretic point of view, the rational users are not only
interested in achieving its rate requirement uk, but also maximizing its own utility function
uk. As denoted in Sec. 1.3.3, pricing is adopted in the described wireless system to control
the power allocation such that the QoS requirements are satisfied. The game can be played
either between the users and the system regulator or among the users. We propose two types
of power allocation games.
In the first game, the system regulator not only controls the power allocation, but also de-
tects and prevents the user misbehavior by careful game design and price selection. The result
of the game is that the QoS requirement of each user is achieved with the minimum power
consumption and no user has the incentive to cheat for their own user utility.
Given the conditions of the universal pricing in Sec. 1.3.3.1, if the power allocation is cen-
tralized at the BS with the given prices β, the power is allocated by solving the UMP:
p = arg max
0≤p≤pmax
K∑
k=1
wkrk(αk, pk)−
K∑
k=1
Fk(βk, pk) (2.2)
s.t. rk(αk, pk) ≥ uk for all k,
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where Fk(βk, pk) is the pricing term as a function of the price βk and the power pk of user k.
This optimization solves the social welfare of all users, which maximizes the difference be-
tween the weighted sum achievable rates and the cost of power for all users.
In the second game, the noncooperative users choose their transmit power distributively.
The NE power allocation is reached in the proposed noncooperative game. By smart price
adaptation, the QoS requirement of each user is met with the minimum power at the NE
point. A reasonable utility function uk of each user k is the difference between the achievable
rate rk(αk, pk) and the pricing term Fk(βk, pk).
uk = rk(αk, pk)− Fk(βk, pk). (2.3)
Each user k transmits with power pk from its feasible strategy space Sk defined as
pk ∈ Sk := {p : 0 < pk ≤ pmax}. (2.4)
The strategy profile is a set of joint strategies for all transmitters defined as
(p1, . . . , pK) ∈ S1 × · · · × SK . (2.5)
In the noncooperative game formulation, given the strategy profile, each user chooses its
own transmit power pk distributively by maximizing its own utility function.
p = arg max
0≤p≤pmax
uk(pk, βk) (2.6)
s.t. rk(αk, pk) ≥ uk for all k.
Given the proper prices β, (2.2) and (2.6) find the optimal power allocation p to achieve the
QoS requirement of each user.
By a user centric approach, the users have access to a broader strategy space due to the
following reasons:
• The self-interest driven users have more intelligence and possibility to manipulate the
systemwhile ignoring the system objective in order to maximize their own user utility.
• The users have incentives to manipulate their preferences measured on utility functions
or their private types such as CSI to the system regulator with the objective of obtaining
a better resource allocation.
In order to ensure the QoS requirements of all users in the system, the user misbehavior
should be carefully analyzed. By predicting the user misbehavior, the strategy-proof mech-
anism is designed. Such mechanism should satisfy effectiveness and incentive compatibility
with the tool of pricing.
The quasi-static block flat-fading channels are assumed for the general MAC and BC. The
CSI is assumed to be known even though the users can manipulate αk.
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2.2 Problem Statement and Contributions
In this section, the problems studied in this thesis are formulated. The methodologies related
to these problems are stated. At the end of this section, the papers that are published concern-
ing the solutions to these problems are listed.
Both the centralized and distributed resource allocations for the general MAC and BC are
discussed, where pricing is utilized to indirectly force the power allocation of each user. Due
to the interference coupling among the users, each user’s behavior influences the rate of other
users. Therefore, pricing is also employed to feedback the private information about the users
and prevent user misbehavior. Different types of games are adopted in order to guarantee the
QoS requirement of each user in the system.
Problem 1 and 2 arise in Chapter 3. Universal linear pricing is investigated for the general
MAC and BC under QoS requirements.
Problem 1. Is the pricing mechanism which is linear in both the prices and power a universal pricing
mechanism for the general MAC and BC?
When considering the pricing mechanism, the linear pricing is the simplest and most direct
method to apply. We investigate the conditions of the linear pricing to be a universal pricing
mechanism for the general MAC and BC, where SIC and DPC are applied respectively at
the BS. The prices β are proposed for the certain decoding (encoding) order for the general
MAC and BC, respectively. With the given prices β, the power allocation p for the K users is
optimized in such a way that the QoS requirement of each user is reached with the minimum
power. We also analyze the cost terms for each user under this linear pricing mechanism. The
best coding order to minimizing the sum transmit power is obtained.
Problem 2. What is the user behavior when maximizing its own payoff measured on certain utility?
Is it possible to design an incentive compatible mechanism to prevent user cheating?
From the game theoretic point of view, announcing one’s true information may not be the
best strategy of rational users when considering to maximize its own payoff. It is the responsi-
bility of the system regulator to detect and prevent the user misbehavior. Otherwise, the QoS
requirement of the users are no longer guaranteed. In such a sense, a game is formulated not
among the users but between the users and the system regulator who provides the univer-
sal prices. The cheating behavior and its results are investigated. The mechanism to prevent
cheating is discussed.
Chapter 4 deals with Problem 3 and 4. We focus the scenario on the general MAC, with and
without SIC, respectively. The non-linear pricing which is logarithmic in power and linear in
the prices is shown to be a universal pricing mechanism.
Problem 3. Given the linear pricing framework, how does the non-linear pricing which is non-linear
in the power and linear in the prices work as the universal pricing mechanism for the general MAC?
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Problem 3 is studied in Chapter 4.2. Given the conditions of the linear pricing to be universal
pricing, we analyse other pricing mechanisms for the general MAC with and without SIC,
respectively. The pricing mechanism which is logarithmic in power and linear in the pricing
parameters are universal pricing mechanism for log-convex interference functions1. The prices
are proposedwith the given QoS requirements. The optimal power allocation is derived under
the pricing mechanism so that the rate requirement of each user is achieved with minimum
sum power. The cost terms corresponding to the universal non-linear pricing of each user are
analyzed, where the weights are optimizedwith respect to the revenue of the system regulator.
Problem 4. What is the best cheating strategy if the selfish/malicious users maximize their own
user utility? How to design an incentive compatible mechanism to prevent cheating with cheat-proof
pricing?
Problem 4 is studied in Chapter 4.3 and 4.4. The best cheating strategy is derived if the
selfish/malicious users misrepresent their private information on the purpose of maximizing
their own user utility. A worst case strategy is designed in order to guarantee the QoS require-
ment of all the honest users, where the malicious users are excluded from the system UMP.
According to the best cheating strategy, we propose different types of infinite RG to counter
the user misbehavior. The cheat-proof pricing is derived so that no user will have incentives
to cheat. The simulation results illustrate that the proposed RG is an incentive compatible
mechanism.
After the theoretical analysis on the centralized power allocation for the general MAC, we
apply the user-centric resource allocation problem to the heterogeneous networks. Chapter 5
investigates Problem 5.
The two-tier macro-femtocell scenario is considered. The MBS adopts certain well-designed
compensation framework to motivate the femtocell access points (FAPs) to serve the nearby
macrocell user equipments (MUEs). While ensuring the rate requirement of each UE, the total
power consumption of the whole two-tier network is minimized.
Problem 5. How does the proposed centralized power allocation work in the heterogeneous net-
works?
Due to the fact that the indoor wireless data traffic explodes rapidly, heterogeneous net-
works such as the two-tier macro-femtocell networks have attracted high interest in both
academy and industry. With the results of the power allocation to fulfill the QoS requirement
of each UE, we develop the novel compensation framework to motivate the hybrid access in
the uplink transmission of the femtocell network. A Stackelberg game is formulatedwhere the
MBS serves as a leader and the FAP serves as a follower. Two compensation frameworks are
proposed, where in the first model the regulator exists in the system and the universal power
price obtained in Chapter 4 is utilized in the compensation function. In the second model, the
1log-convex interference functions will be discussed in Sec. 4.1.2
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energy efficiency of the whole macro-femtocell network serves as the utility of the MBS. The
optimal number of accepted MUEs in the hybrid access and the optimal compensation price
are derived in both frameworks. The first model is studied in Chapter 5.1 and the second
model is studied in Chapter 5.2.
At last but not the least, the distributed resource allocation for the general MAC is con-
sidered. Chapter 6 deals with Problem 6. Each user chooses the transmit power as its best
response to maximize its own utility. The individual prices are proposed so that the QoS re-
quirement of each user is achieved at the NE transmit power.
Problem 6. How is the pricing mechanism for distributed resource allocation of the general MAC
with and without SIC?
We develop the noncooperative game with individual pricing for the general MAC with
and without SIC, respectively. Each user allocates its own power by optimizing the individual
utility function with clever price adaptation. We show that by the proposed prices, the BR
power allocation of each user converges rapidly. The individual prices are proposed such
that the Shannon rate-based QoS requirement of each user is achieved at the unique NE point.
Different types of user behavior are analyzed and the strategy-proof mechanism is designed
with the punishment prices when the types of the malicious users are detected.
2.3 State of the Art
In this section, we first describe works about interference management in the wireless sys-
tems, including interference alignment, superposition coding. Then related works regarding
resource allocation that apply game theory and microeconomic theory such as pricing are
provided. Furthermore, we mention works on the analysis of the user behavior and the mech-
anism design to prevent the user misbehavior. Afterwards, related works on heterogeneous
networks and distributed resource allocation for wireless communications are discussed.
2.3.1 Interference Management
Consider K non-cooperative transmitter-receiver communicating pairs. They interfere each
other if they communicate over a wireless channel on the same frequency band. Through a
new strategy known as interference alignment [38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44], it is possible to have
each transmitter operate up to 12 its interference-free capacity. The ergodic interference align-
ment for the K-user interference channel with time-varying fading is developed [45]. If the
channel gains have independent, uniform phases, this technique allows each user to achieve at
least 12 its interference-free ergodic capacity at any signal-to-noise ratio. The interference align-
ment, decomposition and performances are analyzed for a multiple-antenna X-channel with
two transmitters and two receivers [46]. Based on the idea of interference alignment, authors
in [47] show that the degrees of freedom achieves K2 for the K user time-varying interference
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channel. The results in [48] show that an interference alignment model for the determinis-
tic K-user interference channel can be applied into a fully connected Gaussian interference
network.
The superposition coding enhances the achievable rate region for the general interference
channel [49]. The capacity of DPC to that of TDMA for a multiple-antenna (multiple input
multiple-output (MIMO)) Gaussian BC is compared [50]. They show that the sum-rate capac-
ity (achievable using DPC) of the multiple-antenna BC is larger than single-user capacity (i.e.,
the TDMA sum-rate) in the system. This result also holds for the sum-rate gain of SIC over
TDMA for the uplink channel. In a high-interference regime for cognitive radio, multiuser
decoding at the primary receiver is shown to be optimal [51, 52].
2.3.2 Resource Allocation with Game Theory and Pricing
The optimal power allocation is studied tomaximize theweighted sum rate under interference
power constraints and individual transmit power constraints [53], for a cognitive multiple ac-
cess channel. The authors [54] introduce hierarchy in energy games modeled by a decentral-
ized MAC. In [55], the energy aware MAC region with and without SIC is studied. In [56],
the precoding strategy selection algorithm of the secondary users in cognitive MIMO MAC
system is proposed to maximize the sum rate, based on the game-theoretic framework. In
[57], the auction mechanisms for sharing spectrum among a group of users is analyzed with
the constraint of the interference temperature at a measurement point. Motivated by the idea
of cooperative communication, the authors study the cooperation and competition within the
cognitive radio networks [58].
Pricing has been successively utilized in the wireless networks to enforce the system effi-
ciency. There exist previous works concerning universal pricing mechanism for interference
coupled systems [12]. Traditionally, pricing in communications networks is treated on the ser-
vice layer. However, pricing also affects how services are used and resources are consumed
[35]. On the physical layer, pricing is applied to manage interference and resource allocation.
The impact of interference coupling on the convexity of certain utility functions is character-
ized [59]. The Pareto efficiency of a pricing policy in terms of the transmit power and the
Nash equilibria are characterized by using the supermodularity property [2]. Linear pricing
in femtocell networks based on Stackelberg games is studied in [60]. By a pricing scheme,
the transmitted power is allocated to maximize the total utility summed over all users subject
to power constraints in a two CDMA adjacent cell networks [61]. In [62], the power control
and beamformer design are investigated for interference networks, based on the exchange of
interference prices. A set of prices corresponding to all degree of freedoms (DoFs) must be
exchanged to achieve the centralized optimal allocation.
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2.3.3 User Misbehavior and Mechanism Design
The behavior of users on networked systems ranges from altruistic on the one end tomalicious
(adversarial) on the other end. While altruistic users aim to improve the overall network per-
formance, selfish users develop strategies to maximize their own utility and obtain a share of
resources. A malicious user, on the other hand, aims to disrupt the whole network. Malicious
behavior may be due to the users inherentmaliciousness or in competitive scenarios where the
loss of a competing user will likely result in future gains for oneself. Well-known examples of
such adversarial behavior include jamming in wireless networks and denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks [63, 64, 65]. User misbehavior is studied in [66] on the network layer and a clever proto-
col is designed. In contrast to our work on the physical layer, they typically address trust and
misbehavior on themedium access control or network layer. For the inaccurate SINR feedback
in interference networks, [67] studies the impact on the distributed power update algorithm.
The authors in [68] show that the set of correctly behaving links has the ability to detect the
behavior of misrepresenting the utility, if and only if the restricted global dependency matrix
Grestricted is irreducible. The games for networked systems and the user behavior are analyzed
[69]. They also describe the algorithms for cheat-proof mechanism design.
Resource allocation based on d’Aspremont and Gerard-Varet (AGV) mechanism for an in-
centive compatible spectrum sharing game is proposed in [70]. In [71], finite RG and dis-
counted RG equilibrium are analyzed. A repeated graphical game with incomplete informa-
tion is proposed in [72] for interaction of legitimate and malicious users.
2.3.4 Heterogeneous Networks
Interference coordination becomes the primary challenge in the heterogeneous networks. Sev-
eral cognitive radio inspired approaches to enhance the interference coordination for femtocell
networks are applied in [73]. Distributed power control scheme for closed access femtocell
networks in down-link is formulated in [74] by using a noncooperative game model. In [75],
the power allocation to achieve the SINR based QoS requirement is provided for the uplink
transmission. The authors [76] propose a game-theoretical mechanism to derive the optimal
allocation in the general femtocell channel allocation problemwith or without prioritized fem-
tocells.
A Stackelberg Game to investigate the price-based resource allocation strategies for the two-
tier spectrum sharing femtocell networks is proposed in [60]. The utility-aware refunding
framework for hybrid access femtocell network is analyzed [77], where they use TDMA for
data transmission. A resource allocation mechanism is designed for the two-tier orthogonal
frequency-divisionmultiple-access (OFDMA) femtocell networkswith the analysis of wireless
users’ selfish characteristic and private traffic information [78]. For the two-tier femtocell net-
works, the throughput maximization problem subject to QoS constraints in terms of success
probabilities and per-tier minimum rates is formulated in [79]. In [80], the uplink interference
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problem in OFDMA-based femtocell networks is dealt with partial cochannel deployment. An
inter-tier interferencemitigation strategy offers significant performance improvement over the
existing methods. The authors devise a cooperative resource allocation algorithm, which is an
enhanced modified iterative water-filling, to improve intercell fairness in femtocell networks
[81].
2.3.5 Distributed Resource Allocation
The distributed resource allocation have been discussed plentifully for different wireless com-
munication scenarios. Each user allocates its resources independently to optimize its own
utility function. In [82], the authors consider a distributed power control scheme for wireless
ad hoc networks, in which each user announces a price that reflects compensation paid by
other users for their interference. The MAC game models are discussed in [83] in which each
transmitter makes individual decisions regarding their power level or transmission probabil-
ity. The authors in [84] address the efficient distributed power control via convex pricing of
users’ transmission power in the uplink of CDMA wireless networks supporting multiple ser-
vices. The CDMA power control as a noncooperative game is also discussed in [85], where a
cost function is introduced as the difference between the pricing and utility functions. A game-
theoretic approach is investigated in [86] for power control in ad-hoc networks. The conditions
of the unique NE and the global convergence of MIMO iterative waterfilling are discussed
in [87]. The distributed joint power and admission control algorithms are proposed [88] for
the management of interference in two-tier femtocell networks, where the newly-deployed
FUEs share the same frequency band with theMUEs using CDMA. The optimal decentralized
power allocation in fast fading MIMO MAC is investigated by the authors in [89], where the
players (the mobile terminals) are free to choose their power allocation in order to maximize
their individual transmission rates. A distributed interference pricing for allocating power
among multiple transmitters is presented [90] in order to optimize the weighted sum-rate in
interference channels.
2.4 Contributions and Structure
In the List of Publications, the published papers in which results of this thesis were discussed
are listed. The results of Problem 1 and 2 are published in [II] and correspond to Chapter 3.
The results of Problem 3 and 4 are published in [I] and [III] and correspond to Chapter 4. The
results of Problem 5 are published in [IV] and [V] and correspond to Chapter 5. The results
of Problem 6 are published in [VI] and [VII] and correspond to Chapter 6 in the thesis. The
conclusions and future works are discussed in Chapter 7.
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3 Centralized Universal Linear Pricing for MAC and BC under
QoS Requirements
In this chapter, we address the problem of power allocation in the uplink MAC and downlink
BCwith linear pricing framework to ensure that each user in the wireless network can achieve
its utility requirement. The prices are provided by the system regulator. As illustrated in Sec.
1.3.3, by introducing prices, the resulting power allocation ensures the QoS requirement of
each user. The system optimizer, which can be the BS, is proposed in the framework which
maximizes the system utility with pricing function. The existence of the universal linear pric-
ing mechanism is characterized. The algorithms for solving the linear pricing problems in
MAC and BC are proposed. The sufficient condition for universal linear pricing in MAC with
SIC and its best decoding order are analyzed.
3.1 System Preliminaries
As shown in Fig. 3.1, consider in a wireless system K transmitters with source message are
transmitting with power p = [p1, . . . , pK ]T , and at least K sinks1 are interested in their mes-
sages. The power is allocated centrally by the system. The system optimizer can be the BS or a
separate device. It is a simple dumb device that optimizes the system maximization problem
(SMP) with the given parameters such as CSI α, prices β and weightsw.
In the wireless system,
• Each user k has a rate requirement uk.
• The regulator chooses the optimal universal linear pricing parameter β∗k and weights (pri-
orities) wk in order to achieve the rate requirement uk for each user k.
• The system optimizer maximizes the system utility u˜(p,β,ω) with respect to the pricing
parameter βk and weight ωk and allocates power p∗k to each user k.
In an interference wireless system, each user k is mainly interested in maximizing its own
utility, but not the entire system utility. As shown in Fig. 3.1, the regulator chooses linear
prices β = [β1, · · · , βK ] with the knowledge of channel states α in order to achieve all the
1The sources and sinks could be collocated resulting in MAC or BC.
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Regulator
System Optimizer
Interference Network
Cost ck= βkpk
Channel states αk
Weights ωk
Prices βk
Utility requirements uk
Power Allocation pk
Channel states αk
RXK
RX2
RX1
TXK
TX2
TX1
Figure 3.1: System model of centralized universal linear pricing framework for interference
network
desired points of QoS requirement uk for each user k. And the system maximizes the system
utility u˜(p,β,ω) given below with the linear pricing mechanism.
u˜(p,β,ω) = u(p,ω)−
K∑
k=1
βkpk =
K∑
k=1
ωkgk
(
pk
Ik(p)
)
−
K∑
k=1
βkpk. (3.1)
We denote the solution to this SMP as the optimal power allocation, i.e.,
p∗(β,ω) = argmax
p≥0
u˜(p,β,ω). (3.2)
The fee ck = βkpk on power of link k is paid by the link to the regulator either directly or
via the system optimizer, see Figure 3.1. The pricing serves as a trade off betweenmaximizing
the rate and minimizing the power consumption.
The linear pricing which is linear in both the prices β and the power allocation p is utilized.
From Definition 1.11, the following Lemma states the conditions for the existence of linear
pricing mechanism for the utility u(p,ω).
3.1 Lemma. Let g1, · · · , gK ∈ Conc. And assume I1(p), · · · , IK(p) are linear interference functions.
If and only if u(p,ω) is jointly concave in p for all α ∈ RK+ , and ω > 0, then there exists a universal
linear pricing mechanism.
Proof. The proof is provided in Proof 3.5.1.
Note that there might occur cases in which the individual utility function does belong to a
natural competitive user utility (NCUU) function as defined in [59]. However, the channel re-
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alizations or the SINR is by chance chosen to provide a jointly concave system utility function,
then all rates can be achieved by linear pricing. This behavior could change if another channel
realization leads to a non-concave system utility function.
The result of Lemma 3.1 is related to Theorem 1 in [91]. However here the optimal power al-
location is determined centrally by a system utility (3.1) but not the (possibly unique) outcome
of a noncooperative game.
3.2 User-Centric Universal Linear Pricing for Multiple Access Channel with SIC
It is well known that with SIC at the BS, the capacity region of the single antenna Gaussian
MAC can be achieved. Assume that the BS decides the best decoding order pii = {πi1, · · · , π
i
K}
with perfect knowledge of the channel states α = [α1, · · · , αK ]. The best decoding order will
be determined later.
Assume a SIC decoding order as π1 = [K → K−1→ · · · → 1]. Let the SINR-based function
gk
(
pk
Ik(p)
)
= rk(p). Then the rate function without pricing for each user k is
rk(p) = log
(
1 +
αkpk
1 +
∑k−1
l=1 αlpl
)
≥ uk. (3.3)
Obviously the individual user rate depends on the SIC decoding order. The system optimizer
allocates p for the MAC with SIC by solving
max
p≥0
u˜(p,β,ω) = max
p
K∑
k=1
ωk
(
log
(
1 +
k∑
m=1
αmpm
)
− log
(
1 +
k−1∑
m=1
αmpm
))
− βkpk. (3.4)
In general, the optimal power allocation is characterized by the first order optimality condi-
tions
∂
∂pl
= ωl
αl
1 +
∑l
m=1 pmαm
+
K∑
k=l+1
ωk
(
αl
1 +
∑k
m=1 αmpm
−
αl
1 +
∑k−1
m=1 αmpm
)
−βl = 0. (3.5)
Calculate the power allocation and substitute it into (3.3), then the linear pricing parameter
βk can be derived. For illustration, we now perform a case study.
3.2.1 Two-User Case in MAC
For simplicity and illustration, we investigate the special case with two users first and assume
ω1 6= ω2.
3.2 Lemma. For SIC decoding order [1 → 2], the optimal power allocation with respect to ω and β is
p∗1→21 (β
∗
1) =
ω1
β1
− α2(ω1−ω2)
α2β1−α1β2
for user 1 and p∗1→22 (β
∗
2) =
α1(ω1−ω2)
α2β1−α1β2
− 1
α2
for user 2.
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Figure 3.2: Cost terms for 2-user MAC with different SIC decoding order
The corresponding pricing parameters are β∗1→21 =
α1ω1
2u1+u2
for user 1 and β∗1→22 =
α2
2u2
(
ω1
2u1 +ω2−
ω1
)
for user 2.
For the SIC decoding order [2 → 1], the optimal power allocation is p∗2→11 (β
∗
1) =
α2(ω2−ω1)
α1β2−α2β1
− 1
α1
for user 1 and p∗2→12 (β
∗
2) =
ω2
β2
− α1(ω2−ω1)
α1β2−α2β1
for user 2.
The corresponding pricing parameters are β∗2→11 =
α1
2u1
(
ω2
2u2 + ω1 − ω2
)
for user 1 and β∗2→12 =
α2ω2
2u1+u2
for user 2.
Proof. Please refer to Proof 3.5.2.
Fig. 3.2 shows the sum of the cost terms for the 2-user MAC with both SIC decoding orders.
The x − y domain shows the feasible QoS region. It illustrates that for the weights ω1 = 13 ,
ω2 =
2
3 and equal channels α1 = α2, the sum cost term for decoding order [1 → 2] is higher
than [2→ 1]. This will be analyzed later in Subsection 3.2.5.
3.2.2 K-User Case in MAC
Nowwe investigate the scenario whereK users are transmitting signal to the BS. First, assume
all weights ωi are pairwise disjunct ω1 6= · · · 6= ωK .
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3.3 Theorem. In order to guarantee the QoS requirements u of each user, the universal linear pricing
parameter β for K-user MAC with SIC decoding order pii = [πii → π
i
2 → · · · → π
i
K ] is given by
β = A−1 · 2s, (3.6)
where the matrix of different channels is denoted byA,
A =


αpii
K−1
−αpii
K
0 · · · 0
0 αpii
K−2
−αpii
K−1
· · · 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 · · · αpii0

 .
The vector s is given by
s =


log
(
(ωpii
K
− ωpii
K−1
)αpii
K
αpii
K−1
)
− upii
K
log
(
(ωpii
K−1
− ωpii
K−2
)αpii
K−1
αpii
K−2
)
− upii
K
− upii
K−1
...
log(ωpii1
αpii1
)− upii
K
− · · · − upii1

 .
The power allocation for theK-userMACwith the SIC decoding order pii = [πi1 → π
i
2 → · · · → π
i
K ]
by solving (3.4) is
ppii
k
=
u˜pii
k
− 1
αpii
k
·
K∏
j=k+1
u˜piij
, (3.7)
where u˜i = 2
ui , αpii0 = 1 and ωpii0 = 0.
2
Proof. The proof is provided in Proof 3.5.3.
If identical weights ω1 = · · · = ωK = ω are considered, results in Theorem 3.3 are derived
as follows.
3.4 Corollary. The optimal prices β and power allocation p for the K-user MAC with equal weights
and the SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1] are
βl =
αl
2
∑K
k=1 uk
, (3.8)
pl =
2
∑l
k=1 uk − 2
∑l−1
k=1 uk
αl
.
Proof. Please refer to Proof 3.5.4.
2The power allocation in (3.7) is derived by methods in [92, Chapter 10].
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For the K-user MAC, the system regulator provides the prices β in (3.6) to the system opti-
mizer. Then the power p is allocated by the system optimizer such that the QoS requirements
u are achieved.
3.2.3 Condition for Jointly Concave Utility for MAC with SIC
As indicated in Lemma 3.1, the universal linear pricing exists if and only if u(p,ω) if jointly
concave in p. The following lemma provides the condition of the existence of the universal
linear pricing.
3.5 Lemma. For certain decoding order pii, if pii = [πi1 → π
i
2 → · · · → π
i
K−1 → π
i
K ], a sufficient
condition for a jointly concave utility function u(p,ω) irrespective of the channel realizations α is
ωpii
K
≥ ωpii
K−1
≥ · · · ≥ ωpii2
≥ ωpii1
. (3.9)
Proof. Please refer to Proof 3.5.5.
Fig. 3.2 shows that different SIC decoding orders result in different cost terms for MAC.
Therefore, in the next section, the choice of best SIC decoding order is analyzed.
3.2.4 Choosing Best Decoding Order
The idea for the best SIC decoding order is not to compare the system utility functions for
different decoding orders but to minimize the sum transmit power in the MAC system with
different decoding orders.
3.6 Lemma. The best SIC decoding order depends on the channel state α. In order to maximize the
system utility function u˜(p,β,ω) fulfilling the rate requirement uk with minimum sum power, the
decoding order pii = [πi1 → π
i
2 → · · · → π
i
K−1 → π
i
K ] is induced by
αpii1
≥ αpii2
≥ · · · ≥ αpii
K−1
≥ αpii
K
. (3.10)
If the order of weights in (3.9) for some users does not fit the order of channels in (3.10), e.g., if the
order of channel states is αK ≥ · · · ≥ αk+1 ≥ αk ≥ · · · ≥ α1, but the weight ωk < ωk+1 for user k
and k + 1, then it is sufficient to use the unweighted sum utility maximization as (3.31) at the system
maximizer.
Proof. Please refer to Proof 3.5.6.
3.2.5 Cost Analysis
Figure 3.2 illustrates the cost terms c[ · ] =
∑
i βipi for different SIC decoding orders.
3 In Section
3.2.4, we analyze the best decoding order regarding the channel states α with respect to min-
3[ · ] denotes the SIC decoding order.
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imize the sum transmit power. Now we will analyze the relationship between cost terms and
the SIC decoding order. From (3.6), for a certain decoding order πi = [πi1 → π
i
2 → · · · → π
i
K ],
the pricing parameters for theK-user MAC can be rewritten as
β =


αpii1
( ω
pii
1∏K
j=1 u˜pii
j
)
αpii2
( ω
pii
2
−ω
pii
1∏K
j=2 u˜pii
j
+
ω
pii
1∏K
j=1 u˜pii
j
)
...
αpii
K
(ω
pii
K
−ω
pii
K−1
u˜
pii
K
+
ω
pii
K−1
−ω
pii
K−2∏K
j=K−1 u˜pii
j
+ · · ·+
ω
pii
1∏K
j=1 u˜pii
j
)


.
It is shown that bymultiplying the power allocation in (3.7), the cost terms c[ · ] are independent
of the channel states α.
The cost term cpi
i
is then
cpi
i
= (ωpii
K
− ωpii
K−1
)
u˜pii
K
− 1
u˜pii
K
+ (ωpii
K−1
− ωpii
K−2
)
( u˜pii
K−1
− 1
u˜pii
K−1
+
u˜pii
K
− 1∏K
K−1 u˜piij
)
+ · · ·
+ωpii1
( u˜pii1 − 1
u˜pii1
+
u˜pii2
− 1∏2
j=1 u˜piij
+ · · ·+
u˜pii
K
− 1∏K
j=1 u˜piij
)
. (3.11)
3.7 Lemma. The cost terms c[ · ] are only dependent on the weights ω and the utility requirements u of
each user for different decoding orders. The regulator can charge highest from the SIC decoding order
[K → · · · → 1] if the order of weights is ω1 ≥ · · · ≥ ωK .
Proof. Please refer to Proof 3.5.7.
It is of interest for the regulator to devise the individual weights ω in order to achieve the
unique power allocation with concave utility function, which indeed coincides with the high-
est charge from the users. Fig. 3.2 illustrates this for the 2-user MAC.
3.2.6 Reordering Mechanism
Lemma 3.6 shows that the best SIC decoding order πi is determined by the order of chan-
nel states α. Lemma 3.5 provides the order of individual wights ω induced by a given SIC
decoding order as a sufficient condition for the utility function u(p,ω) to be jointly concave.
Therefore, in order to ensure that the system works with a unique optimal solution, the regu-
lator could set the individual weight ωk according to the order of channel statesα and reorder
the kth user according to the channel states as well.
Assume that the channel states are ordered as αpii1 ≥ αpii2 ≥ · · · > αpiiK−1 ≥ αpiiK which
induce the SIC decoding order as pii = [πi1 → π
i
2 → · · · → π
i
K−1 → π
i
K ]. Set the weights in
order ωpii
K
≥ ωpii
K−1
≥ · · · > ωpii2
≥ ωpii1
to ensure a jointly concave utility function u(p,ω).
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Reorder the user with channel state αpii1 as theK
th user, the user with channel state αpii2 as the
K − 1th user, and so on. Then the SIC decoding order is shifted to pi1 = [K → · · · → 1]. It
is analogue for different decoding orders. Therefore, any fixed SIC decoding order could be
obtained by simply reordering the users with the order of their channel states.
If channel states change, then the regulator changes the weights and SIC decoding order
accordingly.
3.3 User-Centric Universal Linear Pricing for Broadcast Channel with DPC
Known as the duality between MAC and BC, with the same total transmit power, MAC and
BC can achieve the same rate. This duality holds provided that the decoding order of SIC in
the uplink MAC is the reverse of the DPC order in the downlink BC [9]. Using this interesting
duality, we analyze the universal linear pricing problem in BC.
The general utility function for BC is
u(q,ω) =
∑
k∈K
ωkgk
(
qk
Ik(q)
)
, (3.12)
where q is the power allocation in BC. Note that the interference function I(q) here for BC is
different from that in MAC. For a certain DPC precoding order p˜ii = [π˜i1 → · · · → π˜
i
K ], the
interference function for BC is
Ip˜ii
k
= αp˜ii
k
K∑
j=k+1
qp˜iij
+ σ2n. (3.13)
The regulator chooses linear pricing parameters β′ = [β′1, · · · , β
′
K ] and the system utility is
u˜(q,β′,ω) = u(q,ω)−
K∑
k=1
β′kqk. (3.14)
3.3.1 Two-User Case in BC
Similar to the analysis in MAC, we consider the special case of two users in the BC first.
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3.8 Lemma. For BC with DPC precoding order as [1 → 2] according to the SIC decoding order in
MAC as π1 = [2 → 1], the optimized power allocation with respect to the utility requirement uk and
the pricing parameters are
q∗1 = (2
u1 − 1)
(
1
α1
+
2u2 − 1
α2
)
,
q∗2 =
2u2 − 1
α2
.
β∗
′
1 =
ω1α1α2
2u1(α2 − α1 + α12u2)
,
β∗
′
2 =
ω1α1α2(1 + 2
u1)
2u1(α2 − α1) + α12u1+u2
−
ω2α2
2u2
. (3.15)
Proof. Please refer to Proof 3.5.8.
For the DPC precoding order as [2 → 1], the calculations of optimal power allocation and
pricing parameters are similar. In the next section, the power allocation for K-user BC using
universal linear pricing in order to guarantee the QoS requirement of each user is discussed.
3.3.2 K-User Case in BC
Now, we investigate the universal linear pricing problem in BC for generalK-user cases. Due
to the duality betweenMAC and BC, the rate requirement for each user k in BC is the same as
in MAC as uk.
3.9 Lemma. Assume the DPC precoding order as [K → K − 1 → · · · → 2 → 1], the pricing
parameters β∗
′
given by regulator for BC are
β∗
′
l =
ωlαl
Zl
+
K∑
m=l+1
αmωm
(
1
Zm
−
1
Ym
)
, (3.16)
where Yl = 1 + αl
∑l−1
1 qi, and Zl = 1 + αl
∑l
1 qi = Yl + αlql with ωK+1 = 0.
Proof. Please refer to Proof 3.5.9.
3.4 Contrary Example
MAC without SIC is one of the contrary example for our universal linear pricing mechanism.
The interference function for MAC without SIC is
Ik(p) =
∑
l 6=k
αlpl + σ
2, (3.17)
where σ2 is the noise power.
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Then the utility function u(p,ω) =
∑
k∈K ωkgk(
pk
Ik(p)
) is no longer jointly concave with re-
spect to p in general. It becomes the NU function in [12]. There is no universal linear pricing
for these functions in general. For example, if u1 = log
(
1 + α1p11+α2p2
)
and u2 = log
(
1 + α2p21+α1p1
)
,
the eigenvalues for the Hessian matrix with α1 = α2 = 1 and p1 = p2 = 1 are 0.25 and -
0.194444. Therefore, u˜ = u1 + u2 is not jointly concave in p1 and p2. It is possible to be jointly
concave if the Hessian matrix of the system utility u˜(q,β,ω) is larger than 0.
3.5 Proofs
3.5.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof. "⇒": Assume u(p,ω) is jointly concave in p, then the optimization problem
max
p≥0
u˜(p,β,ω) = max
p≥0
(
u(p,ω)−
K∑
k=1
βkpk
)
(3.18)
has a unique solution characterized by the first order optimality condition:
∂
∂pl
u(p∗,ω)− βl = 0 if p∗l > 0. (3.19)
Let us assume that uk ∈ F(α) is achieved by a certain power allocation p, i.e.,
gk(pk/Ik((p))) = uk (3.20)
for all k ∈ K . For positive utility requirements, the required power p∗k is always positive and
thereby justifying (3.19).
Then choose a pricing parameter
β∗l (p) =
∂
∂pl
u(p,ω) |p=p
in order to achieve the necessary power allocation.
"⇐": It is proved in Theorem 1 in [12].
3.5.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. For user 1, the rate requirement for SIC decoding order of [1 → 2] is fulfilled by u1 =
r1(p
∗
1(β1)) = log
(
1 +
α1p
∗
1(β1)
1+α2p∗2(β2)
)
. For user 2, the rate requirement is fulfilled by u2 = r2(p
∗
2(β2)) =
log(1 + α2p
∗
2(β2)).
Therefore, the power needed to achieve the rate requirement is
p∗1(β1) =
2u1 − 1
α1
(1 + α2p
∗
2(β2)) =
2u2(2u1 − 1)
α1
, (3.21)
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p∗2(β2) =
2u2 − 1
α2
. (3.22)
From (3.21) and (3.22), the system maximizes the system utility u˜(p,β,ω) with linear pricing
term
max
p≥0
u˜(p,β,ω) = max
p≥0
(
ω1 log
(
1 +
α1p1
1 + α2p2
)
− β1p1 + ω2 log(1 + α2p2)− β2p2
)
. (3.23)
The optimal power allocation solves this maximization problem by
∂
∂p1
=
ω1α1
1 + α1p1 + α2p2
− β1 = 0, (3.24)
∂
∂p2
=
ω1α2
1 + α1p1 + α2p2
−
(ω1 − ω2)α2
1 + α2p2
− β2 = 0. (3.25)
Now we obtain the power allocation p∗k with respect to the weight ωk as well as the pricing
parameter βk. Substitute p∗k into (3.21) and (3.22), the pricing parameter β
∗
k is observed. The
case for the decoding order [2→ 1] is analogue.
3.5.3 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Proof. It is sufficient to consider the case with SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1]. In order to
obtain the universal pricing of β, setXl = 1 +
∑l
k=1 αkpk. Note that ωK+1 = 0 and αK+1 = 1,
(3.5) can be written as
∂
∂pl
= αl
(
ωl − ωl+1
Xl
+
ωl+1 − ωl+2
Xl+1
+ · · ·+
ωK−1 − ωK
XK−1
+
ωK
XK
)
− βl = 0. (3.26)
Since ∂
∂pK
= ωKαK
XK
− βK = 0,XK =
αKωK
βK
. InsertXK into (3.26), we getXl =
(ωl−ωl+1)αlαl+1
αl+1βl−αlβl+1
.
Therefore,
log(Xl) =
cl︷ ︸︸ ︷
log((ωl − ωl+1)αlαl+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
c˜l
− log (αl+1βl − αlβl+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dl
. (3.27)
Since ωl and αl are given numbers, the first item on the right handside in (3.27) is constant
number cl. DenoteD = [D1, · · · ,DK ],D = A ·β.
From (3.3), the rate of each user l is
rl =

 log(
Xl
Xl−1
) : otherwise
log(Xl) : l = 1
(3.28)
38 3 Centralized Universal Linear Pricing for MAC and BC under QoS Requirements
Then we obtain 2r1 = X1 and 2rl =
Xl
Xl−1
for 1 < l ≤ K , thus Xl =
∏l
k=1 2
rk = 2
∑l
k=1 rk .
Therefore, log(Xl) =
∑l
k=1 rk = X˜l. From (3.27), X˜ = c − log(A ·β), i.e. 2
s = A ·β, where
s = c− X˜ . A−1 always exists because ωk > 0, αk > 0 for all k, 1 ≤ k ≤ K .
This proves the universal linear pricing parameter β in (3.6).
From (3.20) and (3.3), the rate requirement uk for each user with SIC decoding order [π
i
1 →
πi2 → · · · → π
i
K ] is achieved by certain power allocation pwhere
uk = log
(
1 +
αpii
k
ppii
k
1 +
∑K
l=k+1 αpiil
ppii
l
)
. (3.29)
Compute the power allocation p in the SIC decoding order pii as a function of utility require-
ment u and the channel states α,
ppii
k
=
2
u
pii
k − 1
αpii
k
· (1 +
K∑
l=k+1
αpii
l
ppii
l
)
=
2
u
pii
k − 1
αpii
k
· 2
∑K
j=k+1 upii
j . (3.30)
This proves the second statement in Theorem 3.3.
3.5.4 Proof of Corollary 3.4
Proof. When considering the equal weight, the pricing problem is easier to characterize, since
the optimization problem of (3.4) becomes
max
p≥0,pi
u˜(p,β,ω) = max
p
K∑
k=1
log(1 +
k∑
m=1
αmpm)− log(1 +
k−1∑
m=1
αmpm)− βkpk
= max
p≥0,pi
logXK −
K∑
k=1
βkpk. (3.31)
The solution of the optimization problem is
∂
∂pl
=
αl
1 +
∑K
k=1 αkpk
− βl
=
αl
XK
− βl = 0 (3.32)
if pl > 0.
The optimization holds for pl = 2
∑l
k=1
uk−2
∑l−1
k=1
uk
αl
and βl =
αl
Xk
. This result is similar to
equation (6) in [92].
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3.5.5 Proof of Lemma 3.5
Proof. Recall the utility function u(p,ω) for the K users in MAC with SIC. First considering
the SIC decoding order is pi1 = [K → K − 1→ · · · → 2→ 1],
u(p,ω) =
K∑
k=1
ωk log(1 +
αkpk
1 +
∑k−1
m=1 αmpm
)
= ωK log(1 +
K∑
m=1
αmpm) + · · · + (ωk−1 − ωk) log(1 +
k−1∑
m=1
αmpm)
+ · · ·+ (ω1 − ω2) log(1 + α1p1). (3.33)
(3.33) is the sum of weighted concave functions. Since all weights are non-negative, the
overall function is concave, too. For the SIC decoding order pi1, if the weights are ordered as
ω1 ≥ ω2 ≥ · · · ≥ ωK−1 ≥ ωK , then the utility u(p,ω) is jointly concave.
The analysis is analogue for any given decoding order pii = [pii1 → pi
i
2 → · · · → pi
i
K−1 →
piiK ].
3.5.6 Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof. Since the rate requirements u are fixed for different decoding orders, the basic idea to
prove the first statement in Lemma 3.6 is to find the best decoding order which consumes
the lowest sum transmit power. It is sufficient to consider the power allocation pk+1→k and
pk→k+1 for two users k+1 and kwith the decoding order k+1→ k and k → k+1, respectively
[55]. Assume a decoding order π1 = [K → · · · → 1] and αK ≥ · · · ≥ αk+1 ≥ αk ≥ · · · ≥ α1.
From the power allocation of (3.7),
pk+1→kk+1 =
2uk+1 − 1
αk+1
· 2
∑k
i=1 ui ,
pk+1→kk =
2uk − 1
αk
· 2
∑k−1
i=1 ui . (3.34)
pk→k+1k+1 =
2uk+1 − 1
αk+1
· 2
∑k−1
i=1 ui ,
pk→k+1k =
2uk − 1
αk
· 2
∑k−1
i=1 ui · 2uk+1 . (3.35)
Now compare the sum power
∑
i p
k+1→k
i and
∑
i p
k→k+1
i . DefineN =
∑
i p
k+1→k
i −
∑
i p
k→k+1
i .
N = 2
∑k−1
i=1 ui(2uk+1 − 1)(2uk − 1)
(
1
αk+1
−
1
αk
)
. (3.36)
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Since the rate requirement u > 0, 2uk > 1, 2uk+1 > 1 and 2
∑k−1
i=1 ui > 0. With the assumption
αk+1 > αk, N < 0. Therefore, decoding order k+1→ k consumes lower transmit power than
decoding order k → k + 1 for [K → · · · → 1]. For any arbitrary decoding orders pi 6= [K →
· · · → 1] with the channel states αK ≥ · · · ≥ αk+1 ≥ αk ≥ · · · ≥ α1, reordering the successive
two neighbor indices lowers the sum transmit power. It is analogue for any other orders of
channel states α and πi.
This proves the first statement in Lemma 3.6.
Deduced by (3.10), the SIC decoding order for the order of channel statesαK ≥ · · · ≥ αk+1 ≥
αk ≥ · · · ≥ α1 is [K → · · · → 1]. If ωk < ωk+1, then ωk − ωk+1 ≤ 0, using ωk = ωk+1 maximizes
the utility function u(p,ω). This proves the second statement in Lemma 3.6.
3.5.7 Proof of Lemma 3.7
Proof. It is sufficient to compare the cost terms ck+1→k and ck→k+1 of two successive users
k and k + 1 with the decoding order k + 1 → k and k → k + 1, respectively. Assume the
weights for each user are ordered by ω1 ≥ · · · ≥ ωK , which induce the SIC decoding order
as [K → · · · → 1]. By changing the decoding order of two successive users k + 1 and k, the
corresponding pricing parameters are
βk+1→kk+1 = αk+1 ·
(ωk+1 − ωk+2∏k+1
i=i u˜i
+ · · ·+
ωK∏K
i=1 u˜i
)
,
βk+1→kk = αk ·
(ωk − ωk+1∏k
i=i u˜i
+ · · ·+
ωK∏K
i=1 u˜i
)
. (3.37)
βk→k+1k+1 = αk+1 ·
( ωk+1 − ωk∏k−1
i=i u˜i · u˜k+1
+
ωk − ωk+2∏k+1
i=i u˜i
+ · · ·+
ωK∏K
i=1 u˜i
)
,
βk→k+1k = αk ·
(ωk − ωk+2∏k+1
i=i u˜i
+ · · ·+
ωK∏K
i=1 u˜i
)
. (3.38)
Note that ωK+1 = 0, u˜0 = 1, and u˜i = 2
ui . Now we compare the cost terms ck+1→k and
ck→k+1. Define M = ck+1→k − ck→k+1, where ck+1→k = βk+1→kk+1 p
k+1→k
k+1 + β
k+1→k
k p
k+1→k
k and
ck→k+1 = βk→k+1k+1 p
k→k+1
k+1 + β
k→k+1
k p
k→k+1
k . From (3.34) and (3.35), the difference between the
cost terms of the two decoding orders for user k + 1 and k is
M =
(u˜k − 1)(u˜k+1 − 1)
u˜k · u˜k+1
(ωk − ωk+1) . (3.39)
Since u ≥ 0, u˜ ≥ 1. With ωk ≥ ωk+1, M ≥ 0. Therefore. the cost term for decoding order
k + 1 → k is higher than decoding order k → k + 1. For any arbitrary decoding order pi 6=
[K → · · · → 1] with the weights ω1 ≥ · · · ≥ ωK , reordering the successive two neighbor
indices increases the cost term. It is analogue for any other orders of weights α and decoding
orders πi.
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3.5.8 Proof of Lemma 3.8
Proof. According to the MAC and BC duality, the sum transmit power in BC is
∑
i
qi =
∑
i
pi,
q1 + q2 =
2u1 − 1
α1
+
2u1(2u2 − 1)
α2
=
2u1(α2 − α1) + α12
u1+u2 − α2
α1α2
. (3.40)
And solve the optimization problem in (3.14), ∂
∂q1
= ω1α11+α1q1+α1q2−β1 = 0 and
∂
∂q2
= ω1α11+α1q1+α1q2−
ω1α1
1+α1q2
+ ω2α21+α2q2 −β2 = 0. Hence, knowing the sum power in (3.40), the optimal pricing param-
eters β∗
′
1 and β
∗′
2 are solved.
3.5.9 Proof of Lemma 3.9
Proof. From (3.14), the system utility for BC is
max
q≥0
u˜(q,β′,ω) = max
q≥0
K∑
k=1
ωk log
(
1 +
αkqk
1 + αk
∑k−1
j=1 qj
)
−
K∑
k=1
β′kqk. (3.41)
The first optimization condition with respect to ql is
∂
∂ql
=
K∑
m=l+1
(
ωmαm
Zm
−
ωmαm
Ym
)
+
ωlαl
Zl
− βl = 0. (3.42)
Then the rate requirement u is
ul = log
(
1 +
αlql
1 + αl
∑l−1
m=1 qm
)
= log
(Zl
Yl
)
. (3.43)
To solve Yl and Zl, the power given in Chapter 10.3.2 of [9] could be used.
q = (Da −B)
−1
1,
whereDa := diag
(
1
a1
, · · · , 1
aK
)
, and 1 is the vector of all 1’s. AndB have components of αk,
ak :=
2uk − 1
2ukαk
. (3.44)
By insertingDa into Yl and Zl, the optimal pricing parameters β′ are solved.
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3.6 Summary
We propose a linear pricing framework in which a general system utility function is optimized
under the QoS requirements of each user in the uplinkMAC as well as in the downlink BC. For
the MAC with SIC, we characterize the conditions for the system utility to be jointly concave
with respect to power allocation which support the universal linear pricing. Furthermore,
we provide an algorithm of the pricing parameters to achieve the QoS requirement for each
user. The best decoding order for SIC in MAC which minimizes the sum transmit power is
proposed. A reorderingmechanism for the K-userMACwith regard to the order of individual
weight wk is proposed so that the SIC decoding order can be fixed.
In the downlink BC, due to the duality to MAC under the sum power constraint, the univer-
sal linear pricing algorithm is also proposed.
The contrary example shows that linear pricing is not a universal pricing mechanism for the
general MAC without SIC. Because the SINR-based utility function for MAC without SIC is
no longer jointly concave with respect to the power allocation.
In the next chapter, the universal nonlinear pricing mechanism for the general MAC both
with and without SIC is analyzed. Moreover, the user misbehavior is discussed and the
strategy-proof mechanism to prevent cheating is proposed.
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4 Centralized Universal Cheat-Proof Non-Linear Pricing
Framework for MAC
In this chapter we analyze the universal cheat-proof non-linear pricing framework for the gen-
eral MAC system with and without SIC, respectively. It serves as a benchmark. The detailed
systemmodel are introduced and described.
4.1 System Overview and Universal Pricing for General MAC
In order to achieve the utility requirement of each user in the system, we adopt a universal
non-linear pricing mechanism at the system optimizer to enforce the power allocation of the
whole system.
4.1.1 System Preliminaries
We study the system operation with universal cheat-proof non-linear pricing for a wireless
MACwith three types of agents as shown in Fig. 4.1: the systemoperator serving as the benev-
olent regulator, the BS serving as the dumb system optimizer and the transmitters serving as
the selfish (malicious) users. In total, there areK transmitters (users) in theMAC system, each
with single antenna. Each user k has an SINR-based utility requirement uk to be guaranteed
by the system and maximizes its short-term user-utility as well as the long-term total payoff
in the RG. The pricing mechanism is designed as a virtual currency in the system to help the
regulator to shift the system operating point to the utility requirement of each user. Each user
has to pay some virtual money to the system operator based on their utility requirement. We
regard this cost term as the virtual fee for the power allocation in the MAC system. The cost
terms might be a basis for the operator to develop a tariff model. However, the pricing frame-
work influences more on the physical layer processing than on the application layer revenue.
Therefore the time scale is based on the real time physical layer power allocation. These agents
interact and behave in each round i, i = 0, . . . ,∞ (for infinite RG), according to the following
characteristics:
The regulator applies pricing to i) maximize revenue, ii) satisfy the QoS requirements of
all users and iii) guarantee the correct system operation (e.g. punishing the misbehavior of
agents).
1. Obtain the utility requirements u from theK users (higher layer)
2. Compute the universal non-linear pricing parameters βi = [βi1, . . . , β
i
K ] ≥ 0 and charge
the total cost ciK from users
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3. Choose weightsw = [w1, . . . , wK ] > 0with
∑K
j=1wj = 1
4. Send βi andw to the system optimizer
5. Punish user k with trigger strategy Vk involving the trigger pricing βtrk once detecting the
user misbehavior.
The system optimizer automatically allocates the power to the users by solving the system
utility maximization problem (UMP) u˜(p,β,w)with given parameters.
1. Obtain prices βi and weightsw from the regulator
2. Obtain CQI αˆ1, . . . , αˆK from the users, αˆ > 0
3. Solve the UMP to allocate the power pi1, . . . , p
i
K with maximum single user power con-
straint pmax, 0 < pik ≤ pmax
4. Send the power allocation to users and the regulator
The users require system service u = [u1, · · · , uK ] with the proper power allocation p and
pay the fee to the system regulator.
1. Receive the pricing parameters βi1, . . . , β
i
K from the regulator
2. Report CQI αˆi1, . . . , αˆ
i
K to system optimizer by calculating their own short-term user-
utility
3. Receive transmit power allocation pi1, . . . , p
i
K
4. Pay cost cik(β,p) = βk log pk to the regulator
5. Transmit with power pik over the true channel αk
6. Anticipate the long-term total payoff u¯k in the repeated game.
4.1.2 Universal Non-linear Pricing
Let us start from the correct operation for the physical layer power allocation with truthful
agents using the universal pricing. We discuss the general MAC systemwith and without SIC,
respectively. Denote the operation with SIC with · SIC . Consider a general utility function
u(p,ω) =
K∑
k=1
ωk log
(
1 +
αkpk
Ik(p)
)
. (4.1)
Ik(p) is from the set of simple linear interference (plus noise) functions where for MAC with-
out SIC, it is a linear interference function I link (p) =
∑
l 6=k αlpl + σ
2
n, and for MAC with SIC
decoding order π = [π1 → · · · → πK ], ISICpik (p) =
∑K
l=k+1 αpilppil + σ
2
n.
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Figure 4.1: Systemmodel for general MACwith three agents: regulator, system optimizer and
mobile users
A universal pricing mechanism is a tool where the regulator can utilize to shift the operating
point of the wireless communication system to the desired utility requirement of each user k.
Theorem 1 in [12] shows that linear pricing in power pk is not sufficient for achieving all points
if the links are interference coupled, e.g., for the linear interference function. Theorem 2 and 3
in [12] show that linear pricing in βk and logarithmic in pk is a universal pricing mechanism
for log-convex interference functions. An interference function F : RK+1+ → R+ is said to be a
log-convex function if F is log-convex on RK+1.
Linear interference functions are also log-convex interference functions. Therefore, after the
transformation pk = esk , the utility function
∑K
k=1wk log(1 +
αkpk
Ik(p)
) is jointly concave with
respect to s for both MAC with and without SIC. The system utility with pricing mechanism
which is linear in βk and logarithmic in pk is given by
u˜(p,β,w) = u(p,w)−
∑
k
βk log pk. (4.2)
4.1 Definition. The pricing term βk log pk which is linear in βk and non-linear in pk is said to
be universal non-linear pricing if the utility function (4.1) is jointly concave in sk.
In the following section, we consider the rate based utility maximization function as follows.
u˜(p,β,w) =
K∑
k=1
wk log
(
1 +
αke
sk
Ik(es)
)
−
K∑
k=1
βksk, (4.3)
where wk is the weight, βk is the universal non-linear price and sk = log pk.
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4.2 System Operation with Truthful Agents
First we analyze the standard procedure to allocate power pk with corresponding price βk and
weightwk for the truthful agents in theK-userMACwith and without SIC, respectively, using
the universal non-linear pricing mechanism. Therefore, we assume that the CQI α1, ..., αK are
known perfectly and reported truthfully. We omit the notation i for round i in this section for
simplicity. The UMP is to maximize
u˜(p,β,w) =
K∑
k=1
wk log
(
1 +
αke
sk
1 +
∑
j 6=k αje
sj
)
−
K∑
k=1
βksk (4.4)
for MAC without SIC and similarly
u˜(p,β,w)SIC =
K∑
k=1
wSICpik log
(
1 +
αpike
sSICpik
1 +
∑K
j=k+1 αpije
sSICpij
)
−
K∑
k=1
βSICpik s
SIC
pik
(4.5)
for MAC with SIC decoding order π = [π1 → · · · → πK ].
4.2.1 Linear Receiver without SIC
For MAC without SIC, we characterize the optimal power allocation as a function of utility
requirements and the reported CQI. Then, the corresponding pricing parameters are derived.
4.2.1.1 Power Allocation and Universal Non-linear Pricing
The system optimizer allocates the power to each user by solving
p = argmax
p
u˜(p,β,w).
s.t. 0 ≤ p ≤ pmax
4.2 Proposition. In the K-user MAC without SIC, the power of each user k allocated by the system
optimizer in order to optimize UMP is a function of the QoS requirements u and the CQI αk.
pk =
BK
αk
·
2uk − 1
2uk
, (4.6)
where BK =
1∑K
j=1
1
2
uj
−K+1
is a constant for given uj, j = 1, · · · ,K .
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The regulator can ensure the QoS requirements u by pricing parameters (k = 1, · · · ,K)
βk =
(
1−
1
2uk
)1−∑
j 6=k
wj2
uj

 (4.7)
and weights w from the following interval
1 + 12uk −
1
K−1 ·
∑K
j=1
1
2
uj
K − 1
< wk <
1
2uk(K − 1)
. (4.8)
Proof. See Proof 4.5.1.
The achievable rate of each user in the general MAC without SIC is restrict by the total
number of users in the wireless system.
4.3 Corollary. The feasible region U for the K-user MAC system without SIC is
K − 1 <
K∑
j=1
1
2uj
< K, (4.9)
where feasible means that the utility requirements are achievable in the K-user MAC system.
Proof. From (4.6), the utility requirement uk of user k is achievable with positive power al-
location pk if and only if BK > 0 so that K − 1 <
∑K
j=1
1
2
uj
. For positive uk, 2
uk > 1 and
0 < 12uk < 1, therefore
∑K
j=1
1
2
uj
< K is proved.
The definition of the utility requirement uk allows us to rewrite the criterion of feasible util-
ity region (4.9) through an effective bandwidth characterization:
∑K
j=1
2
uj−1
2
uj
< 1 and
∑K
j=1
SINRj
1+SINRj
<
1, where the effective bandwidth
∑K
j=1
2
uj−1
2
uj is a simple monotonic function of uj . Therefore the
utility region is feasible if and only if the sum of the effective bandwidths of theK users is less
than one. This region is similarly characterized in [93], where the authors focus on the user
capacity of synchronous CDMA systems with linear MMSE multiuser receivers. The right
handside (RHS) one of the criterion represents the degrees of freedom in the system.
4.4 Corollary. The feasible utility region Upmax with single user power constraint pmax for theK-user
MAC system without SIC is
max
1≤k≤K
(
1− 12uk
pmax ·αk
)
+K − 1 <
K∑
j=1
1
2uj
< K. (4.10)
Proof. By solving pk < pmax, we obtain
∑K
j=1
1
2
uj >
1− 1
2uk
pmax ·αk + K − 1, k = 1, . . . ,K. Since(
1− 1
2uk
pmax ·αk
)
is always positive,K > max1≤k≤K
(
1− 1
2uk
pmax ·αk
)
+K − 1 > K − 1.
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Figure 4.2: Feasible utility region Upmax for 2-user MAC with pmax and no SIC
Fig. 4.2 shows the feasible utility region Upmax for the 2-user MAC without SIC.
4.5 Remark. If pmax →∞, then the feasible utility region Upmax → U.
4.6 Remark. The power allocation pk for user k is only dependent on its own channel αk and
the utility requirements u of all the users. The power allocation satisfies
1
αk
(1−
1
2uk
) < pk < pmax, (4.11)
since BK > 1 from Corollary 1. Note that the CQI α 6= 0 due to the single power constraint
pmax. Since the system guarantees the utility requirement uk of each user k, the power alloca-
tion pk is inversely proportional to its CQI αk.
4.7 Remark. The pricing parameter βk is independent of the CQI α. This observation is impor-
tant because the regulator does not need to know the channels α1, . . . , αK and can adapt the
prices β to the less fluctuating QoS requirements u. This property reduces the computational
complexity of the regulator and since u is a long-term constant, the update of the universal
pricing parameters is slow.
Given the weightsw in (4.8), the pricing parameters are within the interval
0 < βk < 1−
1
2uk
,
since 0 < 1− 12uk and 0 < 1−
∑
j 6=k wj2
uj < 1.
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4.2.1.2 Cost Terms and Optimal Weights
We assume all the users pay the virtual fee to the system operator for the service depending
on their transmit power allocation. The total cost paid to the regulator by all the users is
cK(β,p) =
K∑
j=1
βj log pj. (4.12)
On the basis of guaranteeing the rate requirement of each user, the regulator will choose the
weight vectorw in order to maximize the revenue cK from the users, i.e.,w := maxw cK(β,p).
Inserting the results in Proposition 4.2,
cK(β,p) =
K∑
j=1
(1−
1
2uj
)
(
1−
∑
l 6=j
wl2
ul
)
log pj
= ξ −
K∑
j=1
(1−
1
2uj
) log pj ·
∑
l 6=j
wl2
ul ,
where ξ =
∑K
j=1(1−
1
2
uj ) log pj is a constant with respect to weightsw.
Since pj is independent of w, we formulate a linear programming (LP) problem to solvew.
minw l
T ·w (4.13)
s.t.
1 + 12uk −
1
K−1 ·
∑K
j=1
1
2
uj
K − 1
< wk <
1
2uk(K − 1)
,
where lT = [2u1
∑K
j=2(1−
1
2
uj ) log pj, · · · , 2
uk
∑
j 6=k(1−
1
2
uj ) log pj, · · · , 2
uK
∑K−1
j=1 (1−
1
2
uj ) log pj ].
4.8 Example. The LP problem for the generalK-user MAC systemwithout SIC can be solved
easily. Here we provide the result of the 2-user MAC without SIC. With w1 = 1 − w2, if
2u2(1− 12u1 ) log p1−2
u1(1− 12u2 ) log p2 ≥ 0, then w1 =
1
2u1 for user 1 and w2 = 1−
1
2u1 for user 2.
Otherwise w1 = 1− 12u2 and w2 =
1
2u2 . Fig. 4.3 shows the contour result of the corresponding
cost terms in the feasible utility region Upmax using optimal pricing and weights.
4.2.2 Non-linear Receiver with SIC
In Chapter 3 [94], universal linear pricing for MAC with SIC was presented. To gain a com-
prehensive understanding and to compare the pricing mechanism with and without SIC, we
consider the same universal non-linear pricing mechanism of the MAC with SIC.
50 4 Centralized Universal Cheat-Proof Non-Linear Pricing Framework for MAC
4.2.2.1 Power Allocation and Universal Non-linear Pricing
Without loss of generality, we assume the SIC decoding order as π = [K → · · · → 1] and
denote the variables with SIC . This decoding order remains the same throughout the whole
paper if not specified otherwise.
4.9 Proposition. In the MAC system with SIC decoding order of π = [K → · · · → 1], the power of
each user k allocated by the system optimizer in order to maximize the UMP is
pSICk =
2uk − 1
αk
·
k−1∏
j=1
2uj . (4.14)
The pricing parameter charged by the regulator for ensuring the user QoS requirement u is
βSICk = (2
uk − 1)
K∑
j=k
wj − wj+1∏j
m=k 2
um
. (4.15)
Proof. See Proof 4.5.2.
4.10 Remark. The power allocation pSICk is only dependent on its own channel αk and utility
requirement uk, and ul of all the users l which are decoded after user k. p
SIC
k is the same as
(3.7). In contrast to the results of Theorem 1 in [94] ((3.6) in Chapter 3), the pricing parameter
βSICk is only dependent on the weights wl and all the ul of user l which are decoded earlier
than user k. In particular, same as βk for MAC without SIC, βSICk is independent of the CQI
α.
4.11 Corollary. If the regulator provides weights
wSIC1 ≥ · · · ≥ w
SIC
k ≥ · · ·w
SIC
K , (4.16)
then the corresponding pricing parameters are in the range 0 ≤ βSICk < 1−
1
2uk .
Proof. Another form of the pricing parameter βSICk in (4.15) is
βSICk =
(
1−
1
2uk
)
·
(
wk + wk+1(
1
2uk+1
− 1) + · · ·+ wK ·
1∏K−1
j=k+1 2
uj
(
1
2uK
− 1)
)
. (4.17)
Since u ≥ 0, 1
2
uj
− 1 < 0. From
∑K
j=1wj = 1, β
SIC
k is always smaller than 1−
1
2uk . From (4.15),
if the weights given by the regulator are in order (4.16), then βSICk is always larger than 0.
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4.2.2.2 Cost Terms and Optimal Weights for MAC with SIC
As in theMAC systemwithout SIC, the regulator in theMAC systemwith SIC choosesweights
wSIC in order to maximize its total revenue, i.e.,
wSIC := max
w
cSICK (β
SIC , pSIC),
from all theK users. Here cSICK (β
SIC , pSIC) =
∑K
j=1 β
SIC
j log p
SIC
j .
The weight vectorwSIC can be solved by the LP problem as follows.
maxwSIC l
SIC ·wSIC (4.18)
s.t. wSIC1 > · · · > w
SIC
k > · · · > w
SIC
K ,
K∑
j=1
wSICj = 1,
where lSIC = [(1− 12u1 ) log p
SIC
1 , (1−
1
2u1 )(
1
2u2 −1) log p
SIC
1 +(1−
1
2u2 ) log p
SIC
2 , · · · ,
∑K−1
j=1 (1−
1
2
uj
)( 12uK − 1) ·
1∏K−1
i=j+1 2
ui
log pSICj + (1−
1
2uK ) log p
SIC
K ].
4.12 Example. We address the result for the 2-user MAC with SIC decoding order of π = [2→
1]. This order is the best by means of minimizing the sum power [94]. If (1 − 12u1 )(
1
2u2 −
2) log pSIC1 + (1 −
1
2u2 ) log p
SIC
2 ≥ 0, then w
SIC
2 = maxw
SIC
2 < w
SIC
1 . Otherwise w
SIC
2 =
minwSIC2 . Fig. 4.4 shows the contour result of the corresponding cost terms in the feasible rate
region. We usemaxw2 = 0.4 and minw2 = 0.1 in Fig. 4.4.
The curves in the u1− u2 plane in Fig. 4.3 and Fig. 4.4 show the cost terms for different QoS
requirements in the feasible utility region with optimal weights. It is clear that the higher the
utility requirements, the higher the cost. Notice that the cost terms are below zero for small u
because the power allocation for small utilities is low. This can be seen as a stimulation mea-
sure, that the users with good channels and low utility requirements could even get payback
from the system because they consume less power and produce lower interference to the oth-
ers. Of course, this negative cost terms can be compensated by adding a constant cost, so the
system which provides service will in total always get positive fees or become at least budget
balanced.
4.3 Cheating Problem
From a game theoretic point of view, the users have incentives not to report their true types. It
is possible for the user k to manipulate the universal non-linear pricing scheme by reporting
the CQI αˆk instead of the true αk in order to maximize its own short-term user-utility.
In this section, we analyze the incentives of the user misbehavior and their best cheating
strategy. Based on this, the cheat-proof pricing strategy is proposed in the next section. First
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Figure 4.3: Cost term for the 2-user MAC without SIC in the feasible utility region Upmax with
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Figure 4.4: Cost term for the 2-user MACwith SIC decoding order [2→ 1] in the feasible utility
region with the optimal pricing and weights given in Example 4.12
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we investigate the influence on power allocation and the resulting achievable rate if there ex-
ists a cheater, namely user k, who cheats on its CQI by reporting αˆk 6= αk. Then, we study
the optimal cheating strategy of the cheater for the MAC systemwith and without SIC, respec-
tively.
4.3.1 Rate Analysis
Since the power pk(αˆ) allocated by the system optimizer is only dependent on u and αˆk, pk(αˆ)
satisfies the QoS requirements u with the reported channels αˆ, i.e.,
uk = log
(
1 +
αˆkpk(αˆ)
Ik(p)
)
, and
ul = log
(
1 +
αlpl(αˆ)
Il(p)
)
, l 6= k. (4.19)
When l 6= k for MAC without SIC and l > k for MAC with SIC, the component αˆkpk(αˆ) of the
cheated CQI αˆk and the power allocation pk(αˆ) after cheating is involved in Il(p). i.e.,
I linl (p) = 1 +
∑
j 6=l,j 6=k
αjpj(αˆ) + αˆkpk(αˆ) (4.20)
for l 6= k in MAC without SIC and
ISICl (p) = 1 +
l−1∑
j=1,j 6=k
αjpj(αˆ) + αˆkpk(αˆ) (4.21)
for l > k in MAC with SIC. We interpret the optimal power allocation as a function of αˆ, i.e.,
p(αˆ) solves (4.19). The actual rate achieved after cheating for each user k is rk(αˆ).
4.13 Lemma. By cheating only the own power allocation does change. e.g., if αˆk > αk (αˆk < αk),
then the power allocation is
1. pk(αˆ) < pk(α) (pk(αˆ) > pk(α)),
2. pl(αˆ) = pl(α) for all l 6= k.
The actual rate rl(αˆ) achieved after cheating deviates from the rate requirement ul. If αˆk < αk, then
the actual rate
1. rk(αˆ) > uk for the cheater k;
2. rl(αˆ) < ul for l 6= k in MAC without SIC;
3. rSICl (αˆ) < ul for l > k and r
SIC
l (αˆ) = ul for l < k in MAC with SIC.
And vice versa.
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Proof. See Proof 4.5.3.
In round i the regulator is able to detect the misbehavior of user k in round i − 1 since the
rates achieved by some other users are lower than the utility requirements while the rate of
user k is higher than its utility requirement if αˆk < αk.
4.3.2 Optimal Cheating by User Utility Maximization
Besides achieving its SINR-based QoS requirement uk, each user k has its own short-term user
utility uˆk(u, αˆi,w) in each round i to maximize with respect to the reported CQI αˆk. Denote
uˆk(u, αˆ
i,w) and uˆk(u,αi,w) as the user-utility with and without cheating, respectively. Since
the pricing parameter is independent of the CQI, βik is the same for both uˆk(u, αˆ
i,w) and
uˆk(u,α
i,w), where
uˆk(u, αˆ
i,w) = rik(αˆ)− β
i
k log p
i
k(αˆ) (4.22)
= log
(
1 +
αk
αˆk
(2uk − 1)
)
− βik log
( yk
αˆik
)
,
uˆk(u,α
i,w) = uk − β
i
k log
(
yk
αk
)
. (4.23)
For MAC without SIC, yk = BK 2
uk−1
2uk , βk = (1−
1
2uk )(1−
∑
j 6=k wj2
uj) and for MAC with SIC,
ySICk = (2
uk − 1)
∏k−1
j=1 2
uj and βi,SICk = (2
uk − 1)
∑K
j=k
wj−wj+1∏j
m=k 2
um
, respectively.
From Lemma 4.13, the users do not have incentives to cheat for a higher CQI αˆk > αk since
its rate requirement uk will not be fulfilled after cheating. Due to single user power constraint
pmax in the wireless system, the minimum effective CQI in transmission for each user k is
αmin,k =
BK
pmax
2uk − 1
2uk
for MAC without SIC and
αSICmin,k =
2uk − 1
pmax
k−1∏
j=1
2uj
for MAC with SIC.
4.14 Theorem. Assume u ∈ Upmax . If the regulator provides weights as in (4.8) for MAC without
SIC or in (4.16) for MAC with SIC, then in round i the malicious (selfish)1 user always reports its
lowest CQI αmin,k or α
SIC
min,k in order to maximize its own user-utility uˆk(u, αˆ
i,w), respectively.
Proof. See Proof 4.5.4.
1Note that the cheating user is selfish (because it maximizes its own user-utility uˆk(u, αˆi,w)) and also malicious
(because all other users in the system suffer according to Lemma 4.13).
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After cheating with the CQI αmin,k, the user utility of user k in round i is
max uˆk(u, αˆ
i,w) = log (1 + zk(2
uk − 1))− βik log
( yk
αmin,k
)
, (4.24)
where zk =
αk
αmin,k
= 2
ri
k
(αˆ)
−1
2uk−1 and yk is defined below (4.23). The real rate for the cheater k in
MAC without SIC achieved after cheating in round i is
rik(αˆ) = log
(
1 +
αkpmax
BK
· 2uk
)
. (4.25)
The real rate for MAC with SIC after cheating with αˆSICk = α
SIC
min,k is
ri,SICk (αˆ) = log
(
1 +
αkpmax∏k−1
j=1 2
uj
)
. (4.26)
In Theorem 4.14, we derive how the user, who cheats, misbehaves by reporting the smallest
CQI αmin,k and αSICmin,k for the MAC without and with SIC. In the next section, we propose a
repeated game mechanism with trigger pricing which counters such misbehavior.
4.4 Cheat-proof Pricing and Repeated Game
In this section, we calculate the incentive compatible mechanism to prevent cheating in the
general MAC systemwith and without SIC. The mechanism includes two parts: 1) Worst case
strategy to ensure the utility requirement of all the honest users: We propose the worst case
power allocation with the worst case pricing parameters. 2) Repeated game formulation with
trigger strategy: We show that it is possible to provide the proper trigger price in order to
prevent user misbehavior analysed in Sec. 4.3.
4.4.1 Repeated Game Design
We assume the regulator adopts the repeated game so that the user misbehavior is detected
and the cheating on the CQI is prevented. A typical repeated game is played in several or
infinite rounds, denoted as i = [0, · · · ]. We adopt the infinite RG in this section in order to
prevent the users cheating. A model with an infinite horizon is appropriate if, after each
round, the players believe that the game will continue for an additional round, while a model
with a finite horizon is appropriate if the players clearly perceive a well-defined final round
[95]. In this case, the finite RG is not appropriate. Because the players can change their strategy
profile in each round of the finite RG. It is possible that the selfish (malicious) users cheat in
the last round of the finite repeated game while pretend to be honest in the first played rounds.
If so, then no punishment can be applied to the cheaters and the utility requirements of the
other users can not be guaranteed.
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For the case in which one user misbehaves, e.g., user k, we assume that in each round i, the
selfish user k maximizes its own short-term user-utility uˆk(u, αˆi,w) = rik(αˆ) − βk log pk(αˆ).
The users may have incentives to cheat on their CQI (αˆ 6= α) to achieve additional profits in
uˆk(u, αˆ
i,w). In order to prevent cheating, a RG is operated among all the users in the system
and the regulator. Whenever the regulator detects a user misbehavior, the trigger strategy Vk
is applied on the cheater k from that round on with the trigger pricing parameter βtrk .
Instead of adjusting the strategy in each stage game, the players in the infinite RG choose
their best strategy once at the beginning of the game by anticipating the expected total payoff.
The mechanism of RG serves as a deterrence (threat) for the players who utilize it, since by
anticipating the long-term total payoff in RG, the cheater will gain nothing and the honest
users will always fulfill their utility requirements with the worst-case strategy.
It is always apposite to consider user k cheats for αmin,k in the 0-th round in the RG. In order
to guarantee the utility requirements ul for users l 6= k, the worst case strategy is performed
for all theK − 1 honest users, where user k is removed from the system optimization.
4.4.2 Worst Case Strategy for Honest Users
From the cheating round on, the system optimizes UMP of theK − 1 users with the standard
procedure given in Sec. 4.2. We denote the parameters in worst case strategywith notation wc.
We refer to it as worst case strategy because the best cheating strategy of the malicious user is
to report αˆk = αmin,k. If the regulator can ensure the rate requirement of all the honest users
in this case, then u can always be guaranteed.
u˜(p,β,w)wc =
∑
l 6=k
wl log
(
1 +
αlp
i,wc
l
Iwcl (p
wc)
)
−
∑
l 6=k
βi,wcl log
(
pi,wcl
)
, (4.27)
where forMACwithout SIC, I linl,wc(p
wc) = N+
∑
j 6=k,l αjp
i,wc
j and forMACwith SIC, I
SIC
l,wc (p
wc) =
NSIC +
∑l−1
j=1, 6=k αjp
i,SIC
j,wc . N = 1 + αkpmax is the worst-case noise-plus-interference.
The systemoptimizer in round i observes themisbehavior of user k by its actual rate ri−1k (αˆ).
Then the real CQI2 αk of user k for MAC without SIC is calculated by
αk =
2r
i−1
k
(αˆ) − 1
2uk − 1
αmin,k =
2r
i−1
k
(αˆ) − 1
pmax
(
BK ·
1
2uk
)
. (4.28)
And for MAC with SIC,
αSICk =
2r
i−1,SIC
k (αˆ)− 1
pmax
·
k−1∏
j=1
2uj . (4.29)
2Note that the calculation of the real channel αk is different for MAC systems with and without SIC.
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Since users l 6= k are honest, by observing αk of the cheater k in N , the utility requirement ul
for all l 6= k needs to be achieved in the worst-case, which solves (4.27).
4.15 Proposition. For the MAC system without SIC, the worst case power allocation pi,wcl for all the
honest users l 6= k, after user k cheated in the i− 1th round, is
pi,wcl =
N
αl
·
2ul − 1
2ul
·BK−1, l 6= k, (4.30)
where BK−1 =
1∑
j 6=k
1
2
uj
−K+2
andN = 1+ (2r
i−1
k
(αˆ)− 1)BK2uk . The real rate achieved by user k in the
(i− 1)-th round ri−1k (αˆ) is obtained by (4.25).
The worst case pricing parameter is
βi,wcl =
(
1−
1
2ul
)(∑
j 6=k
wij −
∑
j 6=l,k
wij · 2
uj
)
. (4.31)
If the regulator gives wik = 0 for the cheating user k, then
∑
j 6=l,k w
i
j = 1.
Proof. See Proof 4.5.5.
4.16 Proposition. For the MAC with SIC decoding order π = [K → · · · → 1], the worst-case power
allocation pi,SICl,wc for all the honest users l 6= k, after user k cheated in the i− 1th round, is
1. pi,SICl,wc = p
i,SIC
l , for l < k
2. pi,SICl,wc =
(2ul−1)
αl
∏l−1
j=1,j 6=k 2
uj · 2r
i−1,SIC
k
(αˆ), for l > k.
The worst case pricing parameter is
1. βi,SICl,wc = (2
ul − 1)
(∑k−1
j=l
wj−wj+1∏j
i=l 2
ui
+
∑K
j=k
wj−wj+1
∏j
i=l, 6=k 2
ui · 2r
i−1,SIC
k
(αˆ)
)
, for l < k
2. βi,SICl,wc = β
i,SIC
l , for l > k.
Proof. See Proof 4.5.6.
4.17 Corollary. After user k cheated in the i − 1th round, the worst case power allocation for all the
honest users l 6= k is always larger than or equal to the power in (4.6) and (4.14), respectively.
Proof. For MAC without SIC, since ri−1k (αˆ) > uk, N > 1 + (2
uk − 1)BK2uk =
∑
j 6=k
1
2
uj
−K+2
∑K
j=1
1
2
uj
−K+1
=
BK
BK−1
> 1. Substituting (4.30) with N > BK
BK−1
, then pi,wcl >
BK
αi
2ui−1
2ui = pl is proved.
For MAC with SIC, from Lemma 4.13 and Theorem 4.14, ri−1,SICk (αˆ) > uk, therefore, com-
paring pi,SICl,wc with p
SIC
k in (4.14), the worst case power allocation p
i,SIC
l,wc ≥ p
SIC
k .
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4.4.3 Repeated Game with Cheat-proof Pricing
Finally, a repeated game is designed to prevent cheating. All the users participating in the
RG know the rules and the trigger strategy. Since in real life, the players are not patient and
thereby they discount the future payoff in the infinite RG, we will focus our analysis in the
δ-discounting infinite RG at first. Later on, the extension to other specification of the time-
average infinite games is also discussed (See Proof 4.5.8). We conclude that by adopting the
well designed infinite RG using the trigger strategywith the proper trigger price βtrk , no player
will have incentive to cheat on their reported CQI.
For the δ-discounting infinite RG, each user anticipates its long-term total payoff in the RG3
as
u¯k = (1− δk)
∞∑
i=0
δikuˆk(u, αˆ
i,w), (4.32)
where δk is the discount factor, 0 < δk < 1. When the honest users report their real CQI
αˆik = αk to the system optimizer, their total payoff is
u¯k(α) = uk(u,α
0,w) · (1− δk)
∞∑
i=0
δik
= uk(u,α
0,w) = uk − β
0
k log p
0
k. (4.33)
When cheating occurs, without loss of generality, we assume that user k cheats αmin,k in round
zero. Then the system optimizer detects it by (4.25) and (4.26) and reports it to the regulator in
the first round. From then on, the trigger strategy works on the malicious user k and leads to
a certain trigger utility Vk. The long-term total payoff u¯k(Vk) for user k to cheat with αmin,k is
u¯k(Vk) = (1− δk) · uˆk(u, α0min,k,w) + (1− δk)
∞∑
i=1
δikVk
= (1− δk) ·
(
r0k(αˆ)− β
0
k log(pmax)
)
+ δkVk. (4.34)
In order to prevent users from cheating about their channels, the overall long-term payoff
u¯k(Vk) with cheating should be smaller than the honest total payoff u¯k(α) with true CQI αk.
Thereby, the overall payoff gain∆uk(Vk) = u¯k(α)− u¯k(Vk) of user k should be positive, where
∆u¯k(Vk) = uk − β
0
k log p
0
k − (1− δk)
·
(
r0k(αˆ)− β
0
k log(pmax)
)
− δkVk. (4.35)
We claim that the RG formulation is an incentive compatible strategy-proof mechanism.
3We will use u¯k with different arguments depending on the context.
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Figure 4.5: Overall payoff gain ∆u¯2(V2) between honesty and cheating as a function of the
number of rounds T with βtr2a < β
tr
2 . pmax = 5, u1 = 0.5, u2 = 1, u3 = 0.1, α2 = 1, w2 =
0.3, w3 = 0.2, δ2 = 0.5 for 3 users MAC
4.18 Proposition. In an infinite repeated game, it is possible for the regulator to compute a trigger
pricing parameter βtrk such that misbehavior is prevented for the MAC with and without SIC.
Proof. See Proof 4.5.7 for the δ-discounting infinite RG and Proof 4.5.8 for the time-average
RG.
4.4.4 Numerical Illustration
All the illustrations are made for the δ-infinite RG.
Fig. 4.5 shows the overall payoff gain ∆u¯2(V2) of user two with and without cheating in
both the 3-user MAC systems with and without SIC, respectively, if the upper limit of rounds
is T (where T → ∞, it is u¯k in (4.32)). The SIC decoding order is [3 → 2 → 1]. It can be
observed that, only after one round, the total payoff u¯2(V2) with cheating is smaller than the
honest total payoff u¯2(α). With the punishment trigger strategy, the users will always report
their true CQI α in order to maximize their total payoff in the RG.
Fig. 4.6 shows how fast ∆u¯2(V2, δ2) is changing with δ2. The overall payoff gain ∆u¯2(V2, δ2)
of user twowithout and with cheating is always positive for all discount factor 0 < δ2 < 1. No-
tice that∆u¯2(V2, δ2) using β
tr,SIC
2a is constant with respect to δ2. This is because by substituting
βtr,SICka into (4.35), ∆u¯
SIC
k (Vk) = β
0,SIC
k log
(
pmax
p
0,SIC
k
)
is independent of the discount factor δk.
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Figure 4.7: Sum utility of each user up to different rounds for the 5-user MAC without SIC.
pmax = 5, u1 = 0.3, u2 = 0.5, u3 = 0.1, u4 = 0.2, u5 = 0.1, α1 = 1, α2 = 2, α3 = 0.5, α4 = 1, α5 =
0.2, w1 = 0.2, w2 = 0.3, w3 = 0.2, w4 = 0.1, w5 = 0.2. User 1 cheats in the 0th round, user 2
cheats in the 1st round and all the others are honest.
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Fig. 4.7 shows the sumutility of each user up to different rounds for the 5-userMACwithout
SIC. We assume user 1 cheats in the 0-th round, user 2 cheats in the first round and all the
others are honest. Trigger strategy is applied immediately after the misbehavior is detected. It
is shown that by cheating, the short-term utility is higher. However, with the trigger strategy
as a punishment, the sum utility decreases rapidly. Therefore, with the proposed RG, no user
will have incentive to cheat.
4.5 Proofs
4.5.1 Proof of Proposition 4.2
The power allocation for the uplink MAC can be obtained by p = (Da −At)−1 ·1 [9, Chapter
10.3.2], where Da := Diag( 1a1 , . . . ,
1
aK
) with ak =
SINRk
(1+SINRk)αk
and At is a K × K matrix
with index of α. 1 is a vector with all 1s. Define the coupling matrix CK = Da − At, then
CK ·p = 1 . With QoS requirement uk = log(1 + SINRk), so ak =
2uk−1
2ukαk
and the matrices
At =


α1 . . . αk . . . αK
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
α1 . . . αk . . . αK

 ,
CK =


α1
2u1−1 −α2 . . . −αK
−α1
α2
2u2−1 . . . −αK
...
...
. . .
...
−α1 −α2 . . .
αK
2uK−1

 . (4.36)
From Cramer’s rule [96], the power allocation pi, i = 1, . . . ,K, is solved by
pi =
det(CiK)
det(CK)
, i = 1, . . . ,K, (4.37)
where CiK is the matrix formed by replacing the ith column of CK by the column vector 1 .
Thereby, pi is solved by det(CiK) =
∏
j 6=i
αj
2
uj−1
· 2uj and det(CK) =
∏
j αj · det(C
′
K), where
C
′
K is a matrix with diagonal indices of
1
2ui−1 and all the other components of −1, so that
det(C
′
K) = (−1)
K ·
∏K
j=1
2
uj
1−2
uj
·
(
1
2u1 −
∑K
j=2
2
uj−1
2
uj
)
=
∏K
j=1
2
uj
2
uj−1
· (
∑K
j=1
1
2
uj
−K+1). Then
from (4.37), the power allocation (4.6) for theK-user MAC without SIC is proved.
The pricing parameters β can be solved by the first optimality condition ∂u˜(p,β,w)
∂sk
= 0. With
pk = e
sk , the pricing parameter is βk = αkpk
(
1
1+
∑K
j=1 αjpj
−
∑
j 6=k
wj
1+
∑
i6=j αipi
)
. By substitut-
ing pk in (4.6), the closed form of the pricing parameter βk is obtained as (4.7).
The regulator always provide positive prices, so the weights should ensure the range of
1−
∑
j 6=k wj2
uj > 0. We use a matrix formulation to solve wj for
∑
j 6=k wj2
uj < 1, j = 1, . . . ,K,
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as UK ·W < 1 . The indices of UK are [UK ]m,m = 0 and [UK ]m,n = 2un , m 6= n. Applying
Cramer’s rule, 0 < wi <
det(U iK)
det(UK)
, where U iK is the matrix formed by replacing the ith column
ofUK by the column vector 1 . wi is solved by det(U iK) = (−1)
K−1 ·
∏
j 6=i 2
uj and det(UK) =
(−1)K−1(K − 1)
∏K
j=1 2
uj so that the upper bound of wi is wi <
det(U iK)
det(UK)
= 12ui · (K−1) .
Since
∑K
j=1wj = 1, 0 < 1 −
∑
j 6=k wj <
1
2uk · (K−1) . In order to obtain the lower bound of
wk, we calculate 1 − 12uj · (K−1) <
∑
j 6=k wj < 1 by the matrix E ·W > F , where E = 1 − I
is a K × K matrix and each row i of F is 1 − 12ui(K−1) . Use the Cramer’s rule, wi >
det(Ei)
det(E) ,
where det(E) = (−1)(K−1) · (K − 1) and det(Ei) = (−1)(K−1) ·
[
1 + 12ui −
1
K−1 ·
∑K
j=1
1
2
uj
]
.
Therefore, wi >
det(Ei)
det(E) =
1+ 1
2ui
− 1
K−1
· ∑Kj=1 12uj
K−1 , and in Upmax , (4.8) is always true.
4.5.2 Proof of Proposition 4.9
For MAC system with SIC and universal non-linear pricing mechanism, the result for power
allocation is the same as in [94], because the pricing mechanism does not change the system
power allocation in order to achieve the single user utility requirement u. However it can also
be calculated by pSIC = (DSICa − A
t
SIC)
−1 ·1 , where DaSIC is same as Da for the K-user
MAC without SIC. For the SIC decoding order of π = [K → · · · → 1], AtSIC and the coupling
matrix CSICK = (D
SIC
a −A
t
SIC) are lower-triangular matrices ofA
t and CK , respectively.
The regulator offers the pricing parameters βSIC by solving the first optimality condition
∂u˜(p,β,w)SIC
∂sk
= αke
sk
(∑K
j=k
wSICj
1+
∑j
i=1 αie
si
−
∑K
j=k+1
wSICj
1+
∑j−1
i=1 αie
si
)
− βSICk = 0. Substitute p
SIC
k
in (4.14) for esk and denote xSICj = 1 +
∑j
i=1 αip
SIC
i =
∏j
i=1 2
ui (see Theorem 1 in [94]), then
βSICk = αkp
SIC
k ·
(wSICk − wSICk+1
xSICk
+ · · ·+
wSICK−1 − w
SIC
K
xSICK−1
+
wSICK
xSICK
)
. (4.38)
With αkpSICk = (2
uk − 1)
∏k−1
j=1 2
uj , βSICk in (4.15) is proved. For other SIC decoding orders
than π = [K → · · · → 1], the process is similar.
4.5.3 Proof of Lemma 4.13
Since all the utility requirements uj , j = 1, . . . ,K are fixed, both the power allocation in (4.6)
and (4.14) are only dependent on and are monotonically decreasing in the reported CQI αˆk.
If αˆk < αk, then pk(αˆ) > pk(α) and vice versa. For all honest users, αˆl = αl, l 6= k, thereby
pl(αˆ) = pl(α).
The actual rate rk(αˆ) achieved by power allocation pk(αˆ) for the cheater k with the real CQI
αk is rk(αˆ) = log
(
1 + αkpk(αˆ)
Ik(p)
)
= log
(
1 + αk
αˆk
(2uk − 1)
)
. Compare with the rate requirement
uk calculated in (4.19). If αˆk < αk then rk(αˆ) > log(1 + 2
uk − 1) = uk and vice versa.
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For MAC without SIC, the actual rate achieved by the honest user l, l 6= k, is
rl(αˆ) = log
(
1 +
αlpl
1 +
∑
m6=l,k αmpm + αkpk(αˆ)
)
. (4.39)
For MACwith SIC decoding order π = [K → · · · → 1], the actual rate achieved by each user
l, l < k, remains the same as ul since the misbehavior of user k has no influence on those users
who are decoded later than it. But the actual rate achieved by each user l, l > k, is
rSICl (αˆ) = log
(
1 +
αlpl
1 +
∑l−1
m=1,m6=k αmpm + αkpk(αˆ)
)
. (4.40)
If αˆk < αk, then pk(αˆ) > pk(α) and αkpk(αˆ) > αˆkpk(αˆ). Comparing with (4.19), rl(αˆ) < ul,
and vice versa. Note that for all users l 6= k in MAC with SIC, rl(αˆ) = ul holds if and only if
the cheater is the first decoded user at the receiver by SIC. This completes the proof.
4.5.4 Proof of Theorem 4.14
First we make a curve analysis of uˆik(u, αˆ,w). Rewrite (4.23) as
uˆik(u, αˆ,w) = log
((αˆk + αk(2uk − 1))αˆβikk
αˆk · y
βi
k
k
)
= log
( αˆβikk + αk(2uk − 1) · αˆ(βik−1)k
y
βi
k
k
)
,
where yk > 0 in Upmax . From (4.7) and (4.15), 0 < β
i
k < 1 −
1
2uk , β
i
k − 1 < 0. Therefore,
limαˆk→0 u
i
k(u, αˆ,w) → ∞ and limαˆk→∞ u
i
k(u, αˆ,w) → ∞. It is important to check the utility
uˆik(u, αˆ,w) with respect to the reported CQI αˆ
i
k. Assume that user k cheats for αˆk in round
0, the first and second derivative of uˆ0k(u, αˆ,w) are
∂uˆ0
k
(u,αˆ,w)
∂αˆk
= 1
αˆk+αk(2
uk−1) +
βi
k
−1
αˆk
and
∂2uˆ0
k
(u,αˆ,w)
∂αˆ2
k
= −1
(αˆk+αk(2
uk−1))2
+
1−βi
k
αˆ2
k
, respectively. There is only one valid αˆ∗k =
1−βi
k
βi
k
αk(2
uk−1)
fulfilled with ∂uˆ
0
k
(u,αˆ,w)
∂αˆk
= 0. Since the second derivative at αˆ∗k
∂2uˆ0
k
(u,αˆ,w)
∂αˆ2
k
∣∣∣
αˆk=αˆ
∗
k
=
βi2
k
α2
k
(2uk−1)2(
βi
k
1−βi
k
)
is always positive, αˆ∗k is the global minimum of the user own utility u
i
k(u, αˆ,w).
As shown in Fig 4.8, in the feasible utility region for both MAC systems, the short-term user
utility uˆ0k(u, αˆ,w) is convex in αˆk with global minimum αˆ
∗
k =
1−βi
k
βi
k
αk(2
uk − 1). At αˆk = αk,
the user utility is decreasing since its first derivative ∂uˆ
0
k
(u,αˆ,w)
∂αˆk
∣∣∣
αˆk=αk
=
1+(βi
k
−1)2uk
αk2
uk
is always
negative. Therefore, in order to maximize its own utility, the user will always report αmin,k.
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Figure 4.8: User utility uˆ0k(u, αˆ,w) vs. reported channel αˆk
4.5.5 Proof of Proposition 4.15
The system optimizer allocates the power by solving the worst-case UMP in (4.27) for all the
K − 1 honest users with the same procedure as in Sec. 4.2. The differences lie in AtK−1 and
the corresponding coupling matrix CK−1 = Da − AtK−1, where the indices of [A
t
K−1]m,n =
αn for m,n 6= k and [CK−1]m,m = αm2um−1 , [CK−1]m,n = −αn for m 6= n and m,n 6= k.
Solve CK−1 ·pi,wc = N by using the Cramer’s rule, p
i,wc
l =
detCiK−1
detCK−1
. Since detCK−1 =∏
j 6=k αj
2
uj
1−2
uj ·
[∑
j 6=k
1
2
uj −K + 2
]
and detCiK−1 = N
∏
j 6=k,l αj
2
uj
2
uj−1
, the worst-case power
(4.30) is proved.
The derivation of βwcl is similar to Section 4.2. Substitute N and BK−1 for p
wc
l to solve
βwcl = αlp
wc
l
(∑
j 6=k
wj
N+
∑
i6=k αip
wc
i
−
∑
j 6=k,l
wj
N+
∑
i6=j,k αip
wc
i
)
. Then Proposition 4.15 is proved.
4.5.6 Proof of Proposition 4.16
From Remark 4.10, when user k cheats, since the power allocation of user l for MAC with SIC
is only dependent on u of users which are decoded later than l, pi,SICl,wc = p
SIC
l for l < k.
For the users l > k, their QoS requirements are achieved even though the cheater k uses
pmax
rwc,SICl = log
(
1 +
αlp
i,SIC
l,wc
xwcl−1 + αkpmax
)
= log
( qwcl
qwcl−1
)
≥ ul, l > k (4.41)
where xwcl−1 = 1 +
∑l−1
j=1,j 6=k αjp
wc
j . Denote q
wc
l = x
wc
l + αkpmax. Since p
i,SIC
l,wc = p
SIC
l for l < k,
xwck−1 = xk−1 =
∏k−1
j=1 2
uj (see proof of Theorem 1 in [94]). Thereby, qwck = xk−1 + αkpmax =
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∏k−1
j=1 2
uj+αkpmax. Then qwck+1 = 2
uk+1 · (
∏k−1
j=1 2
uj+αkpmax) and qwcl =
∏l
j=k+1 2
uj · (
∏k−1
j=1 2
uj+
αkpmax), l > k, if equality holds in (4.41). From ul = log
(
1 +
αlp
i,SIC
l,wc
qwc
l−1
)
and pi,SICl,wc =
2ul−1
αl
· qwcl−1,
pi,SICl,wc =
2ul − 1
αl
·
l−1∏
j=k+1
2uj · (
k−1∏
j=1
2uj + αkpmax), (4.42)
for l > k.
Then substitute αk given in (4.29), p
i,SIC
l,wc =
2ul−1
αl
·
∏l−1
j=k+1 2
uj · 2r
i−1,SIC
k
(α) is proved.
For the pricing parameters for MAC with SIC, βi,SICl,wc remains the same as β
i,SIC
l for l > k
since it is only dependent on wj and uj where j > l. For l < k, the system optimizer will
solve the UMPSIC of (4.27). With the result of pi,SICl,wc and αk, the worst case pricing parameter
βi,SICl,wc is solved. The trick is that the regulator chooses the weight w
SIC
k,wc = 0. Thereby, in the
pricing βi,SICl,wc , there is no component of w
SIC
k,wc and all the components of 2
uk are replaced with
rSICk (αˆ).
4.5.7 Proof of Proposition 4.18 (for δ-discount RG criterion)
The road map of the proof is that the MAC system with and without SIC are treated together
at the beginning. Later on, they will be analyzed separately with SIC to denote the MAC with
SIC. The trigger utility Vk is some realization of the utility function with the trigger pricing
parameter βtrk when pmax is allocated to the cheater k since αˆk = αmin,k, i.e.,
Vk := log
(
1 +
αkpmax
Ik(pwc)
)
− βtrk log(pmax). (4.43)
In order to ensure∆u¯k(Vk) ≥ 0, the trigger strategy Vk fulfills
Vk ≤
uk
δk
−
1− δk
δk
r0k(αˆ)
−
β0k
δk
(
log(p0k)− (1− δk) · log(pmax)
)
. (4.44)
ForMAC systemwithout SIC, the interference function in (4.43) is I link (p
wc) = 1+
∑
l 6=k αlp
i,wc
l .
With the worst case power allocation (4.30), I link (p
wc) = 1−N +N ·BK−1.
For convenience, we define the RHS of (4.43) as V lk , and RHS of (4.44) as V
r
k so that β
tr
k is
solved by fulfilling V lk ≤ V
r
k . Since p
0
k < pmax, δk < 1 and β
0
k < (1−
1
2uk ), we obtain
V rk >
1− δk
δk
(
uk
1− δk
− r0k(αˆ)
)
− β0k log(pmax) (4.45)
>
1− δk
δk
(
uk
1− δk
− r0k(αˆ)
)
− log(pmax). (4.46)
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V lk is upper bounded by the utility with no interference and pmax allocated to user k. Therefore
V lk ≤ log (1 + αkpmax)− β
tr
k log(pmax). If the regulator gives the trigger pricing parameter
βtrk ≥ 1 +
1
log(pmax)
·
(
E −
uk
δk
+
1− δk
δk
r0k(αˆ)
)
(4.47)
by applying (4.46), or more tightly
βtrka ≥ β
0
k +
1
log(pmax)
·
(
E −
uk
δk
+
1− δk
δk
r0k(αˆ)
)
(4.48)
by applying (4.45), where E = log(1 + αkpmax), then∆u¯k(Vk) is always positive.
For MAC with SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1], the interference function in (4.43) is
ISICk (p
wc) = 1 +
∑
l<k αlp
i,SIC
l,wc . From Proposition 4.16, p
i,SIC
l,wc = p
i,SIC
l for all l < k, therefore
V SICk = r
0,SIC
k (αˆ)− β
tr,SIC
k log(pmax). (4.49)
Substitute V SICk into (4.34) and (4.35), respectively. The overall payoff difference for MAC
with SIC is
∆uk(V
SIC
k ) = uk − r
0,SIC
k (αˆ)− β
0,SIC
k log p
0,SIC
k + log(pmax)
(
(1− δk)β
0,SIC
k + δkβ
tr,SIC
k
)
.
Solve for∆uk(V SICk ) ≥ 0, the regulator should provide the trigger pricing parameter
βtr,SICk >
1
δk · log pmax
(
r0,SICk (αˆ) + β
0,SIC
k log p
,0,SIC
k
−uk − (1− δk)β
0,SIC
k log(pmax)
)
(4.50)
in order to prevent cheating. Since pSICk ≤ pmax and β
0,SIC
k < (1 −
1
2uk ), the regulator could
provide the trigger pricing parameter in MAC system with SIC as
βtr,SICk >
(
r0,SICk (αˆ)− uk + log(pmax)δk
)
δk · log pmax
. (4.51)
βtr,SICka >
(
r0,SICk (αˆ)− uk + β
0,SIC
k log(pmax)δk
)
δk · log pmax
.
4.5.8 Proof of Proposition 4.18 (for time-average RG criterion)
If the players are completely patient, corresponding to the limit δ = 1, the time-average crite-
rion can be implemented. Any forms of time-average criterion implies that players are uncon-
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cerned not only about the timing of payoffs but also their payoff in finite number of periods.
The objective of each player in the ’limit of means’ RG is
u¯k = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=0
uˆk(u, αˆ
i,w). (4.52)
Now we will describe shortly if the ’limit of means’ RG is adopted, how it works for the gen-
eral MAC system without SIC. For the honest users, since they do not cheat on their reported
CQI, i.e. αˆk = αk, their expected total payoff is
u¯k(α) = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
i=0
uk(u,α
0,w)
= lim
T→∞
1
T
·Tuk(u,α0,w)
= uk(u,α
0,w). (4.53)
This result is the same as the total payoff for honest users in the discounting RG.
For the cheater k, the resulting total payoff for the cheater k in the ’limit of means’ RG is
u¯k(Vk) = lim
T→∞
1
T
(
u0k(u, αˆ,w) +
T∑
t=1
Vk
)
= Vk. (4.54)
In order to prevent cheating in the ’limit of means’ RG, the regulator should provide the
trigger price βtrk as follows,
βtrk >
log
(
1 + αkpmax
Ik(pwc)
)
− uk + β
0
k log p
0
k
log(pmax)
, (4.55)
so that no users will have incentives to cheat. Since log(pmax) > log p0k, any trigger price
βtrk > β
0
k +
log
(
1+
αkpmax
Ik(p
wc)
)
−uk
log p0
k
will work.
The procedure for the MAC systemwith SIC using the ’limit of means’ RG is similar. There-
fore we skip it here.
We can conclude that if the players are completely patience, the counter mechanism using
the trigger strategy with the trigger price βtrk in the time-average infinite RG such as ’limit of
means’ RG also works for our proposed scenario.
4.6 Summary
For the general MAC, we propose a universal non-linear pricing framework. At first, we
characterize the feasible utility region, the optimal power allocation and pricing for ensuring
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the rate requirements. Then, the user behavior is studied with reporting the false CQI values.
It is shown that the selfish users have incentives to cheat for a smaller CQI value than their
real one to achieve a higher short-term user utility. In order to prevent cheating, we introduce
a repeated game mechanism and derive a suitable trigger strategy which satisfies the rate
requirements for the honest users and punishes the cheating users. Numerical results confirm
that the long-term total payoff after cheating is made smaller than the honest total payoff
leading to a stable incentive-compatible operation.
Serving as a benchmark, the power allocation to ensure the QoS requirement of each user
in the wireless system and the properly proposed universal prices are implemented into the
heterogeneous networks in Chapter 5.
The research of the universal pricing framework can be continued to the distributed topol-
ogy. Chapter 6 investigated the distributed resource allocation for the general MAC system
with and without SIC using the linear and nonlinear pricing framework, respectively. The
noncooperative game is adopted, where the QoS requirement of each user is achieved at the
unique NE power allocation.
69
5 Applications of User-Centric Resource Allocation in
Heterogeneous Networks
Due to the services of 3G and 4G, more and more wireless data traffic is expected from indoor
users. The femtocells, also known as home BS, due to their small and lowpower characteristics
to provide high-quality indoor coverage, have recently attracted significant research consider-
ation. These FAPs, working as BSs, are connected to the operators’ macrocell networks by
backhaul DSL, optical fibre or other connections [4].
A limited number of UEs can be supported by femtocells and therefore the access control
mechanism is pivotal. Currently, three access modes are adopted: open access, closed access
and hybrid access. By allowing unregisteredMUEs to access the nearby FAP and guaranteeing
the QoS of each UE with low cost, the hybrid access shows the most potential. The compen-
sation framework, which not only motivates the FAP for hybrid access, but also benefits the
MBS is challenging.
TheQoS requirement of each UE is a dominant issue. Hence, how to utilize communications
resource such as power and spectrum fairly and more efficiently is of great importance. The
uplink transmission is considered in this chapter, both for the macrocell and the femtocell.
Since the FAPs are small and simple devices, SIC is not applied in the femtocells. The resource
allocation for MAC without SIC analyzed in Chapter 4 can be adopted in this scenario of
heterogeneous networks.
Both the MBS in the macrocell and FAP in the femtocell networks are considered selfish and
rational. On the one hand, due to the low cost and better indoor coverage, the traffic load
and power consumption of the MBS will be greatly reduced with the help of FAP to accept
some MUEs which are nearby. On the other hand, the FAP has no incentive to open access to
other MUEs since the utility of its own reserved FUEs is diminished by sharing the radio and
power resource with the unregistered MUEs. Based on this, we develop the compensation
frameworks such that the utilities of both the MBS and the FAP are maximized respectively.
Two compensation frameworks of motivating the hybrid access of the femtocell are inves-
tigated in this chapter. The first part utilizes the compensation as a function of the universal
nonlinear price βi given in Chapter 4. The second part focuses on the system global energy
efficiency. The MBS compensates the FAP in order to maximize its utility which is the energy
efficiency of the whole two-tier system.
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FAP
FUE
MUE
MBS
MUE
MUE
MUE
MUE
Regulator
˄u1, ..., uK˅
(β1, ..., βK)
Figure 5.1: System model of compensation framework with regulator using universal non-
linear pricing
5.1 Compensation Framework with Regulator using Universal Nonlinear
Pricing
In this section, we integrate the universal non-linear pricing into the compensation framework
for the two-tier macro-femtocell wireless networks which motivates the FAP to apply the hy-
brid access. By adopting the proposed compensation framework, both the utilities of the MBS
and the FAP are maximized. The protocol of hybrid access is provided and numerical simula-
tions are conducted.
5.1.1 Problem Formulation
As depicted in Fig. 5.1, there is a MBS in the macrocell and a FAP in each femtocell network.
In our model, we consider the single macro-femtocell cluster. We assume in total N MUEs
are subscribed by the MBS and M FUEs are subscribed by the FAP, respectively. Due to the
mobility of UEs, someMUEs are in the coverage of the FAP. The MBS is willing to compensate
the FAP by the compensation function for accepting a certain number of MUEs in the hybrid
access since on the one hand, the total power consumption of the MBS is reduced which sig-
nificantly lowers the cost. On the other hand, the revenue of the FAP is improved by fully
utilizing its wireless resource.
In the user-centric wireless system, themain task is to satisfy the QoS requirement uj of each
user j. Otherwise the UEs will leave the service package and as a result, the revenue of the
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system vendor is declined significantly. The uplink transmissions within the macrocell and
the femtocell are exactly the same as MAC model set up in Chapter 4. The MBS and the FAP
are considered as the BSs. Both the multiple mobile UEs and the BSs are equipped with single
antenna. Therefore the interference management is dealt with the power allocation given in
(4.6).
We propose a compensation framework to motivate the hybrid access for the femtocell net-
work. The power allocation and the universal non-linear prices are used for interference man-
agement and the compensation paid by the MBS to motivate the hybrid access. A Stackelberg
game is introduced to optimize the utility functions of both the MBS in the macrocell and the
FAP in the femtocell. Denote K as the number of accepted MUEs in the hybrid access. The
compensation function cK is paid by the MBS to the FAP for servingK MUEs nearby.
The larger the amount of compensation cK paid to the FAP by the MBS, the more MUEs
should the FAP accept since this will benefit its own revenue while ensuring the QoS require-
ments of its own subscribed FUEs. In contrast, the MBS wishes to assign maximum number
K of MUEs to the FAP with minimum compensation in order to maximize the utility of the
macrocell. This tradeoff can typically be modeled with game theory.
TheMBS and the FAP are players in a game. They maximize their own utilities, respectively.
The strategy of the MBS is the compensation price κ and the strategy of the FAP is the optimal
accepted number of MUEs when hybrid access is motivated by the compensation framework.
The utilities of the MBS and the FAP are as follows.
The utility of the MBS is
UM = vM (K)− cK(K,κ), (5.1)
where vM (K) is the utility of the macrocell itself whenK MUEs are served by the nearby FAP
in the hybrid access. We call it self-utility of macrocell. κ is introduced as the compensation
price so that the MBS can influence the strategy of the FAP in choosing the optimal number
K∗ of acceptedMUEs. Both the self-utility of macrocell vM (K) and the compensation function
cK(K,κ) are functions ofK .
The utility of the FAP is
UF = vF (K)− F + cK(K,κ). (5.2)
where F is the fixed fee paid by the FAP to the MBS for the backhaul network support. F
is independent of the number K of accepted MUEs. Similarly, the self-utility of femtocell is
vF (K).
5.1.2 Hybrid Access Protocol between Macro- and Femtocell
In this section, the process of the hybrid access with the compensation framework is discussed.
We adopt the Stackelberg game between the MBS and the FAP and apply the market clear-
ance1.
1The market clears if the quantity of supply is equal to the quantity of demand [14].
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The hybrid access protocol between the two-tier macro- and femtocell works as follows. The
MBS and the FAP compete for the number of MUEs which are served by the FAP in the hybrid
access. This can bemodeled as amarket. TheMBS and FAP can be considered as the consumer
and producer in the market, where the supply of the FAP sF is the optimal number of served
MUEs by maximizing its utility UF , i.e.
sF = K
∗
F := arg max
0≤KF≤N
UF . (5.3)
The demand of the MBS dM is the optimal number of out-served MUEs accepted by the FAP,
dM = K
∗
M := arg max
0≤KM≤N
UM . (5.4)
The utility functions of the MBS and the FAP must be concave functions with respect to K so
that the number of accepted MUEs in the hybrid access can be optimized.
The MBS must take steps to motivate, monitor, and enforce the FAP’s interaction with the
compensation in the hybrid access. If the market clears, the optimal compensation price κ∗
provided by the MBS solves the function where the market demand equals the supply, i.e.,
Find κ∗
s.t. dM = sF . (5.5)
The protocol is formulated as a Stackelberg game, where the MBS acts as a leader with the
compensation price κ as its strategy and the FAP acts as a follower with the accepted number
K of MUEs in the hybrid access as its strategy. The MBS first predicts the best response of
the FAP with the given compensation price κ, and then optimizes its own best response in
choosing the optimal κ∗ so that the resulting optimal number of accepted MUEs K∗F is equal
toK∗M . They interact as follows.
• Optimal Compensation Price κ Selection for MBS
The MBS will maximize its own utility UM with the compensation by choosing the op-
timal compensation price κ. Since the MBS has all the information about the femtocell
from the backhaul support, it can force the FAP to meet the demand ofK∗M by providing
a proper compensation price κ.
• Utility Optimization of FAP with Given κ
The FAP will automatically find the optimal number K of MUEs it would open access to
by maximizing its own utility UF with the compensation function cK of the given com-
pensation price κ. As a result, this optimized K∗F coincides with the number K
∗
M which
maximizes the utility UM of the MBS with cK . Indeed,K∗F = K
∗
M makes the market clear
and leaves the market stable.
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The mechanism which forces the best response of the FAP to be equal to the need of the
MBS is summarised in the following Lemma.
5.1 Lemma. The condition of market clearance for the hybrid access protocol in the two-tier macro-
femtocell networks is that UF and UM are concave functions with respect toK and
∂vM (K)
∂K
= −
∂vF (K)
∂K
. (5.6)
The self-utility vM of the MBS is an increasing function with respect toK and the self-utility vF of the
FAP is a decreasing function ofK .
Proof. In order to achieve market clearance in (5.5), the utility functions of the MBS UM and
the FAP UF should be concave toK . Solving their first derivatives, it results in
∂vM (K)
∂K
−
∂cK(K,κ)
∂K
= 0
∂vF (K)
∂K
+
∂cK(K,κ)
∂K
= 0. (5.7)
Since themoreMUEs are out-served by the FAP, the higher self-utility theMBS should achieve.
vM is an increasing function ofK and therefore vF is a decreasing function ofK .
Due to the utility requirement uk of each UE, the total number of acceptable UEs in each cell
is restricted as follows.
5.2 Corollary. If all the users belong to the same service class, i.e., u1 = . . . = uN = u, then the
number of supportable UEsN in the system to fulfill u is bounded by
0 < N <
1
1− 2−u
. (5.8)
Proof. It is easy to prove from Corollary 4.3.
If there existM registered FUEs served by the FAP and K MUEs assigned by the MBS and
all the UEs belong to the same service class u, then from (5.8), the achievable rate region for
servingM +K FUEs and MUEs in the FAP is
1 < 2u <
K +M
K +M − 1
. (5.9)
So it follows 0 < u < log
(
1
1− 1
K+M
)
. We define for servingK +M UEs,
2u =
1
λ
·
M +K
M +K − 1
, (5.10)
where λ > 1 is a load factor due to the inequality in (5.8).
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5.3 Remark. For any given class of QoS requirements u, the maximum number Kmax of UEs
that can be served in the system to ensure the user u is restricted by 1
1−2−u
. It shows that
the FAP cannot serve too many additional MUEs. This restriction is reflected later in the
compensation paid by the MBS to the FAP and the optimal K of accepted FUEs is influenced
by the numberM of subscribed FUEs as well.
5.4 Corollary. For identical QoS requirement (5.10) of each UE, the number of UEs in the system is
restricted by u and the system load factor λ,
max(N,M +K) ≤
1
2uλ− 1
+ 1, (5.11)
where N is the total number of MUEs in the macrocell, M is the total number of FUEs subscribed by
the FAP andK is the MUEs served by the FAP as well if hybrid access is operated in the system.
Proof. The relationship between the total numberN (not necessarily equal to the total number
of MUEs in the MBS) of UEs in the system and their QoS requirements u is N
N−1 = 2
uλ. The
number of supportable UEs is a function of u and λ,
N(u, λ) =
1
2uλ− 1
+ 1. (5.12)
Since N
N−1 is a decreasing function with respect to N , N(u, λ) ≥ max(N,M + K), which
indicates that no matter all theN MUEs are served by the MBS or the hybrid access is adopted
by the FAP to serveM FUEs andK MUEs, the QoS requirement u is guaranteed in thewireless
system.
The compensation framework which benefits not only both the MBS in the macrocell and
the FAP in the femtocell, but also all UEs in the whole wireless system to fulfill their QoS
requirements u is of great importance.
In the following, we will conduct the utility functions of the MBS and the FAP, respectively,
as well as the suitable compensation function cK .
5.1.3 Utility of FAP in Femtocell
Concerning in a single femtocell, the FAP is only motivated to serveK MUEs if its own utility
UF is maximized with the given compensation from the MBS. The utility of the FAP is defined
as the rate-based utility vF of its own registered FUEs plus the compensation function cK
when accepting K MUEs. The self utility vF of the total M FUEs served by the FAP itself is
defined as
vF =
M∑
k=1
2uk . (5.13)
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Obviously, from the analysis in Remark 5.3, vF is monotonically decreasing in K because the
more MUEs are served, the less utility for FUEs in the femtocell is available.
For identical u, we define the rate-based utility vF as aM -fold rate-based utility function
vF = M · 2u =
M
λ
M +K
M +K − 1
. (5.14)
Since vF is a decreasing function of the number K of accepted MUEs and an increasing
function of the numberM of registered FUEs, the largerK the less the first term of UF .
5.1.4 Utility of MBS in Macrocell
One of the main reasons why the MBS would like to compensate the FAP for hybrid access is
the physical layer energy savings, whichwill result in cost reduction in the higher (application)
layers. The question is how much benefit the MBS can earn from the hybrid access for the K
out-served MUEs by paying the compensation cK to the FAP. Therefore we define the utility
UM of the MBS as the profit from energy saving minus the compensation paid to the FAP.
The utility of the MBS is
UM = η(N −K) log
E[PMBSsum (N)]
E[PMBSsum (N −K)]
− cK , (5.15)
whereN is the total number of MUEs subscribed by theMBS,K is the number ofMUEs served
by the FAP. E[ · ] denotes the expectation of the sum power. η is the equivalent revenue per
unit of relative energy savings. The energy saving part ES = E[P
MBS
sum (N)]
E[PMBSsum (N−K)]
is denoted as the
ratio of sum power consumption of the total N MUEs to that of N minus K MUEs if hybrid
access is adopted by the FAP.
It can be interpreted that ES is an increasing function of K . The larger K is, the more
revenue from ES will the MBS earn.
However in practice, the MBS should not assign all the MUEs to other FAPs. One possible
scenario could be that some MUEs will leave the service package provided by the MBS since
they are always served by the FAPs. Besides, from Corollary 5.2, it is not possible for the FAP
to accept too many MUEs as well because the QoS requirement cannot be reached if the total
number of served UEs is too large. Therefore, N − K in UM serves as a barrier function to
prevent the slope of the ES part monotonically increasing.
5.1.5 Compensation Function
We assume that the compensation cK is a function of the power price βj (4.7) and it is averaged
over the CSI αj of each UE j. This represents the power consumption and the cost for serving
different UEs with variable channel states. It indeed provides an explicit connection of the
physical layer cost to the upper (application) layer revenue. Since the MBS has the whole
information about the femtocell with the backhaul network support, such as the number M
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of registered FUEs, it can influence the outcome of the hybrid access with the compensation
price (will be discussed in Sec. 5.1.6.2).
The compensation function cK paid by the MBS to the FAP for hybrid access serving K
MUEs is given by
cK =
κλ
λ− 1
K∑
k=1
βkµk, (5.16)
where κ is the compensation price determined by the MBS. The power price βk is described in
(4.7). The averaged CSI is µj = E[log( 1αj )]. The compensation cK is a function of
1
αk
since the
power allocation pk (4.6) of each UE k is inversely proportional to the CSI αk.
Equation (5.16) shows the relationship between the compensation function in the macro-
femtocell networks and the total cost for the power allocation in the general MAC system
without SIC in Chapter 4.
From (4.7), the regulator can ensure the identical QoS requirements u in (5.10) of the K
MUEs andM FUEs served by the FAP by providing the power price
βk = β = (1− 2
−u)
(
1−
K +M − 1
K +M
2u
)
= (1− 2−u)
(
1−
1
λ
)
=
(
1− λ+
λ
K +M
)
λ− 1
λ
. (5.17)
Since β > 0, the system load factor λ satisfies
1 < λ <
K +M
K +M − 1
. (5.18)
Note that the QoS requirement u is the same for all the users regardless of the total number
of UEs in the macrocell or the femtocell. Therefore, the load factor λ should fulfill Corollary
5.2 for different total numbers in the single cells.
In order to ensure the rate requirement u of each UE with a positive power price β, the
following Lemma holds.
5.5 Lemma. In the two-tier macro-femtocell system, in which there are N MUEs in total and M
registered FUEs in the femtocell, if the FAP adopts hybrid access and acceptsK MUEs, then the system
load factor λ is bounded by
M +K
M +K − 1
> λ >


M+K−1
M+K ·
N
N−1 ifM +K > N
M+K
M+K−1
N−1
N
otherwise.
(5.19)
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Proof. For different numbers of UEs in the single cells, the load factor λ should fulfill 2u =
1
λ
M+K
M+K−1 =
1
λ′
N
N−1 < min
(
M+K
M+K−1 ,
N
N−1
)
. N−K
N−K−1 is ignored because
x
x−1 is a monotonically
decreasing function. If N > M + K , then 1
λ
· M+K
M+K−1 <
N
N−1 . For N < M + K it is similar.
Concluding the above, we get the lower bound for the load factor λ as
λ >
M +K
M +K − 1
·
N − 1
N
if N > M +K
λ >
M +K − 1
M +K
·
N
N − 1
otherwise. (5.20)
Since β > 0, the load factor λ should also fulfill (5.18). Then Lemma 5.5 is proved.
5.6 Remark. The load factor λ with restriction in Lemma 5.5 is very close to 1 when M and
K are not too small, so λ
λ−1 is multiplied in cK in order to amplify the influence of the power
price βk and the CSI αk, which illustrates the physical layer power consumption. Moreover, it
enhances the influence of the compensation cK in the utility function of the FAP.
5.1.6 Analysis of Compensation Framework and Stackelberg Game Formulation
For simplicity of analysis, we have the following assumptions:
1. All the UEs belong to the same service class and have equal weights, i.e., uk = u and
wk = w with
∑K
k=1wk = 1, so the power pricing parameter βk = β.
2. The system load factor (λ > 1) satisfies Lemma 5.5.
3. We assume the quasi-static block flat-fading channels apply the exponential distribution
e−αk . All the UEs are symmetric distributed. According to Rayleigh fading,
µk = E[− log αk]
= −
∫ ∞
0
e−αk · logαkdαk = γ, (5.21)
for all k where γ ≈ 0.5772 is the Euler-Mascheroni constant.
With the power price β in (5.17) and µk in (5.21), the compensation cK becomes
cK =
κλ
λ− 1
K∑
k=1
(
1− λ+
λ
K +M
)λ− 1
λ
·µk
= κKγ
(
1− λ+
λ
K +M
)
. (5.22)
Fig. 5.2 shows the compensation function cK with respect to the number K of accepted
MUEs in the femtocell. It is a concave but not monotonically increasing function of K , which
very well illustrates the characteristics of the two-tier system. The compensation should be
78 5 Applications of User-Centric Resource Allocation in Heterogeneous Networks
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Number of MUEs: K
Co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fu
nc
tio
n:
 C
K
λ= 1.01
 
 
M=5, κ=5
M=10, κ=10
M=5, κ=10
Figure 5.2: Compensation function with respect to K for power-price based compensation
framework.
larger with the increment of K MUEs served by the FAP, while in the mean time should also
put certain restriction onK due to Corollary 5.2 and 5.4. The maximum affordable number of
UEs is restricted by the users’ QoS requirements u.
With all the aforementioned utilities of the MBS and the FAP, the two-tier macro-femtocell
networks can apply the hybrid access by maximizing their own UM and UF , respectively.
We will apply the backward induction in the following analysis.
5.1.6.1 Utility Optimization of FAP with Given κ
As analyzed before, with the compensation function cK , the expected utility UF at the FAP is
UF =
M(K +M)
λ(K +M − 1)
− F + κKγ
(
1− λ+
λ
K +M
)
. (5.23)
The FAP optimizes the number of acceptable MUEsK in order to maximize UF , i.e.,
K∗ := arg max
0≤K≤N
UF . (5.24)
5.7 Corollary. The utility UF of the FAP with the compensation function cK is bounded with
UF ≤ UF ≤ U¯F , (5.25)
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where the lower bound of UF is
UF =
M
λ
(
K +M + 1
K +M
)
− F + κKγ
(
1− λ+
λ
K +M
)
(5.26)
and the upper bound of UF is
U¯F =
M
λ
(
K +M
K +M − 1
)
− F + κKγ
(
1− λ+
λ
K +M − 1
)
. (5.27)
Proof. Function x+1
x
and 1
x
are decreasing functions of x, so that changing the variables in UF
results in the lower and upper bounds UF and U¯F , respectively.
5.8 Proposition. If the utility of the FAP UF is the utility function in (5.23) and the compensation
term paid by the MBS to the FAP for hybrid access is cK in (5.22), then the optimal number K
∗ of
MUEs will the FAP serve (solving (5.24)) is bounded by
K∗ ≤ K∗ ≤ K¯∗, (5.28)
where the upper bound of the optimal number of MUEs K¯∗ will the FAP serve (solving K¯∗ :=
argmax0≤K≤N UF ) is
K¯∗ =
⌊√
κγMλ2 −M
κγλ(λ− 1)
−M
⌉+
, (5.29)
and the lower bound of the optimal number of MUEsK∗ will the FAP serve (solving the optimization
problem K∗ := argmax0≤K≤N U¯F ) is
K∗ =
⌊√
κγ(M − 1)λ2 −M
κγλ(λ− 1)
−M + 1
⌉+
. (5.30)
Proof. Please refer to Proof 5.3.1.
Fig. 5.3 shows the utility function UF of the FAP with respect to the number of accepted
MUEs K comparing with the rate-based utility vF and the compensation function cK . It is
shown that UF is concave with respect toK and vF is a decreasing function ofK .
Fig. 5.4 shows that the higher the compensation price κ is, the more number of MUEs K∗
the FAP will serve to maximize its own utility UF .
Table 5.1 provides the comparison of the number of optimal accepted MUEs K∗ with the
lower and upper boundK∗ and K¯∗, respectively, for given parameters. It is shown that when
the compensation price κ > 5, the numerically obtainedK∗ is the same asK∗ even thoughM
and K are in small values.
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Table 5.1: Comparison of approximation K¯∗ and K∗ to numerical resultsK∗.
M = 5, λ = 1.01, γ = 0.5772
κ K¯∗ K∗ K∗ maxUF
3 9 7 8 6.3008
4 12 10 11 6.4297
5 13 12 13 6.9717
6 14 13 14 7.3180
25 17 16 17 13.9951
In order to ensure UF as a concave function to a positive K∗, the compensation price κ
decided by the MBS to optimize its own utility UM is restricted as follows.
5.9 Lemma. The compensation price κ provided by the MBS in order to motivate the FAP to accept K
MUEs in the hybrid access fulfills
κ > max
[
M
M − 1
1
γλ(λ− (M − 1)(λ − 1))
,
1
γλ(λ−M(λ− 1))
]
. (5.31)
Proof. Please refer to Proof 5.3.2.
5.1.6.2 Optimization of the Compensation Price at MBS
With the power allocation in (4.6), E[PMBSsum (N)] = E[
∑N
j=1 pj] and E[P
MBS
sum (N − K)] =
E[
∑N−K
j=1 pj], respectively. Therefore the utility function of the MBS is
UM = η(N −K) log
E[
∑N
j=1
BN
αj
(1− 2−u)]
E[
∑N−K
j=1
BN−K
αj
(1− 2−u)]
− cK
= η(N −K) log
E[ 1
αj
]
(
(1−2−u)
N(2−u−1)+1
)
N
E[ 1
αj
]
(
(1−2−u)
(N−K)(2−u−1)+1
)
(N −K)
− cK
= η(N −K) log
N(N −K)(2−u − 1) +N
N(N −K)(2−u − 1) +N −K
− cK . (5.32)
We propose two methods for the MBS to optimize its compensation price κ. On the one
hand to maximize its own utility UM (K∗(κ)), and on the other hand to make sure that the
FAP will accept the optimal number of MUEsK∗ given κ.
5.1.6.3 Close to Optimal Compensation Pricing
The first method is based on the market clearance. Since the optimal number of MUEs ac-
cepted by the FAP is only numerically obtained, the following proposition is calculated with
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the lower and upper bound of K∗. In order to clear the market, i.e., find κ∗, s.t. K∗M = K
∗
(5.5), the MBS applies the following compensation price κ∗.
5.10 Proposition. The FAPwill automatically acceptK∗ = K∗M MUEs from theMBS in order to max-
imize its own utility UF , if the MBS provides the compensation price κ
∗ = M
γ((K∗M+M)2λ(1−λ)+Mλ2)
for the upper bound K¯∗ and κ∗ = M
γλ((λ−1)(K+M−1)2−(M−1)λ) for the lower boundK
∗.
Proof. The proof is straightforward and omitted here.
5.1.6.4 Numerical Search for Compensation Price
The secondmethod is to search the compensation price κ numerically by solving the equation
argmaxκ UM (K
∗(κ)) = K∗. Fig. 5.5 illustrates the numerical search of the optimal compen-
sation price κ∗. The MBS predicts the results for K∗ and K¯∗ of the FAP first. The blue and
red curves correspond to the upper and lower bound K¯∗ and K∗ that the FAP will serve in
the hybrid access with respect to different κ. The green line shows the optimal numberK∗M of
out-served MUEs at the MBS side as an example. The intersection points are the optimal com-
pensation prices κ¯∗ and κ∗. K∗M can be obtained by numerical results solving (5.4). Therefore
the MBS decides its optimal compensation price and pays the compensation cK to the FAP to
motivate the hybrid access in the femtocell. With the given compensation price κ∗, the FAP
will automatically acceptK∗ MUEs by maximizing its own utility UF (κ∗). In general, both the
utilities of the MBS and the FAP are maximized with the proposed compensation framework
while at the same time, the utility requirement u of each UE is guaranteed.
In this section, the compensation framework is established to motivate the hybrid access of
the femtocell based on the power allocation and universal non-linear price β in Chapter 4. In
the next section, the energy efficiency of the whole two-tier system is considered as the utility
function of the MBS.
5.2 Energy-Aware Compensation Framework for Hybrid Macro-femtocell
Networks
The user-centric compensation structure is suggested in Sec. 5.1, which is based on the uni-
versal non-linear price controlled by a regulator in the system. In this section, we focus on
the energy efficiency of the whole macro-femtocell system as depicted in Fig. 5.6, where the
power price β is released. The compensation function is free of β and therefore no regula-
tor is required. We investigate the utility functions of both the MBS and the FAP with proper
compensation and power allocation. The compensation is a function of the channels which de-
pend on the positions of the UEs. A Stackelberg game is formulated and the strategies of the
MBS and the FAP adjust due to the mobility of UEs. The novel hybrid access protocol for the
uplink transmission of the two-tier macro-femtocell networks is proposed and the following
contributions are made.
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Figure 5.5: Illustration of optimal compensation price κ, where the green line shows the opti-
mal number of MUEsK∗M that the MBS wants the FAP to serve as an example.
• The utility functions of the MBS in the macrocell and the FAP in the femtocell are pro-
vided, in which the MBS maximizes the energy efficiency of the whole system and the
FAP maximizes its own revenue with the given compensation function.
• The compensation which is a function of the CSI of the out-served MUEs and the com-
pensation price is established.
• The hybrid access protocol is investigated, where the optimal acceptable MUEs in the
femtocell is drawn with the proposed optimal compensation price.
• Numerous simulations are conducted to illustrate the compensation framework for moti-
vating hybrid access.
5.2.1 Energy Aware Compensation Framework
In this section, the compensation framework applied by the MBS to motivate the hybrid ac-
cess in the femtocell is proposed based on the power consumption of all the UEs (MUEs and
FUEs). The MBS is able to save the energy of the whole system while guaranteeing the QoS
requirement u of each UE by utilizing the femtocell wireless resource. The FAP serves the
nearby MUEs with its spare resource for the compensation paid by the MBS such that its own
utility is maximized.
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FAP
FUE
MUE
MBS
MUE
MUE
MUE
MUE
cK(«)
Figure 5.6: System model of energy-aware compensation framework for hybrid macro-
femtocell networks.
We define the energy aware utility UM of the MBS and the utility UF of the FAP as follows.
5.2.1.1 Utility of MBS in Macrocell
As analyzed above, the power pk (4.6) allocated to each UE, no matter it is served by the MBS
or the FAP, is dependent on their QoS requirement u and the CSI α. We assume the CSI α is
a function of the distance between the UEs and the BSs. Therefore, from an energy efficiency
point of view, the MBS would like to compensate the FAP for hybrid access ofK MUEs if they
are nearer to the FAP than the MBS. In the following, we define the utility UM of the MBS
as the two-tier network global energy efficiency, i.e., the ratio between the total throughput
and the sum power consumption for all UEs in the system to support their QoS requirements
when hybrid access is adopted.
UM =
η(M +N)u(∑
j∈N−K pj +
∑
j∈M+K pj
) , (5.33)
where N −K is the set of MUEs served by the MBS, M+K is the set of FUEs and acceptable
MUEs served by the FAP in the hybrid access mode. η is the equivalent revenue per unit of
energy efficiency.
5.2 Energy-Aware Compensation Framework for Hybrid Macro-femtocell Networks 85
From (4.6), it can be interpreted that the energy consumption part EC =
∑
j∈N−K pj +∑
j∈M+K pj is an decreasing function of the CSI αj . For identical rate requirement u and fixed
number of UEs M + N , the numerator of UM (5.33) is a constant. Thus the objective of the
MBS is to minimize the total power consumption of the whole two-tier networks. If the MBS
wants to motivate the FAP to serve the MUEs, which are near the FAP but farther from the
MBS, then it has to pay.
The MBS is able to determine how many and which are the K out-served MUEs it would
like the nearby FAP to serve by solving
K∗M = max
0≤KM≤N
UM . (5.34)
The more compensation cK is paid to the FAP, the larger K will be. However in practice,
due to Corollary 5.2 the total number of UEs in the FAP is restricted. Otherwise the QoS
requirement cannot be reached. The MBS can control this in the hybrid access by choosing the
proper compensation price κ in cK .
5.2.1.2 Utility of FAP in Femtocell
The FAP can help the system operator to utilize the expensive wireless spectrum more thor-
oughly and spend the powermore efficiently by adopting the hybrid access to serve the nearby
MUEs. However, the FAP is responsible to select the number of acceptable MUEs so that its
own utility UF is maximized. Since the utility of the M subscribed FUEs is diminished with
the increment of K . The utility UF of the FAP is a tradeoff between the rate based utility vF
of its own subscribed M FUEs and the compensation cK paid by the MBS for serving the K
MUEs. We define UF = vF + cK − F .
From (5.10), in the femtocell u = log K+M
λ(K+M−1) . The utility vF of the registered FUEs is a
M -fold rate function
vF = M ·u
= M log
M +K
λ(M +K − 1)
. (5.35)
It is intuitive that the first term vF of UF is a decreasing function of the number of accepted
MUEs K . Therefore, in order to construct a concave utility function with respect to K , the
compensation function cK is defined as follows.
5.2.1.3 Compensation Function
The main idea of this section is to motivate the hybrid access of the femtocell network so that
the MBS is able to satisfy the QoS requirement u of all the MUEs and FUEs with minimum
power consumption. Since the power allocation pk to each UE is a function of the CSI αk,
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which depends on the distance between the UE k and the corresponding MBS or the FAP, we
propose the compensation function cK paid by the MBS to the FAP for servingK MUEs as
cK =
(
κ+
κK
K +M
−
K
M
) K∑
k=1
1
αk
, (5.36)
where κ is the compensation price determined by the MBS.
∑K
k=1
1
αk
illustrates the power
allocation of the UEs as an inverse function of the chennels. cK in (5.36) is conducted to be a
concave function with respect toK .
5.11 Remark. The compensation function cK indicates the physical layer power consumption
for the FAP to serve theK nearbyMUEswithM FUEs because pk in (4.6) is an inverse function
of α. Since cK is usually applied on the higher layers (e.g. application layer), the compensation
framework provides a simple manner to reflect the physical layer energy consumption to the
higher layer revenue of the networks. The compensation price κ is introduced such that the
MBS can influence the choice of the FAP in the acceptable number K of MUEs in order to
enhance the global energy efficiency.
5.2.2 Hybrid Access Protocol between Macro- and Femtocell
Similar to Sec. 5.1, we model the hybrid access protocol as a Stackelberg game, where theMBS
acts as a leader and the FAP acts as a follower. The strategies of the MBS and the FAP are
the compensation price κ and the optimal number K∗F of acceptable MUEs, respectively. By
backward induction, the MBS first predicts the strategy K∗F of the FAP and then determines
the compensation price κ to force K∗F = K
∗
M so that the global energy efficiency is maximized
in the two-tier macro-femtocell networks.
The MBS and the FAP are capable to sense the change of the wireless environment such as
the CSI αk and therefore adjust their strategies. The MBS and the FAP interact in the energy-
aware hybrid access as follows.
• Optimal Compensation Price κ Selection for MBS
In order to minimize the energy consumption in its utility UM , the MBS optimizes K∗M
MUEswhich are nearer to the FAP. By predicting the strategy of the FAP, theMBS chooses
the optimal compensation price κ∗ so that the FAP automatically accepts K∗M = K
∗
F
MUEs.
• Utility Optimization of FAP with Given κ
The simple FAP maximizes its own utility UF by selecting the K∗F nearby MUEs with the
compensation function cK , in which the compensation price κ is determined by the MBS.
As a result, this optimized K∗F coincides with the the number K
∗
M . This is performed by
backward induction [23, pp.68], which starts to solve for the optimal choice of the FAP,
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and then computes backward the optimal choice of the MBS in order to fulfill the QoS
requiement uwith the minimum total power consumption.
We apply the backward induction in the following analysis.
5.2.2.1 Utility Optimization of FAP with Given κ
Given the compensation function cK in (5.36) and vF in (5.35), the utility UF at the FAP is
UF = M log
K +M
λ(K +M − 1)
− F +
(
κ+
κK
K +M
−
K
M
) K∑
k=1
1
αk
. (5.37)
The FAP optimizes K in order to maximize UF , i.e.,
K∗F := arg max
0≤K≤N
UF . (5.38)
5.12 Proposition. Given the compensation term cK in (5.36) paid by the MBS to the FAP for hybrid
access, the FAP maximizes its utility UF in (5.37) by acceptingK
∗
F MUEs (solving (5.38)). K
∗
F can be
solved numerically and its mathematical approximation Kˆ∗F is
Kˆ∗F =
⌊
M
(√
κ−
1∑K
k=1
1
αk
− 1
)⌉+
. (5.39)
Proof. Please refer to Proof 5.3.3.
5.13 Remark. For energy aware compensation framework, the FAP will acceptK∗F > 0MUEs
in hybrid access if the compensation price κ provided by the MBS satisfies
κ > 1 +
1∑K
j=1
1
αj
. (5.40)
5.2.2.2 Utility Optimization of MBS of the Compensation Price
Substitute the power allocation pk (4.6) and the QoS requirement u into the utility function UM
of the MBS. For identical rate requirement u, we have
UM =
η(M +N)u(∑
j∈N−K
BN−K
αj
+
∑
j∈M+K
BM+K
αj
)
(1− 2−u)
. (5.41)
The MBS will obtain the optimal numberK∗M of MUEs by numerical search to maximize its
utility UM . The result is provided in Sec. 5.2.3. Since the CSI αk is dependent on the distance
between the UE k and the corresponding MBS or the FAP, K∗M changes through time due to
the UEs’ mobility. After obtaining the K∗M , the MBS will determine the compensation price κ
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Figure 5.7: Sum power versus CSI as a function of the distance dk.
so that the FAP will automatically acceptK∗F = K
∗
M MUEs in the hybrid access. The following
proposition provides the optimum strategy of the MBS.
5.14 Proposition. The FAP accepts K∗F = K
∗
M MUEs in the hybrid access if the MBS provides the
compensation price as
κ∗ =
K +M
D(K +M − 1)
+
(K +M)2
M2
. (5.42)
Proof. We obtain (5.42) by solving ∂UF
∂K
= 0 (5.51) for κ as a function ofK .
5.2.3 Numerical Results
In this section, numerous simulations are conducted in order to evaluate the compensation
framework to motivated hybrid access in the macro-femtocell networks. For all UEs, the dis-
tance dk between the UE k and the MBS or the FAP has been randomly generated in the inter-
val [0, 100] meters. The CSI is generated as realizations of d−2k so the power decay factor is of
2. The total number of the MUEs in Fig. 5.7 is N = 11. The system load factor is λ = 1.01.
In the left part of Fig. 5.7, the green points are the positions of theN MUEs. The red point is
the position of the MBS denoted as ’M’ and the blue point is the position of the FAP denoted
as ’F’. The points connected to the MBS with dashed lines in red are those MUEs nearer to the
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Figure 5.8: Compensation function with respect to K for energy aware compensation frame-
work.
MBS and similarly, those points connected to the FAP with dashed lines in blue are relatively
nearby the FAP.With this comparison, the MBSwould like to assignK∗M = 6MUEs to the FAP
in order to minimize the total power consumption, which is shown in the right part of Fig. 5.7.
P1 shows the sum power for the MBS to serve all theN MUEs by itself and P2 shows the sum
power allocated by theMBS to serveN−K MUEs plus the sum power allocated by the FAP to
serveK nearby MUEs. It is clear that when the CSI is a function of the distance dk between the
UEs and BSs and the power allocation to each UE is inversely proportional to the CSI, then by
adopting hybrid access in the macro-femtocell network, the total power consumption is much
lower. From the simulations, more than 50% of the energy in the physical layer is saved. We
will use this numerical resultK∗M = 6 in the following simulations.
Fig. 5.8 shows the compensation function cK with respect to the number K of accepted
MUEs in the femtocell for different compensation price κ and MUEsM . It is increasing with
K at the beginning since the moreK the FAP serves, the more compensation it should receive.
However, due to Corollary 5.2, only limited number of UEs can be served in a single cell in
order to achieve the QoS requirement u of each UE. Since the FAP is a simple device who
only cares about its utility UF , the MBS guarantees this restriction by smartly making the
compensation cK concave but not monotonically increasing with the numberK .
Fig. 5.9 and 5.10 show the utility function UF of the FAP with respect to the number of K
MUEs andM FUEs for different compensation prices κ, respectively. UF is a concave function
ofK and the numerical result of the optimal acceptable K∗F is given in the figure.
Fig. 5.11 and 5.12 show the optimal number of acceptable MUEsK∗F to maximize the utility
function UF of the FAP versus the compensation price κ and the number of registered FUEs
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Figure 5.9: Utility of the FAP UF as a function of numberK of acceptable MUEs.
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Figure 5.10: Utility of the FAP UF as a function of numberM of FUEs.
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M . Note that the star points are the approximate results calculated in (5.39). It indicates that
for different couples of parameters even when M and K are not large integers, Kˆ∗F is quite
accurate and simple to be implemented.
5.3 Proofs
5.3.1 Proof of Proposition 5.8
Proof. In order to find the optimal number of acceptable MUEs K , the FAP checks the first
derivative of (5.23) with respect toK
∂UF
∂K
=
M
λ
−1
(K +M − 1)2
+
κγMλ
(K +M)2
+ κγ(1 − λ). (5.43)
To solve ∂UF
∂K
= 0 in (5.43) is difficult since there are the 4th, 3rd order ofK .
For the upper bound, we approximate the term K +M − 1 to K +M . For large K and M
this is naturally true, but we will show with simulation results that even for small value of K
andM , this approximation is quite accurate and thereby simplifies the problem significantly.
SetK +M = x. After the transformation, ∂UF
∂K
= 0 becomes
M
λx2
=
κγMλ
x2
+ κγ(1 − λ)
(K +M)2 =
M − κγMλ2
κγλ(1− λ)
K¯∗ =
√
M − κγMλ2
κγλ(1− λ)
−M.
The lower bound of the optimal number of MUEs served by the FAP is obtained by solving
∂U¯F
∂K
=
M
λ
−1
(K +M − 1)2
+ κγ(1 − λ) +
κγλ(M − 1)
(K +M − 1)2
=
κγλ(M − 1)− M
λ
(K +M − 1)2
+ κγ(1 − λ) = 0. (5.44)
Then we obtain
κγλ2(M − 1)−M
λκγ(λ− 1)
= (K +M − 1)2. (5.45)
The lower boundK∗ in (5.30) is proved.
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Note that K should always be positive integers, we find the nearest integer of the approxi-
mation result. Therefore the number of accepted MUEs in the femtocell is
⌊√
κγ(M − 1)λ2 −M
κγλ(λ− 1)
−M + 1
⌉+
≤ K∗ ≤
⌊√
κγMλ2 −M
κγλ(λ − 1)
−M
⌉+
.
5.3.2 Proof of Lemma 5.9
Proof. In order to ensure the utility function of the FAP UF to be concave, the compensation
price κ should fulfill
∂2UF
∂K2
=
M
λ
2
(K +M − 1)3
−
2κγMλ
(K +M)3
< 0
κγλ2 >
(K +M)3
(K +M − 1)3
κ >
(K +M)3
(K +M − 1)3
1
γλ2
. (5.46)
In order to ensure the optimal number K∗ of accepted MUEs in the Femtocell to be positive,
both the lower and the upper boundK∗ and K¯∗ should be positive.
For the upper bound of optimal number of accepted MUEs K¯∗ to be positive values, from
(5.29), it follows
M − κγMλ2
κγλ(1 − λ)
> 0 and
M − κγMλ2
κγλ(1− λ)
> M2. (5.47)
We obtain κ > max
[
1
γλ2
, 1
γλ(M(1−λ)+λ)
]
. Since λ > 1, λ > λ + M(1 − λ). Then to ensure a
positive K¯∗, the compensation price should fulfill
κ >
1
γλ(M(1 − λ) + λ)
. (5.48)
For the lower bound of optimal number of accepted MUEs K∗ to be positive values, from
(5.30), it follows
κγ(M − 1)λ2 −M
κγλ(λ− 1)
> 0 and
κγ(M − 1)λ2 −M
κγλ(λ− 1)
> M − 1. (5.49)
We obtain κ > max
[
M
M−1
1
γλ2
, M
M−1
1
γλ(λ−(M−1)(λ−1))
]
. Since λ > λ − (M − 1)(λ − 1), to ensure
a positiveK∗, the compensation price should satisfy
κ >
M
M − 1
1
γλ(λ− (M − 1)(λ − 1))
. (5.50)
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Together with the conditions in (5.46), (5.48), (5.50), we have
κ > max
[ (K +M)3
(K +M − 1)3
1
γλ2
,
1
γλ(M(1 − λ) + λ)
,
M
M − 1
1
γλ(λ− (M − 1)(λ− 1))
]
.
Since x
x−1 is a decreasing function with respect to x,
M
M−1
1
γλ(λ−(M−1)(λ−1)) >
(K+M)3
(K+M−1)3
1
γλ2
.
Therefore, in order to guarantee a positive K∗ of the optimal number of accepted MUEs
in the femtocell, the compensation price κ determined by the MBS is restricted with κ >
max
[
M
M−1
1
γλ(λ−(M−1)(λ−1)) ,
1
γλ(λ−M(λ−1))
]
, which depends on the number of FUEs registered
in the femtocellM and the system load factor λ.
5.3.3 Proof of Proposition 5.12
Proof. The first derivative of (5.37) is
∂UF
∂K
=
−M
(K +M)(K +M − 1)
+
K∑
k=1
1
αk
(
κM
(K +M)2
−
1
M
)
. (5.51)
Mathematically solving ∂UF
∂K
= 0 in (5.51) is difficult because of the 3rd order of K . We
approximate the term K + M − 1 to K + M . For large K and M this is naturally true, but
we will show with simulation results in Sec. 5.2.3 that even for small values of K andM , this
approximation is quite accurate and thereby simplifies the problem significantly.
Since
∑K
k=1
1
αk
is independent of κ and M , we set
∑K
k=1
1
αk
= D. After the transformation
and approximation, ∂UF
∂K
= 0 becomes
D
(
κM
(K +M)2
−
1
M
)
=
M
(K +M)2
(K +M)2 = M2
(
κ−
1
D
)
.
Note that K should always be positive integers. Therefore the mathematically calculated
optimal number of accepted MUEs in the femtocell is Kˆ∗F =
⌊
M
(√
κ− 1∑K
k=1
1
αk
− 1
)⌉+
.
5.4 Summary
For the two-tier macro-femtocell wireless networks, we propose two compensation frame-
works to motivate the hybrid access. The utility functions of the FAP in femtocell and the
MBS in macrocell are analyzed, respectively. The compensation function is provided by the
MBS to encourage the FAP for hybrid access to accept theMUEs nearby. The Stackelberg game
is formulated where the MBS plays as the leader and the FAP plays as the follower.
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Firstly, the compensation framework based on the universal non-linear power pricing (Chap-
ter 4) in order to fulfill the QoS requirement of each UE is discussed. The compensation frame-
work with the universal power pricing provides the insight between the physical layer power
cost to the upper layer revenue. The power allocation and the universal nonlinear prices ob-
tained in Chapter 4 are applied in the compensation framework.
Secondly, in order to fulfill each UE’s SINR-based QoS requirement with the minimum sys-
tem sum power, we proposed an energy aware compensation framework. The MBS maxi-
mizes the global energy efficiency of all the UEs in the system. And the FAP maximizes its
utility with the given compensation paid by the MBS.
The MBS predicts the best response of the FAP and chooses the compensation price. The
closed form solution of the optimal number of acceptable MUEs is obtained. The optimal
compensation price is calculated at the MBS as its strategy. Simulation results show that the
utilities of both the FAP at the femtocell and the MBS at the macrocell are maximized with the
proposed compensation frameworks, which result in a win-win solution.
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6 Pricing for Distributed Resource Allocation in MAC Under QoS
Requirements
In the previous chapters, the centralized resource allocation is studied using the frameworks
of linear and nonlinear pricing. For the uplink transmission, it is convenient to allocate the
resource such as power centrally since the BS obtains all the information about the transmitters.
By the centralized pricing mechanism, the QoS requirements of all the users in the system can
be guaranteed. However, there are situations where no centralized control is possible. The
power should be allocated by each user themselves. How to ensure the QoS requirement of
each user with distributed power allocation under the circumstances of interference coupling
is interesting.
In this chapter, the distributed power allocation is investigated in the analytical setting of
game theory for the general MAC system with and without SIC, respectively. The noncoop-
erative game is formulated. The outcome of the game is the unique NE power allocation. If
each self-optimizing user in the game aims at maximizing its own rate, then transmitting at
the full power is their best strategy. However, this will cause high interference to other users
and waste energy. For the mobile users, the battery life is an important problem. Saving en-
ergy for the long-term run is as well of interest to each user in the wireless system. Besides,
the objective of each user in our system is not to pursue maximum rate but to fulfill its rate
requirement. Therefore, transmitting with full power in order to achieve higher rate is not
necessarily the best strategy of each user.
The individual price on the transmit power is introduced into the utility function of each
user. The pricing performs as the trade-off between maximizing the rate and minimizing the
transmit power and therefore limiting the interference to other users. The individual prices
are carefully designed to ensure the existence, uniqueness and convergence of the NE power
allocation and as a result to guarantee the rate requirement of each user at the NE point.
In the following, the noncooperative game is discussed firstly without the malicious users.
Later on, the malicious behavior is analyzed and the strategy-proof pricing to counter the user
misbehavior is proposed.
6.1 System Preliminaries
Consider the general MAC with K transmitters and one receiver as the BS. The uplink trans-
mission system works as follows. We assume the system guarantees the rate requirement ui
of each self-optimizing user by providing the individual prices βi. The transmit power pi is
allocated by each user i in a distributed fashion. Due to the interference coupling, the non-
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cooperative game is formulated among theK users in the system. Each user as a player in the
game maximizes its own utility ui as a function of the price βi and the transmit power p. The
pure strategy set of each user is their transmitting power with single user power constraint
pi < p
max
i .
The noncooperative game in normal form G(K,P,U) is described by the set of players i ∈ K,
where K is a finite set K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} with the strategy profile of transmit power p. Their
strategy space is a compact and convex set denoted by P = [0, pmax1 ]× [0, p
max
2 ]×· · ·× [0, p
max
K ].
The utility function is the set U = {u1(p1, p−1), u2(p2, p−2), . . . ,
uK(pK , p−K)}. The pricing controls the interference caused by each user and therefore leads
the NE point of the noncooperative game to the desired region guaranteeing the rate require-
ment ui of each user i.
The users play the BRD to reach the NE power allocation. The individual prices β are
designed such that the feasible rate requirement of each user can be achieved at the NE point
of the non-cooperative game with minimum power allocation.
6.1 Definition. The strategy profile of transmit power p∗ is said to be the NE power allocation
for G(K,P,U) if and only if no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single player is profitable
for that player, i.e.,
ui(p
∗
i , p
∗
−i) ≥ ui(pi, p
∗
−i), ∀i, i ∈ [1, . . . ,K],
0 < pi ≤ p
max
i , (6.1)
where p−i = [p1, · · · , pi−1, pi+1, · · · , pK ] denotes the transmit power of all the other users ex-
cept user i.
At the NE power allocation, no user can improve its own utility by changing its power level
individually given the choices of others.
6.2 Noncooperative Game for MAC without SIC
In this section, the distributed power allocation for the general MAC system without SIC is
discussed. The noncooperative game is formulated.
6.2.1 System Operation with Truthful Agents
The noncooperative game of theMAC system can be formulated as an economic model, where
the consumers are the users. The trading good is the power. The producer provides the indi-
vidual prices βi to each consumer i. Since each user has a rate requirement ui to be guaranteed
and the interferences are coupled among all the users, the demand in power of each user is
dependent on others. The BS is responsible to tune the prices such that the pricing enforces the
NE power allocation to meet the rate requirement of each user in the system with minimum
power.
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There are various possibilities for pricing policies on transmit power, among which linear
pricing is the easiest to apply. However, for the general MAC system without SIC, the linear
pricing cannot implement a universal pricing mechanism [12]. In order to better illustrate the
properties of the model, we introduce the normalized distributed pricing term βi(p−i) as a
function of the individual price βi and the demand of all the other users Ii(p−i), i.e.,
βi(p−i) =
βi
Ii(p−i)
. (6.2)
6.2 Definition. Ii(p−i) is a function denoting the demand on power p for all the other users
except i.
The normalized pricing term denotes the quality of the good (power). If the interference
from other users is high, then the price of the power for user i should be lower in order to
guarantee its rate requirement. The utility function of each self-interested user is based on its
achievable rate ri(pi, p−i) and the normalized pricing term as follows.
ui(pi, p−i) = ri(pi, p−i)− βi(p−i)pi. (6.3)
When there is single link or Ii(p−i) is a constant, the utility function is ui(pi, p−i) = ri(pi, p−i)−
βipi. In the multiuser case, the interference obviously influences the quality of the good (re-
source) that user i buys. In order to express the quality loss due to interference, the higher
interference, the lower the pricing term, and thus the more power consumed. Therefore,
the pricing term βi(p−i) is normalized by the noise plus interference caused by all the other
users. Let the normalized noise plus interference to user i caused by all the other users be
Ii(p−i) = 1 +
∑
k 6=i αkpk. The utility of user iwith normalized pricing term is
ui(pi, p−i) = ri(pi, p−i)−
βi
Ii(p−i)
pi
= log
(
1 +
αipi
Ii(p−i)
)
−
βi
Ii(p−i)
pi. (6.4)
Each user plays its BRD by maximizing its own utility function ui(pi, p−i), i.e., each rational
self-optimizing user chooses its power level as the BR to the power chosen by other users.
6.3 Definition. Best response power allocation is the strategy which produces the most favorable
outcome for a player, taking other players’ strategies as given [23]. In our scenario,
ui(p
BR
i , p−i) ≥ ui(pi, p−i) ∀i, i ∈ [1, . . . ,K]. (6.5)
The game BRD for user i can be expressed as theK coupled problems ∀i = 1, . . . ,K,
max
0≤pi≤pmaxi
ui(pi, p−i) = ri(pi, p−i)−
βi
Ii(p−i)
pi s.t. ri(pi, p−i) ≥ ui (6.6)
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A basic result from game theory is that each fixed point of the BRD is an NE point, although
in general, convergence of the BRD is not guaranteed, nor is the existence of the fixed point.
In the following section, the BR power of each user i is obtained in closed form.
6.2.1.1 Best Response Power Allocation
If the prices βi = 0, transmitting with full power pmaxi is the BR of each user. Due to the pricing
term with positive βi > 0, we can conclude the users’ BR of transmit power as follows.
6.4 Proposition. For all i = 1, . . . ,K , define p
i
(p−i) as
p
i
(p−i) =
(
1
βi
−
1
αi
)(
1 +
∑
k 6=i
αkpk
)
. (6.7)
The i-th user’s best-response is given by pBRi = max(0,min(pi(p−i), p
max
i )). Moreover, the noncoop-
erative game G(K,P,U) always admits an NE {pBRi }
K
i=1.
Proof. Please refer to Proof 6.5.1.
Each user plays its BR strategy on the transmit power by taking the other users’ BR power
into consideration. In the following section, the existence, convergence and uniqueness of the
NE power allocation of the game is investigated.
6.2.1.2 Nash Equilibrium Power Allocation
The noncooperative game G(K,P,U) always admits at least oneNE power allocation {pNEi }
K
i=1.
In this part, we figure out the NE point and show that it is unique.
6.5 Proposition. The Nash equilibrium power allocation of each user i in the noncooperative game
G(K,P,U) for the general MAC system without SIC is pNEi = max(0,min(p
NE
i
, pmaxi )). With given
individual prices βi,
pNE
i
=
αi − βi
α2i
·
1∑K
j=1
βj
αj
−K + 1
. (6.8)
The noncooperative game G(K,P,U) always admits this unique NE point.
Proof. Please refer to Proof 6.5.2.
In order to ensure the positive power allocation and therefore to guarantee the rate require-
ment of each user, the following conditions regarding the number of users in the wireless
system, the individual prices and the channel states should be fulfilled.
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6.6 Corollary. In the general K-user MAC system without SIC, the rate requirement of each user i is
achieved by the NE power allocation if and only if
K − 1 <
K∑
i=1
βi
αi
< K. (6.9)
Proof. In order to ensure the rate requirement of each user, the system guarantees pNE
i
> 0 in
(6.8) by providing the prices β. From (6.7), βi < αi. Therefore, the right part of the inequality
is proved. The left part of the inequality is obtained by ensuring 1∑K
j=1
βj
αj
−K+1
> 0 in (6.8).
The existence and uniqueness of the NE power allocation for the general MAC systemwith-
out SIC is proved. In the numerical simulation, the convergence rate of the NE is shown. We
will observe that the proposed noncooperative game converges very fast.
By definition, the best-response correspondence (BRC) BR(p) = {BRk(p−k)}Kk=1 is a stan-
dard function if, it satisfies the following three properties [10]. 1) Positivity: BRk(p−k) ≥ 0
for all p−k ≥ 0, k = 1, . . . ,K . 2) Monotonicity: BRk(p
(1)
−k) ≥ BRk(p
(2)
−k) for all p
(1)
−k ≥ p
(2)
−k,
k = 1, . . . ,K . 3) Scalability: λBRk(p−k) > BRk(λp−k) for all p−k ≥ 0, λ > 1, k = 1, . . . ,K.
Now, the following proposition holds.
6.7 Proposition. The non-cooperative game G(K, S,U) admits a unique NE, and its BRD is guaran-
teed to converge to the unique NE.
Proof. The key concept of the proof is to realize that the BRC of the noncooperative game
G(K, S,U) is a standard function. From Corollary 6.6, p
i
(p−i) in (6.7) is positive for all p−i ≥ 0.
Since
(
1
βi
− 1
αi
)
> 0, p
i
(p−i) is monotonically increasing with p−i. The equality in the prop-
erty of monotonicity holds if pBRi = p
max
i or p
BR
i = 0.
Since λ > 1, it holds that λ
(
1
βi
− 1
αi
)(
1 +
∑
k 6=i αkpk
)
=
(
1
βi
− 1
αi
)(
λ + λ
∑
k 6=i αkpk
)
>(
1
βi
− 1
αi
)(
1 +
∑
k 6=i αkλpk
)
=
(
1
βi
− 1
αi
)(
1 + λ
∑
k 6=i αkpk
)
.
Therefore, the BRC in Proposition 6.4 is a standard function which satisfies the properties of
positivity, monotonicity and scalability.
It is shown in [10] that the fixed point p = BR(p) is unique for a standard function. There-
fore, standard games, are known to admit a unique NE and to have a BRD that converges to
the NE, provided an NE exists [2].
6.2.1.3 Pricing for QoS Requirements
The objective of pricing in the proposed noncooperative game G(K,P,U) is to implicitly en-
force the NE power allocation to the desired point. The NE power allocation is efficient if the
rate requirement of each user is guaranteed with minimum power. The prices β are chosen to
ensure that the efficient NE is the outcome of the game.
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As shown in [97], the power allocation is solved as a function of the rate requirement u of
each user to achieve the SINR-based QoS requirements. Recall (4.6) in Chapter 4 that
pUi =
BK
αi
·
2ui − 1
2ui
, (6.10)
where BK = 1∑K
j=1
1
2
uj
−K+1
is a constant for given uj , j = 1, · · · ,K . This power allocation is
done centrally at the system optimizer, which could be the BS for the general MAC system.
With the properly designed universal pricing term, the power allocation in (6.10) is solved
such that the rate requirement u is guaranteed for all the users.
For the noncooperative game G(K,P,U), the individual price βi is designed by the BS such
that the rate requirement ui of each user i is achieved at the NE transmit power p
NE
i . For
the problem at hand, in order to determine the individual prices, pNE
i
should be equal to pUi .
Therefore, we solve the universal individual prices for the distributed power allocation in
MAC without SIC as follows.
6.8 Lemma. In theK-user non-cooperative game G(K,P,U) of the general MAC system without SIC,
the rate requirement ui of each user i is achieved with the NE power allocation p
NE
i if the individual
price is
βi =
αi
2ui
. (6.11)
Proof. Solve the equation pNE
i
= αi−βi
α2i
· 1∑K
j=1
βj
αj
−K+1
= pUi =
BK
αi
· 2
ui−1
2ui for βi.
6.9 Remark. The region in (6.9) is equivalent to the feasible utility region in Corollary 1 in [75]
(Corollary 4.3), if the individual prices βi are given in (6.11).
The price βi is only dependent on the individual CSI αi and the rate requirement of each
user ui. Therefore, it is the local information of each user i. The users can update its individual
prices when its CSI and rate requirement change.
6.10 Remark. The closed form individual price βi allows the distributed implementation of
the proposed noncooperative game. The prices acting as a control signal can be broadcasted
by the BS to all the transmitters before the game is played.
From the power allocation in (6.10), the sum power consumption in the MAC system is
Psum(α1, . . . , αK) =
∑K
i=1
BK
αi
· 2
ui−1
2ui . If we consider the special case of identical rate require-
ments ui = u, i ∈ [1, . . . ,K], the following Lemma is provided.
6.11 Lemma. Given the identical rate requirement ui = u, i ∈ [1, . . . ,K], the sum power consumption
for the general MAC without SIC is Psum(α1, . . . , αK) = BK ·
2u−1
2u ·
∑K
i=1
1
αi
. Psum(α1, . . . , αK) is
Schur-convex in the CSI α = [α1, . . . , αK ] of all users, i.e.,
Psum(1, 0, . . . , 0) ≥ Psum(α1, . . . , αK) ≥ Psum
(
1
K
, . . . ,
1
K
)
, (6.12)
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for all αi ≥ 0,
∑K
i=1 αi = 1.
Proof. Psum(α1, . . . , αK) is a symmetric function because its value is the same for any permu-
tation of its K variables α, i.e.,
Psum(α1, α2, . . . , αK) = Psum(α2, α1, . . . , αK) = · · · = Psum(α1, . . . , αK , αK−1).
Psum(α1, . . . , αK) is Schur-convex because it is symmetric and convex.
As described in Fig. 4.8 in [98], Lemma 6.11 shows that in the perspective of energy effi-
ciency, all users distributed equally around the BS is the best scenario.
6.2.1.4 Algorithm of Noncooperative Game
The algorithm of the proposed noncooperative game for the general MAC without SIC where
the transmit power is allocated in a distributed manner is provided in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1Noncooperative game for MAC without SIC
Input:
InputK ; (u1, . . . , uK); (α1, . . . , αK); (β1, . . . , βK); n; ǫ: required accuracy
Initialize:
P0 = (p
0
1, . . . , p
0
K); p
−1
i = 0
1: while | pni − p
n−1
i |≥ ǫ do
2: for i = 1 : 1 : K do
3: Pn = (p
n
1 , . . . , p
n
K);
4: pni =
(
1
βi
− 1
αi
)(
1 +
∑
k 6=i αkp
n−1
k
)
5: n = n+ 1
6: end for
7: end while
8: return
NE power Pn = (pn1 , . . . , p
n
K)
With the provided individual price βi, each user can achieve its rate requirement ui at the
NE transmit power when playing the BRD in the noncooperative game.
The problem when there exist malicious users is analyzed in the next section.
6.2.2 Malicious Behavior for MAC without SIC
From the game theoretic point of view, the users have incentives to hide their private types.
These types include the private information, such as the CSI, or its own utility preferences.
For the noncooperative game, the users are more likely to conceal their true utility functions
to each other in order to overtake the other users when performing the BRD. In this section,
we investigate the user misbehavior where the malicious users try to enhance its own utility
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Table 6.1: Private type of user behavior
User behavior Vi
Malicious users 0 < Vi ≤ 1
Selfish users Vi = 0
Altruistic users −1 ≤ Vi < 0
0
ViSelfish
MaliciousAltruistic
1-1
Figure 6.1: Private type of user behavior
by harming the other users. The private type determines the utility function of each user and
is independent of each other.
We define Vi to denote the private type [99] of user behavior in the system. See Table 6.1. As
shown in Fig. 6.1, the private type Vi of each user i is a continuous normalized value between
[−1, 1], which denotes the extent of its behavior. For example, if user i’s private type is Vi = 1,
then it is an extreme malicious user and if Vi = −1, then it is an extreme altruistic user.
The utility function of each user iwith the private type Vi is denoted as ui(pi, p−i, Vi). Since
each user i in the noncooperative game Gv(K,P,Uv) has the individual rate requirement ui
to be achieved besides maximizing its utility function ui(pi, p−i, Vi), altruistic users who ben-
efit the other users’ utilities are not concerned in the current model. Later on, we focus on
considering the malicious behavior with private types Vi.
The utility function of user iwith type Vi for MAC without SIC is defined as
ui(pi, p−i, Vi) = ri(pi, p−i, Vi)−
βi
Ii(p−i)
pi +
Viαipi
Ii(p−i)
, (6.13)
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where the third term reflects the interference to all the other users. For malicious users, they
benefit from harming all the other users.
In the following, the noncooperative game Gv(K,P,Uv) is played for the general MACwith-
out SIC where malicious behavior exists.
6.2.2.1 Best Response Power Allocation with Malicious Users
Follow a similar procedure as in Section 6.2.1, by maximizing the utility function ui(pi, p−i, Vi),
we obtain the BR and the NE power allocation of each user i with private type Vi for MAC
without SIC.
6.12 Lemma. For all users i = 1, . . . ,K with private type Vi and utility ui(pi, p−i, Vi) in (6.13),
define p
i
(Vi) as
p
i
(Vi) =
(
1
β˜i(Vi)
−
1
αi
)(
1 +
∑
k 6=i
αkpk(Vk)
)
. (6.14)
Here β˜i(Vi) = βi − Viαi is the individual price with type Vi. The i-th user’s best-response power
allocation with type Vi is given by p
BR
i (Vi) = max(0,min(pi(Vi), p
max
i )).
Proof. Please refer to Proof 6.5.3.
Define the BR power allocation with Vi of malicious users as pBRi,m(Vi) and selfish users as
pBRi,s (Vi), respectively. We observe that the BR power allocation of the malicious user is higher
than that if all users are regular, i.e., pBRi,m(Vi) > p
BR
i . Because β˜i(Vi) = βi − Viαi < βi for
positive Vi. For selfish users, although its own private type Vi = 0, pBRi,s (Vi) is higher than
it should be to achieve the rate requirement due to the increment of transmit power of other
existing malicious users, i.e., pBRi,s (Vi) > p
BR
i . If there is no malicious users in the system, the
BR transmit power in the proposed noncooperative game with the private type V remains the
same as in Sec. 6.2.1. If Vi = 0 for all i, i ∈ [1, . . . ,K], pBRi (Vi) = p
BR
i .
6.13 Remark. Notice that the BRD of Gv(K,P,Uv) for the MACwithout SIC when considering
the malicious behavior of users is not restricted to single malicious user. The number of the
malicious users can be arbitrary integers. The BR transmit power of each user i is independent
of the private types of other users. So the users do not require information exchange about the
private types of each other to perform the BRD of the game. The property that the proposed
noncooperative game is applicable for arbitrary number of malicious users also holds for the
NE power calculation in the next subsection.
6.2.2.2 Nash Equilibrium Power Allocation with Malicious Users
In this part, we analyse the NE power allocation of the noncooperative game Gv(K,P,Uv)with
private type Vi. From (6.8), we can conclude the following result.
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6.14 Proposition. The Nash equilibrium power allocation of each user i in the noncooperative game
Gv(K,P,Uv) for the general MAC system without SIC and with private type Vi is p
NE
i (Vi) = max(0,
min(pNE
i
(Vi), p
max
i )). Given the individual prices β˜i(Vi) with type Vi,
pNE
i
(Vi) =
αi − β˜i(Vi)
α2i
·
1∑K
j=1
β˜j(Vj)
αj
−K + 1
. (6.15)
The noncooperative game always admits this unique NE point.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as in the Proof 6.5.2 by replacing the individual price
βi with β˜i(Vi).
This NE power is achieved when there are arbitrary number of malicious users. The differ-
ence in the number of malicious users implies in
∑K
j=1
β˜j(Vj)
αj
.
From Proposition 6.14, we observe that the NE power pNE
i
(Vi) is a function of types V =
[V1, . . . , VK ] of all the users in the system. However, given the values of the typesV ,
∑K
j=1
β˜j(Vj)
αj
can be considered as a constant. pNE
i
(Vi) can be seen as a function of its own type Vi and CSI
αi under the assumption that the type values remain constant for a long period of time.
6.15 Remark. Define pNEi,s (Vi) as the NE transmit power for the selfish users and p
NE
i,m (Vi) as
the NE transmit power for the malicious users, respectively. The NE power of user i when
there are malicious users in the system is higher than that when there are no malicious users,
no matter user i itself is malicious or selfish. Comparing with pNEi in (6.8), for malicious users,
due to the private type 0 < Vi ≤ 1, both parts
αi−β˜i(Vi)
α2i
and 1∑K
j=1
β˜j (Vj )
αj
−K+1
in (6.15) become
larger. Therefore, pNEi,m (Vi) > p
NE
i . For selfish users,
1
∑K
j=1
β˜j(Vj )
αj
−K+1
is larger since there exist
malicious users in the system. Therefore, pNEi,s (Vi) > p
NE
i as well.
This observation is important because the system power consumption is much higher when
there are malicious users. In order to understand the influence of the malicious behaviour on
the resulting NE power and the rate of both the selfish and malicious users comprehensively,
we have the following Proposition.
6.16 Proposition. With the individual price βi =
αi
2ui , the NE power allocation p
NE
i (Vi) in (6.15)
of each user i in the noncooperative game Gv(K,P,Uv) for the general MAC system without SIC and
with private type Vi is higher than or equal to p
U
i in (4.6). Denote p
NE
i
(Vi, V−i.u) as a function of the
rate requirement ui, i = [1, . . . ,K],
pNE
i
(Vi, V−i.u) =
1 + Vi − 2
−ui
αi
·
1∑K
j=1(2
−uj − Vj)−K + 1
. (6.16)
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Given the type value V of all the users,
pNE
i
(Vi, V−i,u) =
1 + Vi − 2
−ui
αi
·BK(V ), (6.17)
where BK(V ) =
1∑K
j=1(2
−uj−Vj)−K+1
.
The resulting rate ri(Vi) of user i is
• ri(Vi) = ui, for selfish users with Vi = 0
• ri(Vi) > ui, for malicious users with 0 < Vi ≤ 1.
Proof. Please refer to Proof 6.5.4.
When there are malicious users in the MAC system without SIC, the feasible region for the
individual prices β is different due to the values of user private types V .
6.17 Corollary. In the general MAC system without SIC, when there exist malicious users with private
types V , the rate requirement of each user i is achieved by the NE power allocation if and only if
K − 1 +
K∑
j=1
Vj <
K∑
j=1
βj
αj
< K +
K∑
j=1
Vj . (6.18)
Proof. The proof follows the same step as in Corollary 6.6 to ensure the positive NE power in
(6.15).
∑K
j=1
β˜j(Vj)
αj
−K+1 > 0 proves the left part of the inequality. And αi−βi+Viαi
α2i
> 0 proves
the right part of the inequality for positive αi.
For the uplink transmission, when the achievable rate ri(Vi) of user i is obtained by the BS,
the private type Vi of each user i can be detected.
6.18 Lemma. Given the achievable rate ri(Vi) of each user i ∈ [1, . . . ,K], the private type Vi is
obtained as
Vi = 2
−ui − 2−ri(Vi), (6.19)
where the achievable rate of each user i in the general MAC without SIC is
ri(Vi) = log
(
1
2−ui − Vi
)
. (6.20)
Proof. Please refer to Proof 6.5.5
6.19 Remark. The achievable rate of each user is only dependent on its own private type Vi
and the rate requirement ui in the proposed noncooperative game G
v(K,P,Uv) for the MAC
system without SIC when users misbehavior is considered. Therefore, no collusion can be
formed in the system.
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If Vi = 0, then ri(Vi) = ui for selfish users. Otherwise if 0 < Vi ≤ 1, then ri(Vi) > ui for
malicious users. The selfish users can achieve its rate requirement but the malicious users can
achieve better rates. The selfish users compensate the higher interference frommalicious users
by increasing its transmit power as well. The system is responsible to detect the malicious
users bymeans of Lemma 6.18 and investigate themechanism to counter the user misbehavior.
The number of the malicious usersM and the total usersK , the private type Vi and the rate
requirement ui are mutually restricted to ensure the positive NE power allocation p
NE
i (Vi),
and therefore to ensure the positive achievable rate ri(Vi).
6.20 Lemma. In the general K-user MAC system without SIC, the rate requirement ui of each user i
can be achieved if and only if the following conditions are fulfilled ∀j, j ∈ [1, . . . ,K].
0 ≤
K∑
j=1
Vj <
K∑
j=1
2−uj −K + 1 and 0 ≤ Vj < 2
−ui (6.21)
Proof. Since 2−uj < 1 and 0 ≤ Vi ≤ 1, the first term in (6.16) is positive. In order to achieve
the rate requirement ui, positive power allocation must be ensured. Thus the second term in
(6.16) should be positive as well. With β˜i(Vi) = βi − Viαi, 0 ≤
∑K
j=1 Vj <
∑K
j=1 2
−uj −K + 1
is obtained. Since the feasible region of the rate requirement is given in Corollary 1 in [75] as
K − 1 <
∑K
j=1 2
−uj < K,
∑K
j=1 Vj < 1 is satisfied.
The single type constraint in Lemma 6.20 is to ensure the positive rate ri(Vi) in (6.20). Thus
1
2−ui−Vi
> 1. With 2−ui < 1, (6.21) is proved.
6.21 Remark. Note that if the user types V do not fulfill Lemma 6.20, then the NE power
allocation pNEi (Vi, V−i) and the achievable rate of each user i is negative no matter it is selfish
or malicious. Thereby, the utility requirements u are not feasible. Then the rates of all users
cannot be guaranteed and the misbehaviour is immediately detected by the receiver.
Lemma 6.18 provides the BS the opportunity to capture themisbehavior and the type values
of the malicious users. Since the uplink transmission is considered, the BS is able to obtain the
rate ri(Vi) of all the users. If the rate achieved by user i is higher than its rate requirement ui,
then the BS detects the malicious user i and applies the punishment strategy on it with the
strategy-proof price βMi . The following section gives the details.
6.2.3 Strategy-Proof Pricing
In this section, we design the strategy-proof prices in order to counter the malicious behavior
analysed in Section 6.2.2. If the types of the malicious users are detected, then the following
mechanism can be adopted.
Denote βMi as the trigger price applied on themalicious user iwhenever it is detected by the
system. In order to counter the malicious behavior, the price given to the malicious users βMi
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should be tailored such that the BR power allocation of the malicious users are made smaller
than if it is selfish. βMi can be considered as the punishment price. The following Proposition
on cheat-proof pricing is obtained.
6.22 Proposition. In the K-user non-cooperative game Gv(K,P,Uv) of the general MAC system
without SIC, no user has an incentive to behave maliciously if the punishment price βMi is given as
βMi ≥ βi + Viαi. (6.22)
Proof. With the individual price βi, pBRi,m(Vi) > p
BR
i (Vi). Therefore, the punishment price β
M
i
should be introduced such that the BR power allocation of malicious users pBRi,m(β
M
i ) is smaller
than the BR power allocation of the selfish users, i.e.,(
1
βMi − Viαi
−
1
αi
)
Ii(p−i) ≤
( 1
βi
−
1
αi
)
Ii(p−i). (6.23)
Since Ii(p−i) > 0 and αi > 0, (6.23) becomes 1βMi −Viαi
≤ 1
βi
. Therefore, (6.22) is proved.
The punishment price βMi can be seen as the original individual price βi plus an additional
price Viαi which is proportional to the private type of users.
Whenever the malicious behavior is detected by means of Lemma 6.18, the punishment
price is applied on the malicious user. This is the rule of the proposed game and all rational
players are fully aware of the rule before the game is played. By maximizing its own utility
function ui(pi, p−i, Vi) in (6.13), no user will have incentives to harm the other users.
From Lemma 6.18, the private type Vi of each user i is detected at the BS from the achievable
rate ri(Vi) and the rate requirement ui. By observing the user misbehavior, the BS is able to
punish the targeted malicious user with the trigger price βMi in (6.22). Otherwise, the BS can
take the default value Vi = 1 for malicious users in the punishment price. Since the individual
utility ui(pi, p−i, Vi) is a linear function of the private type Vi of each user i, the optimal private
Vi for malicious users is the maximum value that fulfills the restrictions in Lemma 6.20.
6.2.4 Strategy-Proof Algorithm for MAC without SIC
If there exist malicious users in the general MAC system without SIC, the noncooperative
game works as follows. The Input values of the individual prices become β˜i(Vi) with the
private type Vi of users. If the misbehavior is detected, the strategy-proof price βMi = βi+Viαi
is adopted to the malicious user i from then on.
The strategy-proof algorithm for MAC without SIC is shown in Algorithm 2. The system
operation with all truthful agents is a special case of Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2 Noncooperative game for MAC without SIC with private type Vi and trigger
strategy in (6.22)
Input:
InputK ; (u1, . . . , uK); (α1, . . . , αK); (β˜1(V1), . . . , β˜K(VK)); ǫ: Required accuracy; n
Initialize:
P0 = (p
0
1, . . . , p
0
K); p
−1
i = 0
1: while | pni − p
n−1
i |≥ ǫ do
2: for i = 1 : 1 : K do
3: Pn = (p
n
1 , . . . , p
n
K);
4: pni =
(
1
β˜i(Vi)
− 1
αi
)(
1 +
∑
k 6=i αkp
n−1
k
)
5: if ri(Vi) > ui then
6: Vi = 2
−ui − 2−ri(Vi)
7: β˜i(Vi) = βi + Viαi
8: end if
9: n = n+ 1
10: end for
11: end while
12: return
NE power Pn = (pn1 , . . . , p
n
K);
6.3 Numerical Results
In this section, we present some numerical results of our proposed distributed power alloca-
tion framework with pricing in the general MAC system without SIC under individual QoS
requirement ui.
Define the channel gains αi =| hi |2∼ χ2n with diversity order n. Fig. 6.2 shows the system
average sum NE power
∑K
i=1 p
NE
i with different diversity orders n for different numbers of
users in the MAC. The rate requirement is set as identical ui = 0.05.
Fig. 6.3 demonstrates the convergence rate of the BRD using the chosen price βi in (6.11)
for the 2-user MAC. It is shown that the BRD converges very fast. Results of different sets of
parameters are shown. The convergence points of the power allocation are the same as the NE
power pNE
i
in (6.8), where pNE
i
= pUi in (4.6).
Fig. 6.4 shows the Price of Malice (PoM) [100] of the proposedmodel. The PoM captures the
ratio between the NE in a purely selfish system and the worst NE with M malicious players.
Formally, PoM in our case is
PoM(M) =
PNEsum(0)
PNEsum(M)
, (6.24)
wherePNEsum(M) denotes the sumpower allocation at theNEwhen there areM malicious users.
PNEsum(M) =
∑K
i=1 p
NE
i (Vi) in whichM users are with Vi > 0 andK −M selfish users are with
Vi = 0.
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Figure 6.2: Average sum power required to fulfill the QoS requirement for different number
of total users
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Figure 6.3: Convergence of the BR dynamics for the noncooperative game in MAC without
SIC
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Figure 6.4: Price of Malice vs. number of malicious users
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Figure 6.5: Price of Malice in the criterion of sum utility difference vs. number of malicious
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Figure 6.7: Comparison of BR transmit power with and without malicious user for the 2-user
MAC without SIC
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We apply the PoM(M) to evaluate how much the sum power consumption of the whole
K-user MAC system loses when there exist M malicious users. In the simulation, the total
number of users in the system is K = 10. Different sets of rate requirements of each user ui
are performed. The channel gain is set to be αi = 1. The private type of theM malicious user
i is Vi = 0.06, while Vj = 0 for theK −M selfish users. When there is no malicious user in the
system, PoM(M) is one and it is strictly decreasing with the number of malicious users. It is
observed that the PoM quickly drops from one if one or two malicious users are added. For
some QoS requirements, the PoM(M) decreases more than 20% when there is one malicious
user, which indicates the importance of the counter mechanism.
If we define the PoM in a different way as PoMu(M) =
∑K
i=1 ui(pi,p−i,Vi)−
∑K
i=1 ui(pi,p−i)∑K
i=1 ui(pi,p−i)
[99],
then Fig. 6.5 shows the curves for K = 10 users with different rate requirements u. The
CSI α and the individual prices β as well as the private types V are set to be identical. It is
shown that the more malicious users in the MAC system, the higher the difference between
the sum utilities of the systemwith and without malicious users. Since PoMu(M) is positively
correlated to 2−u, the impact of malicious users is larger if the rate requirement u is smaller.
PoMu(M) is almost linearly dependent on the number of malicious users.
In Fig. 6.6, the relation between the proposed prices β and the resulting NE transmit power
as a summation PNEsum =
∑K
j=1 p
NE
j is shown for different total numbers of users. In the simu-
lation, the individual prices are restricted to the region in Corollary 6.6 for different K . That
is the reason why the starting points of βi are different. In order to show the influence on the
resulting NE power of price choices, identical CSI and prices for all users are assumed. It is
intuitive to see that the higher the individual prices β, the lower the NE transmit power pNEi
of each user. From Lemma 6.8, to ensure the rate requirement of each user the individual price
βi is related to ui and the CSI αi. Therefore, βi in (6.11) provides the best individual price to
lead the NE transmit power of the noncooperative game to the desired point with the mini-
mum power consumption. Due to the identical CSI αi = 1, for all i, i ∈ [1, . . . ,K], the curves
in Fig. 6.6 show exactly the individual prices to ensure different rate requirement of each user
and the resulting sum NE power. The points in the figure show β = α2u as an example, where
u = 0.2 forK = 5 and u = 0.1, K = 10, respectively.
Fig. 6.7 compares the BRD transmit power of the proposed noncooperative game for the
2-user MAC without SIC when there is no malicious user and when user 2 is malicious. We
observe that both the power of the selfish user 1 and the malicious user 2 become larger com-
pared to the BRD transmit power without malicious user. It shows the importance to detect
and prevent the misbehavior of users when they allocate their power distributively.
6.4 Distributed Power Allocation for MAC with SIC
In this section, we extend the pricing for distributed resource allocation to the general MAC
with SIC. Without loss of generality, we assume the SIC is performed at the receiver with the
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SIC decoding order as [K → · · · → 1] for the K transmitters. In the following, this decoding
order is fixed if without specification. The operation for MAC with SIC is denoted as .SIC .
The linear pricing, which is linear in both the prices β and the power p is adopted for the
distributed power allocation in the generalMACwith SIC. Linear pricing is a universal pricing
for interference functions in MAC with SIC. Linear pricing for MAC with SIC is a simple and
more efficient pricing scheme. Given the non-linear pricing for the general MAC without SIC,
the whole picture of distributed power allocation inMAC underQoS requirement of each user
is provided with the linear pricing analysed in this section.
6.4.1 System Operation with Truthful Agents
Different from the characterization for the MAC system without SIC, the utility function of
each user for MAC with SIC is based on the achievable rate rSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i ) and the linear
pricing term βSICi p
SIC
i as follows.
uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i ) = r
SIC
i (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i )− β
SIC
i p
SIC
i (6.25)
The noncooperative game GSIC(K,P,U) is played among the K users. The utility function
of each user i is uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i ). Their strategy space is the transmit power p
SIC
i ∈ [0, p
max
i ].
In the following, the BRD and NE power of the noncooperative game GSIC(K,P,U) are ana-
lyzed.
The BRD of this noncooperative game can be expressed as theK coupled problems
max
0<pSICi <p
max
i
uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i ) s.t. r
SIC
i (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i ) ≥ ui ∀i = 1, . . . ,K. (6.26)
Each user maximizes its own utility function uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i ) and then plays the BRD in
the noncooperative game.
6.4.1.1 Best Response Power Allocation for MAC with SIC
The BR power allocation for the noncooperative game of MACwith SIC decoding order [K →
· · · → 1] is concluded as follows.
6.23 Proposition. For all i = 1, . . . ,K , define pSIC
i
as
pSIC
i
(pSIC−i ) =
1
βSICi
−
1
αi
(
1 +
i−1∑
k=1
αkp
SIC
k
)
. (6.27)
The i-th user’s best-response for the general MAC system with SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1] is
given by pBRi,SIC = max(0,min(p
SIC
i
, pmaxi )). Moreover, the noncooperative game G
SIC always admits
an NE {pBRi,SIC}
K
i=1.
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Proof. Please refer to Proof 6.5.6.
6.4.1.2 Nash Equilibrium Power Allocation for MAC with SIC
In this part, we figure out the unique NE point of the noncooperative game GSIC(K,P,U) for
the general MAC with SIC.
6.24 Proposition. The Nash equilibrium power allocation of each user i in the noncooperative game
GSIC(K,P,U) for the general MAC system with SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1] is pNEi,SIC =
max(0,min(pNE
i,SIC
, pmaxi )). Given individual prices β
SIC from the BS,
pNE
i,SIC
=
1
βSICi
−
αi−1
αi
1
βSICi−1
, (6.28)
where pSIC1 =
1
βSIC1
− 1
α1
. The noncooperative game GSIC always admits this unique NE point.
Proof. Please refer to Proof 6.5.7.
6.4.1.3 Pricing for MAC with SIC under QoS Requirements
The BS of the uplink transmission provides the individual price βi to each user and leads the
NE point of the noncooperative game to guarantee the rate requirement of each user with
minimum power.
The minimum power to achieve the QoS requirement ui in the general MAC with SIC de-
coding order [K → · · · → 1] is shown in [97] as a function of u. Recall (4.14) as
pUi,SIC =
2ui − 1
αi
i−1∏
j=1
2uj . (6.29)
In order to achieve theQoS requirement ui, theNE power allocation of the game G
SIC(K,P,U)
should be set equal to the power pUi,SIC in (6.29). This could be managed by providing a set
of properly designed prices βSIC . Thereby, the individual price βSICi of the noncooperative
game GSIC(K,P,U) for the general MAC with SIC is set as follows.
6.25 Lemma. In the K-user non-cooperative game GSIC(K,P,U) of the general MAC system with
SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1], the rate requirement ui of each user i is achieved with the NE
power allocation pNEi,SIC if the individual price β
SIC
i is
βSICi = αi · 2
−
∑i
j=1 uj . (6.30)
Condition
βSICi
βSICi−1
< αi
αi−1
ensures the positive NE power pNE
i,SIC
in (6.28).
Proof. Solve the equation pNE
i,SIC
= 1
βSICi
− αi−1
αi
1
βSICi−1
= pUi,SIC =
2ui−1
αi
∏i−1
j=1 2
uj for βi using the
forward substitution.
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The NE power in (6.28) pNE
i,SIC
= 1
βSICi
− αi−1
αi
1
βSICi−1
> 0 proves the condition β
SIC
i
βSICi−1
< αi
αi−1
.
In the noncooperative game proposed for MAC with SIC, the last decoded user’s strategy
on transmit power is fixed in order to meet its rate requirement due to total interference cance-
lation. From the game theoretical point of view, it is a dominant strategy. Then by backward
induction, the best strategy of the users decoded earlier will be fixed. The NE point of this
game is quickly reached. However the game still needs to be played because the best re-
sponse power allocation of the users are dependent on the strategies made by those users who
are decoded later than them. Here the analysis of user misbehavior comes into play.
6.4.2 Malicious Behavior for MAC with SIC
If there exist malicious users in the MAC system with SIC as mentioned in Sec. 6.2.2, the
private type Vi still applies. We follow the same procedure as in Sec. 6.2.2 in this section.
We assume for the general MAC with SIC, the utility function of each user with the private
type Vi is as follows.
uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i , Vi) = r
SIC
i (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i )− β
SIC
i p
SIC
i + Viαip
SIC
i , (6.31)
where the third term denotes the influence to the users who are decoded later than the user i.
Since the interference caused by the malicious user i is only due to its own power allocation, it
is simplified as the linear term to keep consistent with the linear pricing. The higher the term
Viαip
SIC
i , the more interference to the other users.
6.4.2.1 Private Type Best Response Power for MAC with SIC
Follow a similar procedure as in Section 6.4.1, we obtain the distributed BR power allocation
of each user with private types Vi and NE point with malicious users in the system.
6.26 Lemma. For all i = 1, . . . ,K with type Vi in the general MAC with SIC decoding order [K →
· · · → 1], define pSIC
i
(Vi) as
pSIC
i
(Vi) =
1
β˜SICi
−
1
αi
(
1 +
i−1∑
k=1
αkp
SIC
k (Vk)
)
. (6.32)
Here β˜i
SIC
(Vi) = β
SIC
i − Viαi is the individual price with type Vi. The i-th user’s best-response with
type Vi is given by p
BR
i,SIC(Vi) = max(0,min(p
SIC
i
(Vi), p
max
i )).
Proof. Solve pSIC
i
(Vi) for the first derivative
∂uSICi (p
SIC
i ,p
SIC
−i ,Vi)
∂pSICi (Vi)
= 0 from (6.31).
∂uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i , Vi)
∂pSICi (Vi)
=
αi
1 +
∑i
j=1 αjp
SIC
j
− βi + Viαi = 0
118 6 Pricing for Distributed Resource Allocation in MAC Under QoS Requirements
provides the result in (6.32).
The second derivative with respect to pSICi (Vi) is
∂2uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i , Vi)
∂2pSICi (Vi)
=
−α2i
(1 +
∑i
j=1 αjp
SIC
j )
2
< 0. (6.33)
Therefore, pSIC
i
(Vi) in (6.32) is the global optimum.
If there is no malicious user in the system, the result in Lemma 6.26 is exactly pBRi,SIC in (6.27)
when Vi = 0 for all i, i ∈ [1, . . . ,K].
6.4.2.2 NE Power Allocation with Malicious Users for MAC with SIC
The K users in the system play the BRD in the proposed noncooperative game and their NE
point is derived as follows.
6.27 Proposition. The NE power allocation of each user i in the noncooperative game GSIC(K,
P,Uv) for the general MAC system with SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1] and private type Vi is
pNEi,SIC(Vi) = max(0,min(p
NE
i,SIC
(Vi), p
max
i )). Given the individual prices β˜i
SIC
(Vi) with type Vi,
pNE
i,SIC
(Vi) =
1
β˜SICi (Vi)
−
αi−1
αi
1
β˜SICi−1 (Vi)
. (6.34)
The noncooperative game always admits this unique NE point.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps as in Proof 6.5.7 by replacing the individual price βSICi
with β˜SICi (Vi).
Given the individual price βSICi = αi · 2
−
∑i
j=1 uj , the NE power in (6.34) can be expressed
as a function of the rate requirement u and the private types V .
6.28 Proposition. With the individual price βSICi = αi · 2
−
∑i
j=1 uj , the Nash equilibrium power
allocation pNEi,SIC(Vi) of each user i in the noncooperative game G
SIC(K,P,Uv) for the general MAC
with SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1] and private type Vi is higher than or equal to p
U
i,SIC in (6.29).
pNE
i,SIC
(Vi,u) =
1
αi
( 1∏i
j=1 2
−uj − Vi
−
1∏i−1
j=1 2
−uj − Vi−1
)
, (6.35)
where pNE
1,SIC
(V1,u) =
1
α1
(
1
2−u1 − V1
− 1
)
. (6.36)
Proof. Insert β˜SICi (Vi) = β
SIC
i − Viαi with β
SIC
i = αi · 2
−
∑i
j=1 uj into (6.34), then (6.35) is
proved. If all the users are selfish, pNE
i,SIC
(Vi, V−i) = p
U
i,SIC, which is the minimum power
allocation in order to achieve the rate requirement ui of each user i.
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From (6.32), for malicious users with private type 0 < Vi ≤ 1, the transmit power is larger
than that of a selfish user.
For the uplink transmission, by comparing with the rate requirement of each user, the
achievable rate serves to detect the user misbehavior. The achievable rate rSICi (V ) is obtained
given the rate requirements u and the private types V of user i and all the users decoded later
than i.
6.29 Lemma. Given the private types V of the users, the rate achieved for each user i in the general
MAC with SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1] is
rSICi (V ) = log
(∏i−1
j=1 2
−uj − Vi−1∏i
j=1 2
−uj − Vi
)
, where rSIC1 (V ) = log
(
1
2−u1 − V1
)
. (6.37)
Proof. Insert the result of NE power with the malicious users in (6.35) into the rate rSICi (V ). If
the SIC decoding order is [K → · · · → 1] without generality, the rate of user 1 is
rSIC1 (V ) = log
(
1 + α1p
NE
1,SIC(V1, V−1)
)
= log
( 1
2−u1 − V1
)
. (6.38)
For the users i > 1,
rSICi (V ) = log

1 +
∑i
k=1
(
1∏k
j=1 2
−uj−Vk
− 1∏k−1
j=1 2
−uj−Vk−1
)
1 +
∑i−1
k=1
(
1∏k
j=1 2
−uj−Vk
− 1∏k−1
j=1 2
−uj−Vk−1
)

 . (6.39)
Eliminate the same items step by step in the numerator and denominator, respectively. Then
we obtain rSICi (V ) = log

 1∏ij=1 2−uj−Vi
1
∏i−1
j=1
2
−uj−Vi−1

 and rSICi (V ) in (6.37) is proved.
The extent of users’ malice is restricted by the rate requirements u. Otherwise no user can
achieve its rate requirement and the malicious users cannot benefit by the misbehavior.
6.30 Lemma. In the general MAC system with SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1], the rate require-
ment ui of each user i can be achieved if and only if the following conditions of the user private type Vi,
the total number of users K and the rate requirement ui are fulfilled.
i−1∏
j=1
2−uj (1− 2−ui) > V SICi−1 − V
SIC
i , (6.40)
2uiVi ≥ Vi−1, (6.41)
0 ≤ V SICi <
i∏
j=1
2−uj . (6.42)
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Proof. The rate requirement of each user is only achieved with positive transmit power. There-
fore, (6.40) is proved by ensuring (6.35) to be positive.
As shown in (6.37), the achievable rate is a function of the rate requirements u and the type
value V . The actual rate rSICi (V ) is higher than or equal to ui if and only if
∏i−1
j=1 2
−uj−Vi−1∏i
j=1 2
−uj−Vi
≥
2ui . Therefore, condition (6.41) is proved.
The third condition is due to the positive rate in (6.37). ui > 0, 0 < 2
−ui < 1, therefore,∏i
j=1 2
−uj < 1.
Given the expression of the achievable rate rSICi (V ) as a function of the private types of the
users, the type values can be calculated by the BS.
6.31 Lemma. In the general MAC with SIC decoding order [K → · · · → 1], the private types V of
the users are obtained by the BS given the achievable rate rSICi (V ) and the rate requirement ui.
V SICi =
i∏
j=1
2−uj −
i∏
j=1
2−r
SIC
j (V ), i ∈ [1, . . . ,K]. (6.43)
Proof. From (6.37), we obtain
Vi =
2r
SIC
i (V )
∏i
j=1 2
−uj −
∏i−1
j=1 2
−uj + Vi−1
2r
SIC
i (V )
. (6.44)
The proof is given by the forward induction. For the last decoded user i = 1, its private type is
V SIC1 = 2
−u1 − 2−r
SIC
1 (V ). Insert V SIC1 into V
SIC
2 and calculate the type values forwardly and
so on, (6.43) is proved.
Similar to Sec. 6.2.3, when the user misbehavior is detected, the strategy-proof pricing for
MACwith SIC is applied on that user with βSICi,M = β
SIC
i +Viαi. By maximizing the individual
utility function uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i , Vi), no user will have incentives to harm the other users and
therefore, the rate requirements of all users in the system are guaranteed.
Figure 6.8 compares the regions of individual prices for 2-user MAC with and without SIC
and malicious user, respectively. The colors are changed due to the transparent effect of the
overlapping regions. The CSI of the two users are set to be α1 = 1 and α2 = 2. For the case
of MAC with user misbehavior, user 2 is assumed to be malicious with private type V2 = 0.1.
User 1 is selfish with private type V1 = 0. According to Lemma 6.8 and Remark 6.9, we
understand that the region of individual prices in Corollary 6.6 corresponds to the region of
feasible QoS requirements in Corollary 4.3 of Chapter 4. In other words, for every point ui in
the feasible rate region, there exists an individual price βi or βSICi such that ui can be achieved
by the proposed noncooperative game for MAC without and with SIC, respectively.
The feasible QoS regions for MAC with and without SIC are illustrated in Fig. 4.3 and 4.4
in Chapter 4. The rate region for MAC with SIC is larger than that without SIC. Therefore in
Fig. 6.8, the region of individual prices for MAC with SIC is larger as well. The right lower
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Figure 6.8: Regions of individual prices for MAC with and without SIC and malicious user.
part denotes the SIC decoding order [2→ 1] and the left upper part denotes the SIC decoding
order [1→ 2]. Due to different CSIs, the regions of the two decoding orders are not symmetric.
The regions of prices for MAC without SIC are from Corollary 6.6 and 6.17. The regions of
prices for MAC with SIC are from Lemma 6.25 for feasible QoS requirements u. The region
of MAC with SIC and malicious user is restricted by β˜
SIC
i
β˜SICi−1
< αi
αi−1
, where β˜SICi = β
SIC
i − Viαi.
It is shown that the regions with malicious user is smaller than that without malicious user,
which implies that the rate region is declined due to user misbehavior. The regions converge
to the point A and B because of the single user power constraint pmax.
6.5 Proofs
6.5.1 Proof of Proposition 6.4
Proof. Solve the first derivative of ui(pi, p−i) to be zero with respect to pi.
∂ui(pi, p−i)
∂pi
=
αi
1 +
∑
k 6=i αkpk + αipi
−
βi
1 +
∑
k 6=i αkpk
= 0. (6.45)
The positive result p
i
(p−i) is achieved in (6.7) if βi < αi. Otherwise it is set to zero to avoid
negative power.
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The second derivative of ui(pi, p−i)with respect to pi is
∂2ui(pi, p−i)
∂p2i
=
−α2i
(1 +
∑
k 6=i αkpk + αipi)
2
< 0. (6.46)
Therefore, p
i
(p−i) in (6.7) is the global maximum.
By observing that the strategy set of each user is a compact and convex set, ui(pi, p−i) is a
continuous function with respect to the powers of all users, and concave with respect to pi,
which implies the existence of at least one NE.
6.5.2 Proof of Proposition 6.5
Proof. In order to determine the NE power allocation pNE
i
, we find the fixed point by jointly
solving the set of utility maximization problems in (6.6). We formulate it as linear equations
A+D ·p = p. Therefore, p is solved by
p = (I −D)−1 ·A, (6.47)
where the matrixD is formulated as
D =


0 A1α2 . . . A1αK
A2α1 0 . . . A2αK
...
...
. . .
...
AKα1 AKα2 . . . 0

 , (6.48)
where Ai = 1βi −
1
αi
.
Using the Cramer’s rule, p = det(B
i)
det(B) , where B = I −D. The matrix B
i is the matrix of B
where the ith column is replaced by the vectorA.
B =


1 −A1α2 . . . −A1αK
−A2α1 1 . . . −A2αK
...
...
. . .
...
−AKα1 −AKα2 . . . 1

 . (6.49)
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Nowwe solve det(Bi) and det(B).
det(Bi)
=
K∏
i=1
Ai ·
∏
j 6=i
αj · det


1 −1 . . . −1
1 1
A2α2
. . . −1
...
...
. . .
...
1 −1 . . . 1
AKαK


=
K∏
i=1
Ai ·
∏
j 6=i
αj · det


1 0 . . . 0
1 1+A2α2
A2α2
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 . . . 1+AKαK
AKαK


=
K∏
i=1
Ai ·
∏
j 6=i
αj
(
1 +
1
Ajαj
)
. (6.50)
det(B) =
K∏
i=1
Aiαi(−1)
K · det


−1
A1α1
1 . . . 1
1 −1
A2α2
. . . 1
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 . . . −1
AKαK


=
K∏
i=1
Aiαi · det


C 1+A1α1
A1α1
. . . 1+A1α1
A1α1
0 1+A2α2
A2α2
. . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . 1+AKαK
AKαK


=
∏
j
(1 +Ajαj)

1− K∑
j=1
Ajαj
1 +Ajαj

 , (6.51)
where C = 1
A1α1
− 1+A1α1
A1α1
·
∑
j 6=1
Ajαj
1+Ajαj
. Therefore, the NE power p
i
= det(B
i)
det(B) is
p
i
=
Ai
1 +Aiαi
·
1
1−
∑K
j=1
Ajαj
1+Ajαj
. (6.52)
Insert Ai = 1βi −
1
αi
, The proposition is proved.
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6.5.3 Proof of Lemma 6.12
Proof. Solve p
i
(Vi) for the first derivative
∂ui(pi,p−i,Vi)
∂p
i
= 0 from (6.13).
ui(pi, p−i, Vi)
p
i
=
αi
αipi + Ii(p−i)
−
βi
Ii(p−i)
+
Viαi
Ii(p−i)
= 0. (6.53)
We obtain
αipi + Ii(p−i) =
αiIi(p−i)
βi − Viαi
.
Therefore (6.14) is proved.
The second derivative of ui(pi, p−i, Vi)with respect to pi is
∂2ui(pi, p−i, Vi)
∂p2
i
=
−α2i
(αipi + Ii(p−i))2
< 0. (6.54)
Therefore, the global optimum of the utility function with private type Vi in (6.13) is guaran-
teed. pBRi (Vi) = max(0,min(pi(Vi), p
max
i )) ensures the positive transmit power to achieve the
rate requirement of each user under single user power constraint pmaxi .
6.5.4 Proof of Proposition 6.16
Proof. Insert β˜i(Vi) = βi − Viαi with βi = αi2ui into (6.15), then (6.16) is proved. It can be
observed that the second term in (6.16) is a constant for all the users with the given type Vj and
it is larger if there exists at least one user with Vi > 0. If all the users are selfish, pNEi (Vi, V−i) =
pUi , which is the minimum power allocation in order to achieve the rate requirement ui of each
user i.
Finally, we calculate the achievable rate of each user with pNEi (Vi). The rate requirement ui
can be achieved for the selfish users with Vi = 0. Since the power allocation of malicious users
is larger than that of selfish users, their actual rate is greater than their rate requirements.
6.5.5 Proof of Lemma 6.18
Proof. Insert pNE
i
(Vi, V−i) in (6.17) into ri(Vi).
ri(Vi) = log
(
1 +
(1 + Vi − 2
−ui)BK(V )
1 +
∑
j 6=i(1 + Vj − 2
uj )BK(V )
)
= log
(
1 +
1 + Vi − 2
−ui
2−ui − Vi
)
= log
(
1
2−ui − Vi
)
. (6.55)
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From the result of the achievable rate ri(Vi) in (6.20), Vi in (6.19) is obtained.
6.5.6 Proof of Proposition 6.23
Proof. Solve the first derivative of uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i ) to be zero with respect to p
SIC
i .
∂uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i )
∂pSICi
=
αi
1 +
∑i−1
k=1 αkp
SIC
k + αip
SIC
i
− βSICi = 0. (6.56)
The positive result pSIC
i
is achieved in (6.27) if 0 < βSICi <
αi
1+
∑i−1
k=1 αkp
SIC
k
. Otherwise it is set
to zero to avoid negative power.
The second derivative of uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i )with respect to p
SIC
i is
∂2uSICi (p
SIC
i , p
SIC
−i )
∂p2i,SIC
=
−α2i
(1 +
∑i
k=1 αkp
SIC
k )
2
< 0.
Therefore pSIC
i
(pSIC−i ) in (6.27) is the global optimum of the utility function.
By observing that the strategy set of each user is a compact and convex set, uSICi (p
SIC
i ,
pSIC−i ) is a continuous function with respect to the power of all users, and concave with respect
to pSICi , which implies the existence of at least one NE.
6.5.7 Proof of Proposition 6.24
Proof. The NE power allocation is obtained by jointly solving the set of utility maximization
problem in (6.26). pSIC is solved by the linear equations
C ·pSIC = A, (6.57)
where C is a lower triangular matrix
C =


1 0 0 . . . 0
α1
α2
1 0 . . . 0
α1
α3
α2
α3
1 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
α1
αK
α2
αK
α3
αK
. . . 1


, (6.58)
and Ai = 1βSICi
− 1
αi
.
The matrix equation with lower triangular matrix is very easy to solve by an iterative pro-
cess called forward substitution. Therefore, the NE power allocation is obtained in (6.28).
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6.6 Summary
In this chapter, we investigate the distributed power allocation by means of noncooperative
game for the general MAC system with and without SIC, respectively. Each user in the game
allocates its own power by maximizing its individual utility function. We propose the in-
dividual prices in the utility function such that the Shannon rate-based QoS requirement of
each user is satisfied at the NE point power allocation. We provide the BRD power allocation,
which converges rapidly to the NE point. The existence, uniqueness and convergence of the
NE power allocation are proved. The different private types regarding the user behavior are
analysed, especially the malicious behavior. The resulting power allocation and the achiev-
able rates at the NE power allocation for all the users with the different individual types are
observed. It is proved that with the presence of malicious users, the number of users satisfying
the QoS requirement will be less compared to a all regular user network if the power alloca-
tion remains the same. The strategy-proof mechanism is designed with the punishment price
to counter the malicious behavior, in which an additional price proportional to user types is
introduced. The private types of users are detected by comparing the achievable rates and the
QoS requirements. Numerical results illustrate the PoM and show that the BRD of the pro-
posed noncooperative game converges rapidly to the unique NE point. With the punishment
price, no self-optimizing user will have incentives to behave maliciously.
6.6.1 Comparison of Centralized and Distributed Pricing-based Resource Allocation
Comparing with the centralized power allocation investigated in Chapter 4, the resulting NE
power allocation in the proposed noncooperative game achieves the same power as in the cen-
tralized algorithm. This is the minimum power allocation which ensures the QoS requirement
of each user in the general MAC system. Therefore, the outcome of the proposed noncoopera-
tive game is led to the efficient point by introducing the individual prices into the user utility
function.
The prices in the centralized allocation is independent of the user CSI. This is important for
the central controller (system regulator) to provide the prices. Because by knowing the QoS
requirements u of the transmitters, which are the relatively long-term constants, the regulator
needs not to update the prices as a control signal rapidlywith the change of channel states. The
regulator is released from updating the CSI of users and the prices of the centralized allocation
are the long-term parameters. The regulator in this setting could be the higher layer devices
such as the wireless vender and can locate far away from the transmitters. The stable pricing
parameters also make possible the mapping between the physical layer resource allocation
and the higher layer revenue.
The individual prices provided by the BS in the distributed allocation are dependent on the
QoS requirements u and each user’s own CSI. For the BS in MAC, the CSI of all the users
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are acquired due to the uplink transmission. For each transmitters, its own CSI is the local
information. Therefore, each user can allocate its transmit power with the local optimization.
By playing the proposed noncooperative game with the individual prices, the NE power al-
location is achieved. No user will deviate unilaterally from the NE power allocation. Since the
NE point is the same as the centralized power allocation, the rate requirements of all the users
in the feasible rate region are guaranteed. From Definition 1.11, both the pricing framework
of the centralized and distributed resource allocation are universal pricing.
For the uplink transmission where single receiver exists, the centralized power allocation is
a proper mechanism. Since the prices are independent of CSI, the computational complexity
is manageable, However, there are scenarios where the centralized control is not available.
In that cases, the distributed power allocation is necessary. In our proposed noncooperative
game, each user achieves the NE power allocation by local estimation of others. Due to the
closed form results in both the centralized and distributed frameworks, the computational
complexity of both frameworks are very low.
Moreover, the two frameworks discuss different user misbehavior and cheat-proof strate-
gies. In the centralized allocation, the manipulation of the CSI is analyzed. The worst case
study to ensure the QoS requirements of all the honest users and the RG to prevent malicious
users from cheating are investigated. In the distributed allocation, since each self-interested
user maximizes its own utility, the misrepresentation of the utility function is studied. The
strategy-proof mechanism by adopting the punishment prices to the malicious users is pre-
sented. By anticipating the resulting payoff, no user in the MAC system will have incentives
to behave maliciously.
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7 Conclusions and Future Work
We investigate the resource allocation for the general MAC and BC under individual QoS
requirements, particularly we focus on the uplink MAC scenario. The single-user decoding
is assumed at the receivers, therefore interference is treated as noise. The quasi-static block
flat-fading channels are statistically independent of each other. Due to the high demand in
data rate and the scarcity of wireless resources such as power, it is important to allocate the
resource in a socially optimal manner. The theory of microeconomics, typically game theory
and mechanism design come into play.
Instead of maximizing the achievable rates, our problem deals with allocating the power
efficiently to guarantee the QoS requirement of all the users in the wireless system. The Shan-
non rate is set to be the criterion of the QoS requirement. From the game theoretic point
of view, revealing one’s true private information or announcing one’s exact preferences for
utilities might not be the best interest of users. The designed system must be capable of mon-
itoring and preventing the user misbehavior such that the power allocation ensures the rate
requirement of each user.
Pricing on the physical layer resources is proposed in our systemmodel. We investigate the
universal pricing mechanism to allocate the power in the wireless system. A pricing mech-
anism is said to be universal pricing if for all the points in the feasible utility region, there
exists a price such that the required utility is achieved by the price-based resource allocation.
Both linear and nonlinear pricing frameworks are studied. Linear pricing in the current con-
text refers to the pricing term which is linear in both the prices and power. Nonlinear pricing
refers to the pricing term which is logarithmic in power and linear in the prices. The condi-
tions for both linear and nonlinear pricing to be universal pricing are analyzed.
Typical multi-user communication systems include MAC and BC. For the general MAC
system, we show that linear pricing is a universal pricing if SIC is applied at the receiver.
The regulator is introduced into the system to provide the prices and weights (priority) to the
system. The regulator is responsible tomake sure the QoS requirement of each user is achieved
by selecting the prices. The power of each user is allocated by the system optimizer. Being a
simple device, the system optimizer allocates the power to each user by maximizing the UMP
with the given prices and weights. The prices serve as the tradeoff between maximizing the
sum rate and minimizing power. Therefore the UMP is the difference between the system
weighted sum rate and the sum pricing term. We show that with the proposed prices, the
power allocation is derived such that all users achieve their QoS requirements. The best SIC
decoding order regarding to minimize the sum power consumption is provided. Based on
the SIC decoding order, the cost terms are analyzed with regard to different orders of weights.
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Due to the uplink-downlink duality, the linear pricing based power allocation for BC with
DPC is analyzed as well. MAC without SIC is shown as a contrary example for the linear
pricing to be the universal pricing mechanism.
There are scenarios where no SIC is applied at the receiver, for example the single BS is
shared by several operators with different RANs. Nonlinear pricing is shown to be universal
pricing for the MAC system without SIC. Besides guaranteeing the QoS requirements of all
users by providing the prices and weights to the system optimizer, the regulator takes the
responsibility in detecting and preventing the users from cheating their reported CSI. The op-
timal power is allocated by the system optimizer with the given prices. The prices are shown
to be long-term values which are independent of the user CSI. Restricted by the total number
of users in the system, the feasible rate region of the general MAC is characterized. The cost
terms on power are analyzed with regard to different weights. It is possible for the selfish (ma-
licious) users to manipulate the universal nonlinear pricing scheme by reporting the lower CSI
instead of the true values for higher short-term utility. The users’ best cheating strategy and
the results on rates of all the users in the system are investigated. Derived from this, the re-
peated game is introduced to prevent users from cheating. In the RG, the trigger strategy with
the suitable trigger price is applied to the cheated user whenever the misbehavior is detected.
All the honest users are protected by the worst-case strategy. By anticipating the total payoff
of the proposed RG, we show that no user will have incentives to cheat. Numerical results
confirm that the long-term total payoff after cheating is made smaller than the honest total
payoff leading to a stable incentive-compatible operation. The nonlinear pricing mechanism
works as well for the general MAC with SIC.
The uplink transmission within the heterogeneous networks is exactly the same scenario as
MAC. From the energy efficient point of view, the MBS in the macrocell is willing to motivate
the hybrid access of femtocells, which the nearby MUEs can be served by the FAP instead of
the MBS itself. Based on the universal nonlinear pricing framework for MACwithout SIC, the
power allocation to ensure the feasible QoS requirements of all users in the system is adopted
into the heterogeneous networks. Since both theMBS and FAP are self-interested devices, two
compensation frameworks are proposed to motivate the hybrid access. The Stackelberg game
is formulated where the MBS serves as the leader with the compensation price as its strategy
and the FAP serves as the follower with the accepted number of MUEs in the hybrid access
as its strategy. The first compensation framework is based on the universal non-linear power
pricing, which provides a good connection between the physical layer power cost to the upper
layer revenue. Concerning the total power consumption of thewhole two-tiermacro-femtocell
network, an energy aware compensation framework is discussed in the second model. The
MBS determines the best compensation price by maximizing the global energy efficiency of
all the UEs in the system. And the FAP chooses the optimal number of accepted MUEs in
the hybrid access by maximizing its utility with the given compensation paid by the MBS.
Numerous simulations are conducted showing that the proposed compensation frameworks
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result in a win-win solution. The utilities of both the FAP at the femtocell and the MBS at the
macrocell are maximized with the given compensation frameworks.
For multi-user communication systems where there is single BS, centralized power alloca-
tion is appropriate. However, there are situations when central control is not possible. Here
the distributed power allocation comes into play. Each user in the system allocates its own
power by maximizing its utility function. The noncooperative game is applied to analyze the
distributed power allocation for the general MAC with and without SIC, respectively. It is
well known that the NE point of a noncooperative game might not be efficient. The individual
prices are introduced to the utility functions of each user in the proposed noncooperative game
such that the resulting NE power allocation achieves the QoS requirement of each user. We
prove that the unique NE power allocation exists. The BRD is provided to converge rapidly to
the unique NE point. The different private types regarding the user behavior are analysed, es-
pecially the malicious behavior. The resulting power allocation and the achievable rates at the
NE point for all the users with the different individual types are observed. In order to counter
the malicious behavior, the strategy-proof mechanism is designed with the punishment price,
in which an additional price proportional to user types is introduced. The PoM, the conver-
gence of BRD and the comparison of power allocation with and without malicious behavior
are illustrated with numerical results. The regions of prices are shown for 2-user MAC with
and without SIC and malicious user, respectively. The price region corresponds to the region
of feasible QoS requirements. For every point in the feasible rate region, there exists an indi-
vidual price such that the QoS requirement can be achieved by the proposed noncooperative
game for MAC without and with SIC, respectively.
The universal pricing are successfully applied to resource allocation for the multi-user com-
munication systems. By smart price selection and adaptation, the QoS requirement of each
user in the system is guaranteed. The user misbehavior is analyzed, where for centralized
resource allocation the malicious users cheat for their reported CSI and for distributed alloca-
tion the malicious users misrepresent their utility functions. Methods from game theory and
mechanism design are utilized to prevent user misbehavior. By proposing the proper punish-
ment prices, no user has incentives to behave maliciously. Furthermore, some potential future
works are discussed in the following.
7.1 Future Works
In this thesis, we focus our scenario on the single cell of multi-user communication systems
where single BS exists. The pricing framework could be implemented to multi-cell scenarios.
Besides, the general MAC or BC can be extended to interference channels.
For the heterogeneous network, it is interesting to extend results from the single macro-
femtocell cluster to multi-femtocells. The different femtocells competes for the nearby MUEs
in order to maximize their revenue. The MBS is responsible to distribute different MUEs to
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separate FAPs in order to improve the energy efficiency of the whole two-tier system. Auction
can be utilized to model such scenarios. Each FAP acting as the bidder bids for the quantity of
acceptable MUEs. The MBS acting as the auctioneer decides the winner of the auction.
The universal pricing mechanism is adopted in this thesis in order to lead the power alloca-
tion to fulfill the QoS requirement of each user in the system. Other methods besides pricing
could be interesting for the future works.
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